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Abstmct 
ABSTRACT 
'Black was the colour of our fight. ' Black Power in Britain, 1955-1976 
This thesis examines in detail the rise and fall of the British Black Power 
movement. It is the first book-length study of Black Power in Britain and the only 
one of any size written by a historian. 
It traces the roots of British Black Power in (1) the anti-colonialist 
traditions of immigrants from Africa, the Caribbean, India and Pakistarý the last 
three categories of which came to Britain in unprecedented numbers after 1955; (2) 
the influence of the contemporaneous black freedom struggle in the United States; 
and (3) most importantly the encounter with white racism in the United Kingdom. 
It argues that, although politically it was short-lived, the movement had a long- 
term cultural impact on black protest. It created a unifying black political identity 
and shifted the debate about domestic race relations onto a consideration of white 
racism as well as black immigration. 
The exaggerated violence of the Black Power movement's rhetoric, 
however, gave the state the opportunity to harass activists on the streets and in the 
courts. Police infiltrated, spied on and frequently raided Black Power groups. 
Internally, cultural nationalism and increasingly dogmatic Marxist-Leninist 
agendas created political divisions that fragmented the movement. Most Black 
Power activists came from the Caribbean: the movement failed to directly engage 
large numbers of Asians, who made up the majority of Britain's post-war 
immigrants. 
Nonetheless, Black Power's legacy was bome unintentionally in the 
11 industrial militancy of Asian immigrants in the 1970s, and deliberately by the 
Abstract 
founders of numerous social welfare and educational projects in black 
communities. The young black men who took direct action against police 
harassment and intimidation on the streets of Notting Hill and Southall in 1976 
reflected both Black Power's militant spirit and its failure to achieve its goal of a 
society built on respect and equality. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
'My biggest motivation for joining, the Panthers was my experience growing up as 
a black youth in England. " So says Linton Kwesi Johnson - poet, reggae 
musician, record label boss and former Black Power activist. The fact that Britain 
had its own Black Power movement, which ran concurrently with its more famous 
American namesake, is not widely known. British Black Power developed as a 
reaction of the post-war generation of black immigrants, who came predominantly 
from the Caribbean and Southern Asia, to their experience of white racism in 
Britain. 2 It was shaped by their traditions of resisting British colonial exploitation 
in their home countries and built on the foundations of anti-colonialism and 
resistance to racial discrimination laid by previous generations in Britain, most 
notably African students in the 1930s and 1940s. It was also heavily influenced by, 
and often mimetic of, American Black Power, which provided a blueprint for 
rebellion in the urban centres of the industrial West In Britain, however, members 
of Black Power groups neither carried guns nor engaged in violence, although their 
fiery rhetoric suggested otherwise. By the middle of the 1970s, the state's 
repressive response to the threat it perceived from Black Power had combined with 
the movement's internal tensions to undermine its coherence. Although a few 
groups that had started life as part of the Black Power movement continued to exist 
into the 1980s and 1990s, after the mid-1970s they no longer found Black Power a 
useful concept around which to organise. 
1 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
2 The term 'black' is used throughout the thesis to denote people from Affica, the Caribbean and 
southern Asia. Immigrants of Caribbean descent are referred to as 'West Indians' because this is 
how they would have described themselves at the time. The term 'Asian' refers to Pakistanis, 
Indians and, after December 1971, Bangladeshis, as well as diasporan Asians from eastern and 
southern Africa. Ile term 'black Briton' is used to distinguish the first generation of British-born 
black people from their immigrant parents. 
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Because Black Power is notoriously difficult to dcfine and its American 
form so dominates the public's perception, it is essential to explain what Black 
Power meant in the British context and what constituted the 'British Black Power 
movement' with which this thesis concerns itself. Black Power movements in the 
Caribbean, North America and Britain had different timeframes and took different 
forms in response to the demographic, cultural and historical specificities of their 
region. Caribbean academic Brian Meeks, for example, has very specifically pin- 
pointed the start of Black Power in the Caribbean as 16 October 1968, the day that 
the Jamaican government refused to let radical Guyanese academic Walter Rodney 
into the country to attend the Black Scholars conference, and says the movement 
was killed, alongside'Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, on 19 October 
1983.3 In the United States, historians generally take the starting point of the Black 
Power phase of the civil rights movement to be 16 June 1966, when Student Non- 
violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) leader Stokely Carmichael emerged from 
a Mississippi gaolhouse after his twenty-seventh arrest and proclaimed that he 
would no longer be asking for freedom but demanding 'Black Power! In his 
history of American Black Power, Peniel Joseph argues that the movement reached 
the zenith of its unity and cohesion in 1972, but had begun to decline precipitously 
- split by the power struggle between advocates of Pan-Africanism and socialism - 
by the time Carmichael and others took part in the sixth Pan-African Congress in 
Dar-es-Salaarn in 1974. And while Joseph explains that, 'For the men and women 
who found inspiration and courage through their acceptance of the ideal of racial 
3 Speech by Brian Meeks at the Internationalising Black Power conference at the Institute for the 
Study of the Americas, London, on 25 October 2007. 
4 See P, Weisbrot, Freedom Bound- a history ofAmerica's civil rights movement (New York, 
1991), P. 199. 
2 
Introduction 
equality, the movement never ended', his narrative concludes when the Black 
Panther Party ceased to function as a national organisation in 1975.5 
In Britain, the birth of the Black Power movement can be marked by the 
founding of the Universal Coloured People's Association (UCPA) in June 1967. 
The London group's mild, slightly old-fashioned sounding name belied its clear 
self-identification as a Black Power organisation - the UCPA's newspaper, for 
example, was called the Black Power Newsletter. As the UCPA was formed before 
the July 1967 London visit of Stokely Carmichael, which did a great deal to 
promote the Black Power message in Britain, one must look to Britain's own 
heritage of anti-colonial protest, both at home and in its colonies, to explain the 
emergence of the group. 'Too many people here in England, and unfortunately 
people in the United States too ... see Black Power and its advocates as some sort 
of portent, a sudden apparition, as some racist eruption from the depths of black 
oppression and black backwardness', wrote Trinidadian intellectual CLR James in 
1967. 'It is nothing of the kind. It represents the high peak of thought on the Negro 
questions which has been going on for over half a century. 6 
Precise definitions of Black Power am elusive. 7 When Black Power doyen 
Stokely Carmichael and his co-author Charles Hamilton published their 1967 
movement bible, Black Power. the Politics of Liberation in America, it contained 
no clear-cut definition! During a speech dedicated to the subject, CLR James 
3 P. Joseph, Waiting '771 The Midnight Hour. a narrative histoy ofBIack Power in America (New 
York, 2006), p. 304. The Black Panther Party formally ceased to exist in 1982. 
6 CLR James, 'Black Power its past, today and the way ahead', text of a speech given in London in 
August 1967, reprinted as a pamphlet by Frank John in 1968, p. 7. Held in the Black Documents 
file at the Institute of Race Relations (IRR). 
7 Historian William Lux wrote in 1972 that, "Me difficulty in defining a phenomenon like Black 
Power is that it has different meanings for its various adherents. It is this universality that so 
complicated the idea'. W. Lux, 'Black Power in the Caribbean, Journal ofBIack Studies 3: 2 
(December 1972), p. 207. 
8 S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, Black Power: the Politics ofLiberation In America (New York, 
1967). 
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managed no more precise a definition of Black Power than a 'banner for people 
with certain political aims, needs and attitudes ... around which they can rally'. 
9 
James did not intend the looseness of his definition to undennine what he 
perceived to be the tremendous significance of this 'banner'. For its followers it 
was, he said, 'the symbol of a tremendous change in life and society as they have 
known it'. 10 Perhaps the closest one can come to a definition is to delineate a set of 
core themes with which all Black Power movements engaged. These are: identity 
(that is culture, self-definition, pride, and dignity); community control (self- 
determination, control of the institutions of one's community and its defence); anti- 
colonialism; and internationalism. In the British movement, unity between people 
of African and Asian descent was also a principal aim. Other political objectives 
were espoused by Black Power groups in different movements at different times: 
but such goals as the revolutionary overthrow of society, Pan-Africanism, 
Marxism-Leninism, geographical separatism and the need for the black community 
to accrue political power and financial wealth, are too specific to be included in a 
general definition of Black Power. 
Britain was particularly fertile ground for the message of Black Power 
because its black subjects had been busily engaging with the movement's central 
themes throughout the twentieth century. Although British Black Power clearly 
drew inspiration from its American counterpart in many ways, there is a strong 
thread of continuity between the demands and actions of -indigenous groups like 
the UCPA and the Black Panther Movement (BPM) and those colonial subjects 
who came to the imperial metropolis in the inter-war period with the intention of 
freeing themselves from British domination. To read the memoirs of Guyanese 
9 CLR Jainesý 'Black Power', p. 4. 
10 Ibid. p 4. 
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student Ras Makonnen, who came to Britain in 1937, helped found the 
International African Service Bureau with George Padmore in the same year, and 
was pivotal in organising the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, is 
to hear Black Power in action long before Stokely Carmichael gave it a name. 
'Ours was a strictly black organisation, wrote Makonnen of the Pan-African 
Federation that organised the 1945 Congress, 'I was not going to take another 
group of white people who would want us to say later that if it had not been for 
them, we wouId never have gained our independence'. " In common with the 
majority of the politically active Africans in Britain alongside whom Makonnen 
had campaigned, he left Britain for Africa in the 1950s to continue the struggle for 
decolonisation there. However, in the 1950s and early 1960s a number of people 
and organisations in Britain provided an intellectual bridge between the struggles 
against imperialism and colonialism of the recent past and the struggles for racial 
equality of the present. People such as Amy Ashwood Garvey, CLR James, Walter X-- 
Rodney (who studied in London from 1963 to 1966), Claudia Jones, and groups 
like the Committee of African Organisations, promoted an international focus that 
situated the struggle against Britain's 'colour bar' widiin a global struggle of the 
oppressed. 
To understand British Black Power, one must explain what was meant by 
the terms identity, community control, anti-cOlOnialism and internationalism in the 
British context. Of all of these, identity is the most important and Black Power"s 
most significant and enduring achievements in Britain lay in this sphere. The first 
step to black liberation, according to the authors of Black Power, was 'to reclaim 
our history and our identity from what must be called cultural terrorism': this was 
11 R. Makonnen, Pan-Afticanismfrom Within (Oxford, 1973), p. 179, 
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12 Self no less true in post-imperial Britain than in ýpost-emancipation America. 
definition - the ability to throw off the negative stereotypes of black people, black 
culture and black countries, historically created by white imperialists to excuse and 
explain their exploitative behaviour, and recognise one's own worth - would lead, 
it was hoped, to an empowering pride, self-respect and dignity for Britain's blacks. 
The adoption in Britain in the late 1960s of the word 'black', in preference to, say, 
West Indian, to describe oneself signified this process of self-definition, and the 
term implied pride and self-respect precisely because it was independently chosen. 
The reclamation of an independent black culture was done in myriad ways in 
Britain, but most strongly through a supplementary education movement for both 
children and adults, in which they could learn about the histories and achievements 
of their ancestors and contemporaries. British Black Power, like all Black Power 
movements, also made a point of asserting that black people were part of a global 
majority. In Britain this was an important part of the development of a 'black 
consciousness', because the recognition of a shared history of oppression under the 
British might help black people of Asian and African origin to unite against a 
common foe. This was a radical message to people who had historically been 
enslaved, indentured and colonised and were still being treated like second-class 
citizens in thýlr home and adopted countries. 
Community control comprised self-help, self-sufficiency, self-determination 
and self-defence. In Britain this encompassed, among other things, a refusal to 
accept government funding and the proliferation of community-based self-help 
programmes such as supplementary schools, homeless hostels and legal advocacy 
services. Geographical separatism and black economic independence were not 
12 S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, Black Power: the Politics oftiberation In America (New York, 
1967), p. 34. 
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viable goals in Britain therefore self-determination and self-sufficiency took the 
form of creating the independent social, welfare and recreational facilities listed 
above. Self-determination also involved an attempt to establish public spaces like 
streets and markets as the domain of the 16cal community and to repudiate the 
police when it was thought they were attempting to watch, control or intimidate 
black people in public. Self-defence did not mean that British Black Power groups 
armed themselves or engaged in violence, although they did seek to protect their 
communities by patrolling the streets, monitoring the actions of the police and 
trying to provide legal advice and representation wherever possible. A commitment 
to self-defence did not necessitate violent behaviour - as politicians, the police and 
the media often believed - but rather was a decision on principle not to passively 
endure individual racism and state repression. 
If the development of a black consciousness was regarded as a process of 
interior decolonisation, British Black Power also explicitly promoted external 
decolonisation, in the form of support for anti-colonial movements in Africa and 
Asia. This was a cause espoused by most Black Power movements, but especially 
British Black Power, located in the heart of the greatest imperial power in the 
world, peopled by former colonial subjects and drawing on a strong tradition of 
metropolitan anti-colonialism. British groups expressed solidarity with, publicised 
the struggles of, and fimdraised for, African liberation movements in Mozambique, 
Rhodesia, Angola and Guind-Bissau, among others, and campaigned against 
apartheid in South Africa. They also supported Irish Republicanism and regarded 
the British army's presence in Northern Ireland as a colonial occupation. 
It was perhaps not surprising that a movement made up of people who had 
recently arrived from countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia should have a 
7 
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strong international focus, or that people who, until very recently, had been 
colonial subjects, identified with the Irish, but there was also a theoretical 
underpinning for Black Power's internationalism distinct from its anti-colonialism. 
By taking a global perspective, black people could see themselves as part of a 
world majority, rather than a national minority. This was particularly important in 
Britain, where in the late 1960s black people constituted about two per cent of the 
population. Paying attention to Third World liberation struggles also served to 
reinforce the idea that black people were as important as white westerners and 
boosted a sense of numerical strength and power. 
The final defining characteristic of British Black Power was that in Britain, 
unlike in the United States, Black Power had to bridge the racial divide between 
Asian, West Indian and African immigrants and their differing experiences of 
colonialism. This meant that interracial unity was a primary objective of the British 
Black Power movement. 'Black Power is Black Unity', explained a leaflet 
produced by the UCPA. 'Black People (that is, Africans, West Indians, Indians, 
Pakistanis, Chinese, Arabs and all non-white peoples), united together can and will 
gain their human rights. We, the black people, need the unity that gives us Black 
Power. ' 13 It is the contention of this thesis that the irrevocable establishment of 
blackness as a unifying political identity was one of the most important 
achievements of British Black Power. '[W]e have got one more chance, i. e. 
BLACK POWER! ... Therefore the truth is "IN UNITY LIES OUR 
LIBERATION"", explained the newsletter of Leicester's Black People's Liberation 
14 Front in 1971. Ile move away from this perspective to a more ethnically-defined 
13 UCPA, 'Black power is black unity', undated leaflet held in the Black Organisations file at the 
MR. 
14 Black Chat, issue 1,197 1, p. 1. Newsletter of the Leicester-based Black People's Liberation 
Party. 
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identity politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s is one of the reasons this thesis 
ends in 1976. 
There are several other reasons why this study draws to a close in 1976, 
despite the fact that two of Britain's major Black Power groups, the Black 
Liberation Front (BLF) and the Black Unity and Freedom Party (BUFP), continued 
to exist and produce newspapers until the 1990s. If CLR James placed Black 
Power at the 'high peak' of black protest politics in 1967, by 1976 it was no longer 
cutting edge. Single-issue politics that were rooted in the experiences and built on 
the strengths of black communities - for example legal defence and anti- 
deportation campaigns; black feminism; Asian Youth Movements; and social and 
welfare organisations that provided skills training and lodging for disadvantaged 
black youths - all owed a great debt to the Black Power movement but also 
superseded it politically. Finally, by 1976, the American Black Power movement, 
collapsing under the weight of sustained and brutal state repression, had ceased to 
be a useful reference point for black people looking for inspiration and a practical 
template for resisting state racism. 
Beyond the boundaries of the Black Power movement, other factors in British 
society made 1976 a watershed year. In August 1976, at the Grunwick factory in 
north London, a strike of black workers, led by an Asian woman, managed for the 
first time to inspire unequivocal support across the trade union movement. It was 
the apex of a sustained campaign of Asian-led strikes that (unintentionally) 
fulfilled the vanguard role of the black worker prescribed by many Black Power 
groups. In Westminster, the successful passage of the 1976 Race Relations Act 
meant that legal sanctions against racial discrimination were finally being applied 
in a systematic and effective manner. At the other end of the spectrum, the street 
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battle between. black youths and *the police that broke out at the Notting Hill 
Carnival in August 1976 represented a new chapter in the history of black 
resistance to the aggressive, discriminatory behaviour of the police, that was 
undoubtedly informed by, but not part of, the Black Power movement. 
British Black Power groups, because of their fear of police persecution, 
deliberately left very little in the way of written evidence, and much of what was 
kept has been left to rot in individual activists' cellars and attics. In the last five 
years a number of Heritage Lottery Fund grants have been awarded to enable the 
long-overdue process of locating, preserving and cataloguing some of these 
document collections. The London Metropolitan Archives now houses the papers 
of activists Eric and Jessica Huntley; the online catalogue of the George Padmore 
Institute lists holdings of papers from several organisations headed by John La 
Rose (see www. georgepadmoreinstitute. org. uk); South London's Black Cultural 
Archives and the Institute of Race Relations are also both in the process of 
archiving their collections. At the time of writing, however, only the George 
Padmore Institute's collection is fully open to the public and access to that is 
severely constrained by the capacity of its very small staff to accommodate 
visitors. Outside of London these problems are even more acute and it is, at the 
present time, virtually impossible to locate and access the meagre historical 
resources on provincial Black Power groups. The. thesis makes London its focus, 
therefore, by necessity. 
This does not necessarily represent an unforgivable distortion of the 
historical record though. Although most towns the size of Huddersfield and 
upwards thar had a substantial non-white population were likely to have a small 
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Black Power group, it was the London organisations, that had the most members 
and by far the greatest influence and impact. According to a 1969 survey, just 
fewer than half the black people in Britain lived in London - therefore the 
predominant focus on the capital is not entirely unwarranted. 15 As long as one is 
careful to acknowledge the existence of groups in the provincial towns and cities, it 
need not undermine one's claim to write about Black Power in Britain that the 
majority of the focus is on London. That said, the research for this thesis has 
thrown up virtually no information about whether the relatively small numbers of 
black people living in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland between 1955 and 
1976 had their own Celtic brands of Black Power, and thus it is only fair and 
accurate to acknowledge that this study sheds no light on British Black Power 
beyond the borders of England. However, until ftu-ther research uncovers evidence 
that there were distinctive Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish Black Power 
movements, the term British Black Power, as opposed to English Black Power, 
will be used. 
'A white person who ventures to speak or write on any aspect of black history must 
first of all answer the question: "'What has black history got to do with white 
people? "', wrote white journalist and author Peter Fryer in 1993.16 The answer of 
this thesis is - everything. The history of black immigration to and settlement in 
Britain is as much 'British history' as that of the economy it boosted. I Without the 
black element", Fryer concluded, 'British history is seriously and misleadingly 
15 EJB Rose et al, Colour and Citizenship: a Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969). pp. 
10 1-2, estimates that 47 per cent of non-white immigrants in Britain lived in London at the time of 
both the 1961 and 1966 censuses. Rose also notes that in 1966 non-white people comprised more 
than 5 per cent of the population of only six local authorities, all of which were London boroughs. 
16 P. Fryer, Aspects ofBrItish Histopy (London, 1993), p. 5. 
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17 incomplete'. The theoretical and methodological approach of the thesis reflects 
this belief It is a critical assessment of the growth of radical protest among the 
black immigrant communities that developed in Britain after the start of large-scale 
immigration from Asia and the Caribbean in 1955. That is not to say that black 
people did not live in Britain and contribute to its politics before the Second World 
War. There has been a continuous black presence in Britain since the sixteenth 
century, from which time black people have been important, if overlooked, agents 
in Britain's domestic history. 18 Although the black presence in Britain before the 
Second World War is a relatively under-researched area of history, it is not the 
focus of this thesis because the story of Black Power in Britain represents an even 
greater lacuna. It is not just under-researched, but unresearched. 
African American historian Manning Marable has described authentic 
black history as 'a historical narrative in which blacks themselves are the principal 
actors and that the story is told and explained largely from their own vantage 
point'. 19 Although written by a white historian, this thesis aspires to 'authenticity' 
in that it seeks to analyse black agency in the post-war period. As broad a range of 
sources as possible has been consulted and, to give voice to black agency, 
wherever possible the thesis references independent sources from within black 
communities in favour of interpretative ones from the white community and the 
state. Hence, underground black newspapers are used more liberally than articles 
17 Ibid., p. 6. 
'a See, for example, P. Fryer, Staying Power., the History of Black People in Britain (London, 
19841 Gretchen Gerzina, Black England. Life Before Emancipation (London, 1995), F. Shyllon, 
Black People in Britain. 1555-1833 (London, 1977) and 1. Walvin, Black and "ite. the Negro 
and English Society (London, 1973). 
'9 M. Marable, Vving Black Hlslory. ý How Reimagining the African-American Past Can Remake 
America's Racial Future (New York, 2006), p. 21. 
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from the mainstream white press. 20 Similarly, the records of black groups like the 
Indian Workers' Association of Great Britain are preferred to the records of white- 
dominated organisations; like the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination 
(CARD), even though many black people participated in the latter. It privileges the 
actions of the radical grassroots groups, such as the UCPA, above organisations 
like the National Council of Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), which were 
convened by the state and had handpicked black members. Unsurprisingly, given 
their unwillingness to leave written evidence that might be used against them, 
original documents from Black Power and other community groups are much 
scarcer than information produced by the state, the mainstream media and the 'race 
relations industry'! ' However, often the best sources of empirical information 
about Black Power groups' activities were Special Branch surveillance files, 
prosecution case notes and police records, which also contained within them Black 
Power literature confiscated during raids. To augment this primary literature, 
fifteen former activists have been interviewed, most of whom claimed it was the 
first time any historian - black or white - had asked about their involvement in 
Black Power. Their memories both contextualise the written sources and fill in 
some of the gaps that remained after a close reading of them, although as with all 
oral history the subjectivity of personal recollection and the distorting effect of 
hindsight must always be taken into account. 
'Me thesis quite deliberately does not often engage with the intellectual 
pyrotechnics of black cultural studies scholars like Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy. 
This is because after two early and important works, Policing The Crisis: 
20 The exceptions to this are the articles of white journalists Colin McGlashan (7he Observer) and 
Derek Humphry (The Sunday I-Imes), who were respected by many black people for their 
perceptiveness about white racism and thus allowed unparalleled access to radical black groups. 
" For an explanation of the slightly pejorative term 'race relations industry' see page 16. 
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Mugging, the State and Law and Order and The Empire Strikes Back: Race and 
Racism in 70s Britain, Hall and his disciples' work descended into jargon-heavy, 
post-structuralist. abstruseness that had little to say about the daily motivations of 
black people. 22 Furthermore, its hostility to empiricism and material analysis 
means that cultural studies has little to tell us about the social and economic 
conditions that gave rise to black political radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s. This 
criticism has been made in various commentaries on black cultural studies ?3 To 
this author, cultural studies' critique of traditional historical methodology also 
seems a little defeatist, as if it assumes that genuinely assessing the economic, 
political and social activities of black people will not reveal a substantial 
contribution to British society. 
As previously noted there is no historical account of the Black Power 
movement in Britain. There are also surprisingly few book-length histories of post- 
war British race relations. A good indicator of how much historians have neglected 
the area is the fact that the most comprehensive and usefut book on the subject, 
Peter Fryer's Staying Power. the History of Black People in Britain, was written 
more than twenty years ago ?4 Fryer's book, the work of a journalist, has been 
justly criticised by feminist Catherine Hall for having "almost nothing to say about 
women' and by academic Tariq Modood. for neglecting the contribution of Asian 
22 S. Hall, C. Critcher, J. Clarke and B. Roberts, policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law 
and Order (London, 1978) and Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studiesý The Finpire Strikes 
Back: Race andRacism In 70s Britain (London, 1992). 
23 See J. Bourne, 'Racism, Postmodernism and the Flight from Class', in D. Hill, P. McLaren, M. 
Cole and G. Rikowski (eds), Postmodernism in Educational Theory. Education and the Politics of 
Human Resistance (London, 1999), A. Sivanandan, 'All that melts into air is solid. the hokum of 
New Times', Race & Class 31: 3 (1990) and A. Sivanandan, 'Le trahison des clercs', Race & Class 
37: 3 (1996). Coming from a very different perspective, sociologist Tariq Modood has robustly 
criticised Paul Gilroys work on the black experience in Britain for excluding the experiences of 
Asian immigrants. See T. Modood, 'Political Blackness and British Asians', Sociology 28: 4 (1994) 
and P. Gilroy, Mere Ain't No Black in 7he Union Jack (London, 1992) and The Black Atlantic: 
Madernity and Double Consciousness (London, 1993). 
24 Fryer, Skying Power. 
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immigrants. 25 Indian journalist Dilip Hiro's Black British, "ite British, strikes a 
more even balance between the histories of Asians, Africans and West Indians in 
Britain, but comes to a close in the late 1960s just as the Black Power movement 
was beginning ?6A former Communist, who had been expelled from the British 
party for his critical reporting of the invasion of Hungary in 1956, Fryer remained 
a committed socialist. Hence Sta)lng Power approaches the history of British race 
relations firmly from the left, and clearly shows the influence of fellow Marxist A. 
Sivanandan, whose polemical essay, 'From Resistance to Rebellion: Asian and 
Afro-Caribbean Struggles in Britain', has remained highly influential since its 
publication in 198 1? 7 Sivanandan's personal experiences as an immigrant from 
Sri Lanka in the 1950s and a fellow traveller of the Black Power movement and his 
professional career as the head of Europe's fa-st race relations library from 1964 
and then the director of a radicalised Institute of Race Relations from 1972, gives 
him a unique insight into the history of race relations and black resistance in 
Britain. His convincingly argued thesis on the economic fiinction of British racism 
in 'From Resistance to Rebellion' is a useful starting point for scholars of British 
race relations. 
The modem academic discipline of race relations was founded in 1947 with 
the publication of anthropologist Kenneth Little's Negroes in Britain: a Study of 
" C. Hall, "itA Afale and Mfda7e Class (Cambridge, 1992), p. 19. In spite of this criticism Hall 
also describes ShWing Power as 'vital'. Modood's criticism is that, 'Despite the usual prefatory 
remarks about Asians as an integral part of black Britain [Staying Power] devotes less am twenty 
of its six hundred pages to them'. T. Modood, 'The limits of America! rethinking equality in the 
changing context of British race relations' in B. Ward and A. Badger (eds), The Making ofMartin 
Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 182. 
26 D. Hiro, Black British. Me British (London, 197 1). 
27 A. Sivanandan, 'From Resistance to Rebellion: Asian and Aft-Caribbean Struggles in Britain', 
Race& Class, 23: 2 (198 1). 
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Race Relations in English Society. 28 The idea of writing a book about the living 
conditions of the black community in Britain had come to Little during a field trip 
to measure the head sizes of black children in Cardiff. Until large-scale 
mumgration to Britain fromlAsia and the Caribbean after 1955 began to make 
black faces more visible in British society, scholars continued to approach the 
study of black immigrants in the same way they would an exotic tribe in the 
Amazon basin. However, Little ýnd his prot6gds' work was important to the future 
study of race relations because it helped to overturn the widely accepted theory that 
races were biologically different, thereby repudiating the eugenic claims of 
scientific racism. 
The state's acknowledgement by the mid-1960s that Britain had become a 
multiracial society coincided with the rising popularity of the new discipline of 
social science. The political consensus at the time was that black immigrants were 
straining Britain's welfare state by occupying council housing, spreading disease, 
undercutting wages and, paradoxically, living off social security. These were 
exactly the sorts of research areas to which the burgeoning ranks of sociologists 
wanted to apply themselves, hence from the mid-1960s onwards the study of 
British race relations became their preserve. They were awarded numerous posts in 
universities and large, well-funded race relations bodies such as the Institute of 
Race Relations and, from 1968, the Runnymede Trust. The enormous volume of 
work they produced earned this new area of study the reputation of being a race 
relations 'industry'. 
7' Y, Little, Negroes in Britain: a Study of Race Relations in English Society (London, 1947). For 
references to Little as a founder of race relations see C. Waters, '"Dark Sti-angeis" in our midst: 
discourses of race and nation in Britain, 1947-1963', Journal ofBrItIsh Studio, 36: 2 (1997), p. 209; 
M. Banton, 'Three current issues in ethnic and racial studies'. British Journal of Sociology 56: 4 
(2005), p. 623 and 1. Duffield, 'History and the historians', History Today 31 (1981), p. 34. 
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Although well-meaning, the majority of the output of the race relations 
industry was predicated on two racist assumptions: firstly, that 'white British 
society was the civilised norm to which others should both aspire and conform and 
secondly, that the biggest obstacle to integration was the inassin-fflable volume of 
black immigrants. 29 Until the publication in 1967 of the Race Relations Board- 
commissioned Report on Racial Discrimination, many academics questioned 
whether racial discrimination actually existed in Britain, viewing disharmony 
between whites and blacks as merely cultural misunderstanding (usually on the 
part of the latter)? o As late as 1973, unwittingly racist assumptions such as, 'The 
puritan influence on the English outlook has meant that many English people feel 
more guilty about wrongdoing than many Asians', were still found in books by 
leading race relations sociologists? ' The statistical data collected in many of these 
books, however, can be very useful. Dubbed 'a Myrdal for Britain, the Institute of 
Race Relations" Colour & Citizenship: a Report on British Race Relations is an 
invaluable compendium of facts and does contain some progressive analysis. 32 On 
the whole, however, the best approach towards the work of race relations experts in 
the 1960s is that of historian Chris Waters, who recommends 'ýe-read[ing] the texts 
... within their historical context, as texts, especially for the ways in which they 
29 Leading works from this period include: M. Banton, The Coloured Quarter. Negro Immigrants in 
an English City (London, 1955); S. Patterson, Dark Strangers: A study of West Indians in London 
(Harmondsworth, 1965) and C. Peach, West Indian Migration to Britain: a Social Geography 
(London, 1969). 
30 Political and Economic Planning, Report on Racial Discrimination (London, 1967), published the 
following year as W. Daniel, Racial Discrimination in England. Based on the P. E. P. Report 
(Harmondsworth, 1968). 
31 M. Banton, Police Community Relations (London, 1973), p. 122. 32 A Swedish economics professor, Gunnar Myrdal published a pathbreaking and comprehensive 
survey of race relations in the United States in 1944. E. J. B. Rose et al, Colour and Citizenship: A 
Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969). G. Myrdal, An American Dilemmm the Negro 
Problem and Modern Democracy (New York, 1944). 
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constituted the "experience" they claimed, transparently and unproblematically, to 
document'. 33 
Finding secondary sources written from a black perspective in the 1970s is 
easier, not least because in 1972 the staff of the Institute of Race Relations voted 
out their management and refused to undertake any more research they felt did not 
reflect the concerns of the black community. A leaflet from June 1974 advertising 
the first issue of the Institute's newly renamed academic journal Race & Class 
explained that, thenceforth, its editorial imperative would be, 'The people we are 
writing for are the people we are fighting for. 34 Edited by Sivanandan, Race & 
Class's commitment to publishing politically engaged and plainly-written articles, 
often by non-academics and activists, has meant that it remains the pre-eminent 
publication for scholars seeking to learn about black history from a black 
perspective. 
35 
In the highly politically polarised. 1980s, most academic work on race 
relations wore its ideology on its sleeve. Much of the discourse on racism became 
the preserve of postmodemists, critical theorists and culturalists, who explored 
themes such as ethnic identity and the transmission of culture. Hard politics drove 
the work of others. The flourishing anti-fascist movement, which grew in response 
to a resurgence of support for the National Front, inspired some academics to 
construct more straight-forward, political analyses of race relations. They primarily 
charted the history of white racism, however, and only dealt with black responses 
33 Waters, 'Dark Strangere', p. 2 10. Italics original. 
34 Advertising leaflet, June 1974, held, unfdedý at the UM 
35 'In considering the overall ten-ain of black political organization and ideology, the most fruitful 
source will be the material produced from within these groups themselves, such as the joumals (e. g. 
Race and Class [sic].... G. Bcn-Tovim and J. Gabriel, 'The politics of race in Britain, 1962-79: a 
review of the major trends and of recent debates', in C. Husband (ed), Race in Britain: Continuity 
and Change (London, 1982), p. 166. 
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to it in pasSing? 6 Feminist publishing house Virago broke new ground in 1985 by 
printing the first history of black women's independent political development. 
37 As 
black women only began to organise as women in the late 1970s, however, only 
the seeds of black feminism are considered in this thesis. Black Marxism found its 
apotheosis in the work of Sivanandan and Ron Raindin's broad, synthetic survey of 
the interplay of race and class in the twentieth century, The Making of the Black 
W ki ClaS in B it i . 
38 or ng Sr an 
Work on British race relations in the last twenty years has, perhaps 
understandably, tended to focus on examining the causes and consequences of the 
riots of 1981 and 1985. Although a discussion of the riots of the 1980s is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it does suggest that the state's successful 
suppression of the Black Power movement in the 1970s contributed to the 
intolerable frustration of the communities that revolted in the 1980s. Writing about 
the 1980s, Paul Gilroy described 'The protracted resistance of black youth against 
the lowly racial fate that had been prescribed for them', arguing that, 'A special 
daring, shaped above all by hopelessness, was what generated the tides of 
protest'? 9 This thesis contends that Black Power, while it failed to avert the 
prescription of a 'lowly racial fate', did equip future generations with the ability to 
recognise such a fate and rebel against it, constructively or otherwise. What Gilroy 
refers to as the 'ieckless despair' of rioting black youth in the 1980s can 
36 IL Thurlow, Fascism in Britain (London and New York, 1987) and C. Holmes, John Bull's 
Island. lmmiýration and British Society 1871-1971 (Basingstoke, 1988) both contain short but 
useful discussions of the role of the far-right in post-war British race relations. 
37 B. Bryan, S. Dadzie and S. Scafe, The Heart ofRace: Black Women's Lives In Britain (London, 
1985). In 1978 Virago had published Finding A Voice, Amrit Wilson's equally path-breaking 
polemic on Asian women's dual oppression by white society and their own communities. A. 
Wilson, Finding a Voice: Asian Women In Britain (London, 1978). 
38 See A. Sivanandan's collection of essays, A Different Hunger (London, 1982) and PL Ramdin, 
71e Making of the Black Working Class in Britain (Aldershot, 1987). Ramdin's coverage of the 
post-war period is largely a synthesis of the historical narratives of Fryer and Hiro and the 
dialectical materialist analysis of Sivanandan. 
39 P. Gilroy, Black Britain., a Photographic History (London, 2007), p. 218. 
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alternatively be interpreted as a targeted response against the policeýo This is an 
argument for another time, but it is worth pointing out that historians who analyse 
the riots in terms of the policies of the Thatcher government and the pathology of 
the black community, would benefit from considering the history of Black Power, 
which a decade earlier represented a more constructive response to similar 
conditions of social and economic inequality and police injustice, and was quashed 
by the state. 
This thesis traces the rise and fall of the Black Power movement and is therefore 
organised chronologically. However, as it is also concerned with the intellectual 
development of Black Power as a theory, the chapters have different, analytical, 
themes. The origins and evolution of the Black Power movement in Britain were 
inherently transnational. The British movement drew inspiration from both its 
American namesake and the struggles against imperialism, both in the countries 
from which its members had emigrated, and in Britain earlier in the twentieth 
century. The state's response to the movement was also influenced by events in 
other nations, particularly its unease about African American riots in the United 
States and the fear that Caribbean Black Power would stand in the way of neo- 
colonialism in the Commonwealth. Throughout its evolution, though, the 
movement was nourished by white British racism, expressed through the state in 
the form of racially discriminatory immigration laws and the inability of police and 
policy-makers to understand that militant black politics was a reactive rather than 
an aggressive phenomenon. 
40 lbidL, p. 218. 
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Chapter one starts with a brief look at the intellectual roots and evolution of 
the British Black Power movement, focusing on the anti-colonial politics of 
African and West Indian students in Britain in the inter-war years. It then considers 
the impact of the American civil rights movement on the newly arrived black 
immigrants to Britain between 1955 and 1965. By examining why mimetic 
activities like the Bristol bus boycott of 1963 and the foundation of the Campaign 
Against Racial Discrimination in 1965 fared so badly, it shows how different the 
societal and race relations contexts were in Britain and the United States during 
this period. The second half of the chapter traces the development of a genuine 
political consciousness among black immigrants after 1955, arguing that it was the 
experience of white British racism, particularly in the form of discriminatory 
unmigration legislation, which both politicised and united them. Abandoning 
support for the Labour Party in 1965, they began to realise the necessity of 
independent political organisation to campaign for equal rights. 
Chapter two contrasts the widespread indifference of black immigrants to 
the non-violent phase of the American civil rights movement with the 
identification of a number of British black activists with American Black Power. 
Showing how British society became increasingly racially POlarised in the second 
half of the 1960s, it argues that it was the widespread press coverage surrounding 
the London visit of charismatic African American radical Stokely Carmichael in 
July 1967 that transformed the fledgling Black Power movement in the capital into 
a national phenomenon. The second half of the chapter uses interviews and 
primary evidence to elucidate the composition and activities of Britain's four most 
important Black Power organisations as well as Michael Xs Racial Adjustment 
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Action Society, which prc-dated the Black Power movement by two years, but was 
regýrded by many as part of it. 
Chapter three assesses these groups' achievements and failings during the 
life of the Black Power movement. It argues that the influence of Black Power 
spread far beyond its tiny official membership, that it fundamentally changed the 
way black people thought of themselves, created a black political identity capable 
of uniting West Indians, Africans and Asians, and radicalised the study of race 
relations. The movement's tenets of education, self-help and community work 
enriched its members' lives and strengthened the communities in which they 
operated. However, weak leadership and a lack of ideological coherence meant that 
the movement was unfocused in its early years. This was rectified in the 1970s by 
heavy discipline and doctrinal rigidities that splintered the groups and eventually 
led to a divide between cultural nationalist organisations like the BLF and Marxist- 
Leninist groups like the BUFP and BPM, which changed their focus from race to 
class during the movement's declining years. Although a few Black Power 
organisations; continued to exist after the mid- I 970s, by then most politically active 
black people, while not hostile to Black Power, found it too blunt a conceptual 
tool. What had been referred to as the Black Power struggle, became simply the 
black struggle. 
Chapter four assesses the relationship between black radicals and the 
British state. It looks at how black people were discriminated against by the police 
and the courts and examines in detail three pivotal trials of Black Power activists. 
It shows that the goverment had an unwritten policy of harassing Black Power 
activists and their organisations through the law and used suspended sentences as a 
form of social control. The British government kept a close eye on how the 
22 
Introduction 
American government was dealing with radical African American dissent and 
borrowed from President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society initiatives. The 
British government's Urban Programme brought many former Black Power 
activists into the orbit of the state by funding their social welfare projects, 
divorcing them from their political objectives in the process. It also passed a wide- 
ranging and effective Race Relations Act in 1976 in an attempt to remove some of 
the black community's grievances. The government's success in destabilising the 
Black Power movement and its attempts to prove its good faith to the black 
community through funding programmes and equality legislation ultimately did 
not diminish black disaffection with the state because of its failure to address the 
crucial issue of racism in the police force. 
The thesis concludes by assessing the history of Asian political activity in 
the 1960s and its links to Black Power, and explains why the latter held little 
ath-action for most Indians and Pakistanis. it points out that Asians' strong sense of 
community and their commitment to maintaining their traditions, customs and 
religious practices in Britain made them cultural nationalists by default. It further 
argues that, in the 1970s, the remaining Black Power groups' belief in the primacy 
of class oppression and the vanguard role of the black worker was realised on the 
shop floor by Asians, who provided the backbone of black industrial militancy. 
Although the overthrow of capitalism was not their objective, their success in 
overturning entrenched trade union racism provided an important step towards 
uniting the black and white working classes and ensuring the more equitable 
treatment of black workers. 
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'The Black Panthers were saying the sort of things I wanted to hear and doing the 
sort of things I thought necessary to do', remembers Linton Kwesi Johnson. 41 
Within this statement lies the essence of Black Power's appeal in Britain. Far more 
than just a facsimile of the American movement, British Black Power was perhaps 
the fu-st independent attempt to address the concerns of black people in Britain in 
an uncompromising way. The epicentre of British Black Power was London, but it 
was a national movement, however numerically small, disjointed-and short-lived. 
Black Power developed in relation to black people's lived experiences, both under 
i colonial rule in their home countries and as the lowest rung of the British 
underclass, and spoke to their domestic and international concerns. Its message of ý 
black pride was transformative, both for its members and British society. Its 
history needs to be told. 
41 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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1965 
Introduction 
Between 1955, when the main thrust of post-war immigration from the Caribbean and 
southern Asia began, and I July 1962, when the Commonwealth Immigrants Act closed 
the country's open door to its colonial and Commonwealth subjects, Britain gained a 
substantial black population. But even after the passage of its fust Race Relations Act in 
1965, Britain still had a long way to travel before it fully adjusted to the idea of being a 
multiracial society. Moreover, during this period most immigrants from Asia, Africa 
and the Caribbean intended only to be a migrant population who would work hard, save 
money and return home. Initially, therefore, they were less interested in British politics 
than in events back home. Having experienced British race relations as its colonial 
subjects, they had no idea what racism in the metropole would be like and in many 
cases did not immediately identify it. A 1967 survey, jointly commissioned by statutory 
bodies the Race Relations Board and the National Council for Commonwealth 
Immigrants (NCCI) concluded that, on the whole, black immigrants thought that racial 
discrimination affected their lives less than it actually did. - 
The politicisation of black immigrants that took place between 1955 and 1965 
was primarily driven by their experiences of white British racism. The 1958 White-on- 
black riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham delivered a sharp message to the 
predominantly West Indian, but also African and Asian, immigrants living there that 
many white Britons were far from happy about the arrival of their fellow citizens from 
the New Commonwealth. The immigrants, whose colonial educations had prepared 
them to find Britain a benevolent, tolerant country that would make no distinction 
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between them and its indigenous population, began to recalibrate their expectations. Yet 
they continued to believe that the Labour Party, because of its egalitarian views on 
immigration, would represent their interests in parliament, and therefore kept faith in 
British electoral politics. By the mid-1960s, this faith had been severely undermined by 
a series of legislative measures passed under Labour, beginning with the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act and culminating in a 1965 %ite Paper, Immigration 
from the Commonwealth, that reversed the party's commitment to unregulated 
Commonwealth immigration. In reaction to a growing impression that it was not just the 
British people but the British state that was racist, and the realisation that economic 
factors meant their stay in Britain was unlikely to be brief, black immigrants began to 
look for ways to come together to fight for their political rights. In developing a group 
political consciousness they drew on the various anti-colonial traditions of their home 
countries and the political struggles of earlier generations of black people in Britain, but 
also began to listen to the radical voices emerging from the United States. 
Black people had been a continuous, if small, presence in Britain for over 500 
years, but the level of black immigration after 1955 represented a new phenomenon. 
'Me Labour government had noted with a distinct lack of enthusiasm the arrival of 492 
mainly Jamaican ex-servicemen on the SS Empire Windrush in June 1948 - seven years 
later, more than 20,000 immigrants from the Caribbean arrived in Britain! Hence, in 
1955 the British government decided to start collecting immigration statistics for the 
' Although historians' estimates differ, they all show a marked increase in immigration from the 
Caribbean between 1952 and 1954. DWp Hiro estimated that the number of Caribbean immigrants 
entering Britain increased from approximately 1, ooo per year between 1948 and 1952 to just under 
11,000 in 1954 and more than 22,000 in 1955. See D. Hiro, Black Britis& "Ite British (London, 1971), 
pp. 8-9. Peter Fryer made higher estimates but followed the same pattern, writing that yearly immigration 
fi-om the Caribbean jumped from a plateau of 2,000 in 1952 and 1953 to 24,000 in 1954. See P. Fryerý 
&aying Power. 7he History of Black People in Britain (London, 1984), p. 372. For a discussion of the 
government's reaction to the arrival of the SS Windrush, see S. Joshi and B. Carter, 'The role of Labour 
in the creation of a racist Britain', Race & Class 25: 3 (1984), pp. 57-61. 
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countries of the New Commonwealth. 2 The increased immigration to Britain from the 
Caribbean in 1955 was partly caused by the fact that, after 1952, the United States, 
West Indians' preferred migration destination, no longer let them into the country. The 
McCarran-Walter Act ended the practice of allowing West Indians to enter the United 
States under the category of British citizens and set a new Caribbean immigration quota 
of just 800 per year? As saving up for a passage to Britain took considerably longer 
than it had for nearby America, the impact of the McCan-an-Walter Act took a few 
years to be felt in the UK, but from the mid-1950s immigration from the Caribbean 
increased considerably. 
Immigration from southern Asia was slight during the 1950s. This was partly 
because until 1960, when the Indian Supreme Court ruled the practice illegal, the 
Pakistani and Indian governments had a gentlemen's agreement with Britain to reduce 
emigration by restricting the issue of passports. From 1960 onwards the British 
economy's need for more workers, the encouragement and financial assistance fi-om 
relatives and ffiends already in Britain, and the fear of pending hinmigration control, 
resulted in immigration from India and Pakistan rising dramaticallyý The majority of 
the Asian iinunigrants were young single men. Indians were predominantly Sikhs from 
the Punjab* or, in far fewer. numbers, Hindus from Gujarat. Pakistanis travelled from 
Sylhet in East Pakistan or Mirpur in West Pakistan and were Muslim. Ironically, it was 
the threat of controls that proved to be the biggest stimulus to immigration from 
' Ile New Commonwealth comprised countries in the Caribbean, Asia, East and West Africa and the 
Mediterranean. What differentiated these nations from Old Commonwealth countries like Australia and 
Canada was that their populations were predominantly non-white. 3 Hiro, Black British, p. S. 
4 Hiro estimated that the combined immigration from the two countries almost quadrupled from 7,500 to 
48,000 between 1960 and 1961. See ibid., p. 108. 
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southern Asia, which had outstripped that from the Caribbean by the time the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act came into effect in 1962ý 
Immigrants from Africa were far fewer and their stays much shorter, although, 
as sociologist A. T. Carey warned in 1955, 'Accurate statistics are not yet available, as 
no separate records of Negroes and other Coloureds are kept by the authorities'. 
6 Home 
Office estimates on the entry and exit of African immigrants from East and West Africa 
between 1955 and I July 1962 show a small, transient population. According to these 
figures, slightly more Africans (240) left Britain than entered in 1960, and most years 
7 saw a net inward migration of less than 2,500 Africans. Data from the 1951 and 1961 
censuses show a fourfold increase in the number of West African immigrants living in 
Britain - from 5,600 to 19,800.8 (The census defmed West Africa as Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone; the countries from which the majority of African immigrants 
to Britain hailed. ) By way of comparison, the 1951 and 1961 censuses estimated the 
number of Indians living in Britain to be 30,800 and 81,400 respectively. 9 Compared to 
the numbers of immigrants from the Caribbean and southern Asia, therefore, few 
Africans came to Britain. It was perhaps this paucity of numbers that led the authors of 
Colour and Citizenship to almost completely disregard African immigrants in their 
supposedly comprehensive survey of British race relations, setting a trend followed by 
many subsequent studies. The political contribution of Africans, if not their numbers, 
-5 By the government's own account, immigration from the New Commonwealth (including Cyprus and 
Malta), which had only risen above 50,000 once between 1955 and 1960 and had been as low as 21,600 
in 1959, shot up to 136,400 in 1961 and 94,900 in the six months before the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act became law on I July 1962. See Immigration From The Commonwealth (London: IIMSO, 1965), p. 
2. 
6 A. T. Carey, Colonial Students (London, 1955), p. 10. Carey estimated the total population of non-white 
people in Britain in 1955 at 50,000. 
R. B. Davison, Black British Immigrants to England (London, 1966). p. 3. Net inward migration, rather 
than the total number of immigrants from Africa arriving each year, has been used because a large 
number also emigrated each year, The same table of figures shows that this was also true of immigration 
from India until 196 1, although the overall volume of immigration was far higher. 
8 Census statistics quoted in E. J. B. Rose et al, Colour and Citizenship (London, 1969), p. 72. 9 lbid., p. 72. Davison estimates the inward migration of West Africans in 1961 as 6,960. Davison, Black 
British, p. 3. 
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made their presence in Britain significant, though, and studies of British race relations 
that do not reflect this make an important omission. 
The first half of this chapter explores the British roots of the political 
consciousness that had begun to emerge among black immigrants by 1965, evaluating 
the impact of black political activity in the first half of the twentieth century, as well as 
in the post-war period. For the newly arrived immigrants, their fast years in Britain 
were spent establishing themselves financially and adapting to their new, usually 
hostile, surroundings. Their heterogeneity militated against group political action, 
although cross-community campaigns, for example against fascist violence and 
impending hinnuigration legislation, were sometimes organised. Occasionally, different 
communities also took action on issues that affected them specifically: Sikhs in 
Birmingham and Manchester, for example, mounted concerted campaigns for the right 
of Sikh bus conductors to wear their turbans at work. The chapter then traces the 
progress of white British racism from the streets to the statute books and explains why 
black people's profound disillusionment with the Labour Party was so crucial in 
shaping their political activity after 1965. Black people had never seen the Conservative 
Party as their natural ally and events in the first half of the 1960s proved them right. In 
1962 a Conservative government introduced a racially-discriminatory system of 
immigration control in the form of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. During the 
general election of 1964 the Conservative candidate for Smethwick beat his Labour 
rival after a campaign that cynically played on the local community's fears about black 
immigration and flided with racism. In this context, when the Labour Party abandoned 
its pledge to oppose immigration restriction in 1964 and then actually tightened controls 
in 1965, black peop le viewed this as a betrayal that signalled the failure of their last 
hope for representation in mainstream Politics. 
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Although one might have expected the American civil rights movement to have 
had a major impact on British race relations, its influence was decidedly limited. The 
second half of the chapter examines two attempts to replicate a US-style civil rights 
movement on British soil - the 1963 Bristol bus boycott and the creation of the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) in 1965 - in order to demonstrate 
why non-violent direct action tactics and strategies failed to garner significant support 
among black immigrants in the early 1960s. Both campaigns were ill-suited to the 
British context, where, in 1965, Asian, African and West Indian immigrants constituted 
approximately 2 per cent of the population, rather than the established, homogenous II 
per cent of African Americans in the United States. Although both the Bristol boycott 
and CARD were started by black people, both failed to gain grassroots black support 
and were mainly championed by white liberals. British journalists, politicians and race 
relations researchers monitored the progress of the civil rights movement in the United 
States and from time to time drew parallels with Britain. Their motivations for 
comparing British and American race relations are also briefly surveyed in the fmal half 
of the chapter. 
The roots of black protest in Britain 
There was a substantial pre-history of black himmigrants campaigning against racial 
oppression in Britain in the twentieth century upon which Black Power activists could 
and did build. Although the African and West Indian students who led the anti-colonial 
struggles in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s usually came from more privileged 
backgrounds dm the younger, working-class West Indians who campaigned against 
domestic racism in the 1960s and 1970s, one cannot analyse, the struggles of the latter 
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without acknowledging the influence of the former. 10 Organisations like the West 
African Students Union (WASU), founded by Ladipo Solanke in 1925, the International 
African Service Bureau (IASB), founded by George Padmorc in 1937 and the Pan- 
African Federation (PAF), founded in 1944, represented the interests of people of 
African descent in Britain, although their main focus was campaigning against British 
colonialism in Africa. Dr Harold Moody's League of Coloured Peoples (LCP), founded 
in 1931 and active until the end of the 1940s, had more of a domestic focus and 
accepted Asian as well as African and West Indian members. In October 1945, Britain's 
central role in the Pan-African movement was confirmed when Manchester hosted the 
fifth Pan-African Congress - the previous four of which had been organised by the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and held in the 
United States. The fifth, however, was convened by the British-based Pan-African 
Federation. Attended by future independent African leaders Kwame Nkrumah and iomo 
Kenyatta, as well as Du Bois, Ashwood Garvey and Padmore, among others, the 
Congress served as a point of crossover between international anti-colonialism and 
domestic anti-racism. Hence, although its aim was to coordinate the struggle to make 
the imperial powers honour their wartime commitments to self-deten-nination for the 
colonies, its opening session was on 'The coloured problem in Britain'. Chaired by 
Marcus Garvey's first wife, Amy Ashwood Garvey, the session heard testimony from 
British groups about the employment and social discrimination facing black working 
class communities in the port areas of cities like Cardiff, Edinburgh and London. 
Speakers remarked that the more affluent black students in Britain should show more 
10 In his study, West Afticans in Britain. 1900 to 1960, historian Hakim Adi notes that, of the West 
African students who came to Britain before the Second World War and joined groups like WASU, 'The 
vast majority were... until the mid-1940s, male and from wealthy, even Royal families'. This stands in 
contrast to the lower middle, working and peasant class immigrants from the Caribbean and southern 
Asia, who constituted the bulk of the immigration in the 1950s and early 1960s. H. Adi, West. 4fricans in 
Britain: 1900 to 1960 (London, 1998), p. 3. 
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solidarity with the workers as imperialism affected them all. " It is worth noting that 
internationalism, Pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism and the importance of solidarity with 
the working class - all themes that would characterise the British Black Power 
movement - were being discussed by black organisations in Britain more than twenty 
years earlier. 
By the end of the 1940s, however, the majority of the activists and groups that 
bad attended the 1945 Congress had either declined or relocated to Africa to continue 
the fight for independence there. During the 1950s and early 1960s, though, associations 
like the Committee of African Organisations (CAO), founded in 1958, and individuals 
such as the redoubtable Ashwood Garvey provided direct crossovers between the anti- 
colonial and Pan-Africanist politics of the 1930s and 1940s and post-war campaigns for 
racial equality in Britain, including the Black Power movement. CAO was an umbrella 
group of thirteen African organisations, including WASU. It shared premises with 
future CARD leader David Pitt, who also attended its meetings, and counted among its 
members future British Black Power leader Obi Egbuna. CAO took a leading role in 
political activity after the 1959 murder of West Indian carpenter Kelso Cochrane in 
Notting Hill, according to a Special Branch report. Describing the organisation as 'at 
first a co-ordinating body representative of all coloured student unions", the report noted 
that CAO had 'since embraced representatives of all coloured organisations in London, 
political and otherwise' and become 'the principal co-ordinating body of the coloured 
12 organisations'. When Malcolm X spoke in London in Fcbruary 1965, inspiring 
audience member Michael de Freitas to change his name to Michael X and set up 
See the reproduced report of the first session in H. Adi and M. Sherwood, The 1945 Manchester Pan- 
, 
#Icef Congress Revisited (London and Port-of-Spain, 1995), pp. 75-7. 
1ý Report No. 4,10* November 1959, Special Branch, Scotland Yard', p. 1. Document contained in HO 
325/9: 'Racial disturbance: Notting Hill activities of extremist organisations, deputation of MPs to see the 
Secretary of State', held at the National Archives (NA). 
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Britain's prototype Black Power organisation, the Racial Awareness Action Society 
(RAAS) , it was at CAO's invitation. 
13 
A remarkable woman, Amy Ashwood Garvey was a tireless political 
campaigner. Having lived in Africa, the United States, the Caribbean and Britain, she 
was a one-woman embodiment of what Paul Gilroy would later term 'the Black 
Atlantic'. 14 Combining and cross-fertilising the politics and outlooks of three 
continents, Ashwood Garvey's impressive organisational experience and grounding in 
Pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism made her 'part of the old politics' in the words of 
Colin Prescod. 15 But her activism in London in the 1950s and early 1960s, especially in 
conjunction with her good friend Claudia Jones, whose West Indian Gazette was the 
pre-eminent black newspaper in Britain between 1958 and 1965, meant that Ashwood 
Garvey also played an important role in shaping the new politics being forged by black 
immigrants in the post-war era. As well as being on the editorial board of the Gazette, 
Garvey co-founded, with'Jones, the Committee of Afro-Asian Caribbean Associations 
(CAACO), while Jones sat on the board of Garvey's Association for the Advancement 
of Coloured People (AACP). The combination of Garvey's Pan-African politics and 
Jones' rigorous political training in the American Communist Party (CPUSA) meant 
that their political perspective was internationalist and emphasised the interplay of class 
and race. Such thinking foreshadowed the ideology of British Black Power groups like 
the Black Unity and Freedom Party (BUFP) in the 1970s. 
The majority of the new wave of black immigrants who arrived in Britain 
between 1955 and 1962 were, however, simply too busy struggling to find a job, a place 
13 Unless otherwise noted4 the information about CAO in this paragraph is taken from H. AdL The 
Committee of African Organisations', paper presented to the Post Imperial Britain conference at the 
Institute of Historical Research, London University, in 2002. 
4 p. Gilroy,, The Black Atlantic, Modernity and Double Consciousness (London, 1993). 5 Colin Prescod, interviewed by the author, 23 January 2008. 
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to live and a way to make ends meet to devote more than a tiny fraction of their time to 
overt political activities. Even A. Sivanandan, who later became a radical Marxist 
intellectual and the director of the Institute of Race Relations, was not actively involved 
in politics for several years after his arrival in Britain in 1958. His experience was 
representative of many of the new post-war immigrants. Formerly a comfortable, 
middle-class bank manager in Columbo, Sri Lanka, Sivanandan did many temporary, 
poorly paid jobs in Britain. Finally he was given a permanent job as a tea boy in a 
library in Wembley and began to study librarianship at evening classes to advance his 
career. When his wife returned to Sri Lanka because she could not bear the privations of 
British life any more, Sivanandan also became a single parent of thme. 'I had to work 
until eight o'clock in the evening and six o'clock on Saturdays', he remembers: 
So did I become political? No. I had all these personal problems - eve ig 
classes, librarianship, travelling to Wembley from Finchley on two buses ... but 
... the personal becomes political: that gave me a visceral experience of 
hardship 
and official racisni, because those were the kinds of fights I had. I had no time to 
do 'political things' [until] 1964 [when] the children were growing up, I'd 
finished my library exams and Ijoined the Institute of Race Relations library. 16 
Sivanandan's distinction between doing 'political things' and becoming 
personally politicised is the key to understanding black imn-dgrant politics in the period 
between 1955 and 1965. The same mundane daily struggles that prevented many 
recently arrived black immigrants from organising in their own interests provided the 
experiential basis for their later political activity. The issues that stirred Britain's ethnic 
minorities to sustained political activity in the 1970s - for example the stigmatisation of 
their children as educationally subnormal at school, their economic exploitation in the 
lowest-paid, most insecure jobs, and the discriminatory treatment of young black men 
16 A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 
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by the police - were grounded in their everyday experiences from the moment of their 
arrival in Britain. 
Asian immigrant organisations were, on the whole, defined by the nationality or 
religion of their members and were primarily concerned with social and welfare issues. 
The events that had the biggest impact on these organisations were often nothing to do 
with British life or politics. The Indian Workers' Association (IWA), for example, 
defmed itself both by its members' nationality and by their status as labourers and many 
of its branches were closely allied to the Communist Party of India (CPI). As well as 
giving members a chance to socialise with other Indians, the IWA offered services like 
translation and advice, for example on how to join a union, fill in benefit forms or 
register with a doctor. In 1962 the organisation faced a major crisis when China invaded 
India and the CPI sided with Mao rather than its own country. The repercussions were 
felt very strongly in the IWA in Britain, which split into pro-Mao and anti-CPI factions 
and lost a substantial number of members from its most pro-CPI branches. 17 Further 
divisions in the IWA were caused by the split of the CPI into two opposing factions in 
1964. 
Attempts at unified action by Asian and West Indian immigrants were 
undermined by the heterogeneity and competing nationalisms in their communities. 
Although most Asian migrants came from India or Pakistan (which was divided into 
East and West territories, over a thousand miles apart), both countries contained a 
variety of competing languages, religions and cultures. Indians had more in common 
with Pakistanis than with Christian, Anglophone West Indians, but a history of violent 
territorial and religious disputes in the Indian subcontinent, long predating the partition 
of India in 1947, meant that Indians and Pakistanis were by no means allies. West 
17 See D. John, Indian Workers'Associallons In Britain (London, 1969), pp. 67-89. 
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Indian immigrants, hailing from a large number of islands with very different 
characters, were also a diverse group. They were divided by strong traditions of island 
nationalism accompanied by a colonially-imposed identification with and loyalty to the 
interests of Britain. This meant that they defined their identity as, for example, Jamaican 
and then British, rather thari West Indian. Colin Prescod, who moved from Trinidad to 
London as a schoolboy in 1958 to join his mother Pearl, identified the lack of a shared 
identity as a major obstacle for first generation immigrants. 'There is a sense', he writes, 
'in which the newly arrived CaribbeanAVest Indian migrants had first to forge a cultural 
group consciousness in the face of the colonially instilled island and colour 
consciousness that they arrived with and which separated them'. 18 Experiencing racial 
discrimination in the metropolis was the process through which this happened in 
Britain, as Guyanan immigrant Eric Huntley explains. 'There was, of course, racism', 
he remembers. 'Living in Guiana in the 1950s, the fact that you were black was not a 
very significant part of your consciousness - but coming here that was brought home to 
you very clearly'. 19 
Ile Notting Hill and Nottingham riots of August-September 1958 were a 
turning point in the New Commonwealth inunigrants' developing consciousness of 
being black in a country that did not welcome black people. Over the August bank 
holiday weekend of 1958 groups of young white men took to the streets of Notting Hill 
and the poor St Ann's district of Nottingham, to indiscriminately attack the two areas' 
black residents. The trouble began in Nottingham on Saturday 23 August. A rumour that 
a West Indian man had attacked a white woman outside a local pub resulted in several 
hundred angry white people converging on St Ann's, where the majority of 
Nottingham's black population lived. Many local West Indian, African and Indian 
111 Colin Prescoý4 e-mail to the author, 30 July 2004. 19 Eric and Jessica Huntley, interviewed by the author, 19 November 2004. 
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residents were attacked before the police could disperse the crowd. A report in the Daily 
F, xpress painted a horrifying picture. Under the headline 'Race riots tefforise a city' the 
newspaper reported that 'Hundreds of Englishmen, West Indians, Pakistanis and 
Africans fought a bloody, 90-minute pitched battle ... Dozens of ... men and women 
were injured by bottles, knives, razors and sticks' . 
20 Even larger crowds of young white 
men returned to the area on Monday 25 and Saturday 30 August, armed with knives, 
bottles and coshes and looking for black people to attack. Having been forewarned by 
the police, the majority of the local black residents stayed indoors and most of the 
fighting took place between the fiustrated whites and the police. On Saturday 6 
September, around 200 young white men again returned to St Ann's but were dispersed 
before any more assaults took place. 21 
The violence in Notting Hill, which involved more people and engulfed a larger 
area, took place between 30 August and 3 September. Recounting the first night of 
rioting, a Daily Express news article titled 'New Riot Terror' reported that 'A Negro- 
baiting mob of 5,000 stormed through London streets shouting for lynchings and 
blood'. 2'2 The London riots were partly fomented by the local activities of Oswald 
Mosley's Union Movement and other neo-fascist groupsý3 The immediate cause of the 
disturbances was a group of nine armed white youths who had been trawling the streets 
in a car looking for black people to beat up. After they had dispatched five black men to 
hospital, street battles developed between other gangs of young white men and local 
West Indian residents who were quick to defend themselves with force. Arguing that the 
scenes which followed were 'race riots and cannot properly be described otherwise', 
20 'Race riots terrorise a city', Daily Express, 25 August 195 S. 21 'Race war flares again in Nottingham', ne Sund4 &press, 7 September 1958. 
22 'New Riot Terroe, The Daily Herald, I September 1958. 
2'See 'Riot mobs out again. Now the Yard asks: is it a plot', News Chronicle, 2 September 1958, and 
'Mosley's Man Opens Fire', The Observer, 7 September 1958. 
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eye-witness Edward Scobie described 'an uninterrupted, chaotic, senseless, repetitive 
sequence of rioting and arson, day and night. [A]lthough most of the more. realistic 
black people remained indoors, he continued, "the more militant and indignant 
collected empty milk bottles, rocks, and some hand-made bombs and ... shelled the 
baying, jeering white mobs in the streets'? 4 
Scobie's account makes it clear that even during the early stages of post-war 
black migration to Britain, West Indians were willing to use violence in self-defence, 
reflecting their own feisty Caribbean traditions of protest and resistance. Although the 
various community groups founded in the riots' wake disavowed violence in favour of 
good neighbourliness and inter-racial understanding, the instinctual response of West 
Indians during the riot had been to fight back. No stranger to violence himself, Michael 
de Freitas, commenting on the Notting Hill riots in his autobiography, wrote that, 'It 
was a sad scene but inevitable. We were finally standing up for ourselves against a 
hostile white world. '2s Black immigrants to Britain in the 1950s did not live under the 
same kind of apartheid-like racial oppression that operated in the southern United States 
and thus could express their resistance more openly, with less fear of reprisal, and with 
some faith that they might receive a sympathetic hearing in court if their actions 
resulted in police charges. Although local blacks seriously criticised the Metropolitan 
Police's behaviour during the riots, claiming that they only intervened in the fighting 
once black people started retaliating, the nine white youths whose self-professed 'nigger 
hunting' trips precipitated the riots received substantial custodial sentences, as had 
several of the white aggressors in Nottingham. 26 Their actions had 'filled the whole 
nation with horror, indignation and disgust', declared Justice Salmon in his pre- 
24 Edward Scobie, Black Britannia. a History oftlacks in Britain (Chicago, 1972), p. 219. " M. Malik, From Michael de Freitas to Michael X (London, 1968), p. 75. 26 See 'Faces of Six Young Tbugs', News Chronicle, 16 September 1958, and 'Prison sentences for five 
Nottingham "rowdies"', The Times, 2 September 1958. 
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sentencing summation, a conclusion supported by the media coverage. 27 Calling his 
verdict a 'Declaration of liberty', the Daily Express described Justice Salmon as 'The 
man whose judgment yesterday ... reaffirms the rights of us all'? 
s 
The Notting Hill riots had a profound effect on black people in Britain and 
provided an important catalyst to their political activity. Six months afier the riots, a 
Special Branch report on 'racial tension' noted that, 'As far as the coloured population 
was concerned there was no political organisation or activity in the Notting Hill area 
until September, 1958, when towards the end of the racial disturbances, many 
mushroom organisations, sprang up'. 29 Ilese organisations were intended to unite the 
local immigrant communities and promote better relations between them and their white 
neighbours. They included: CAACO; the AACP; the Coloured Peoples' Progressive 
Association (CPPA); the Defence Committee, of which Michael de Freitas was a 
leading member, the Inter-Racial Friendship Coordinating Council; and the West Indian 
Standing Conference (WISC), which was set up on the recommendation of Jamaican 
Chief Minister Norman Manley after he visited Notting Hill in the immediate aftermath 
of the riots. 
In Nottingham, the fact that the white mob had not differentiated between West 
Indians and Sikhs as targets led to the rapid foundation of a branch of the IWA in the 
city. On the whole, however, the attitude of Asians to the 1958 riots was ambivalent. 
The violence was directed mainly at West Indians, who constituted the overwhelming 
majority of Britain's non-white population in 1958, and most Asian immigrants felt that 
it had nothing to do with them. Even Ajoy Ghose, who in the 1960s became a founding 
27 Justice Salmon is quoted in Scobie, Black BrUmmia, p. 228. 
2" 'A Declaration of Liberty', The Daily Express, 16 September 1958. 
29 'Metropolitan Police, Special Branch Report on Racial Tension'. 28 May 1959, p. 5. Document 
contained in HO 325/9: 'Racial disturbance: Notting Hill activities of extremist organisations', held in the 
NA. 
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member of Britain's first Black Power group, recalled that in 1958 his political 
consciousness had not yet evolved. 'I was in London but Notting Hill was a foreign 
30 
country for me', he says. 'Those days I didn't think of myself as black'. Sivanandan, 
who was living in Notting Hill in 1958, had a slightly more thoughtful attitude to the 
riots. 'I was having drinks in a pub with some Sri Lankan friends and somebody said 
"there's trouble in Notting Hill Gate"', he remembers, 'and my Sri Lankan friends said 
"It's nothing to do with us, it's to do with the blacks. " That was another moment of 
truth. I had to ask myself- what am I? What does black mean? Is it the colour of one's 
complexion or is it the colour of one's affiliations? 01 
The 1958 Notting Hill riot was a watershed moment because it awakened many 
black immigrants to the fact that at least some white people did not welcome them and 
would never consider them to be British. They had also been shocked by the partiality 
of the Metropolitan Police towards the white aggressors during the riot. When Antiguan 
carpenter Kelso Cochrane was stabbed to death on a Notting Hill street by a gang of 
white youths in May 1959, some local black residents blamed his death on the 
Metropolitan Police's lack of interest in complaints about fascist activity in laie area. 32 
Cochrane's funeral was attended by at least six hundred black people who came to show 
their solidarity against the white fascists they believed had killed him and that his 
murder had not been forgotten by the black community? 3 For many immigrants from 
the Caribbean the cumulative impact of the 1958 riots and Cochrane's murder was to 
extinguish their belief in a benevolent mother country or that they were British in any 
30 Ajoy Ghose, interviewed by the author, 20 August 2004. 
31 A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 20(g. 32 See the Special Branch report on Cochrane's funeral in HO 325/9: 'Racial disturbance: Notting Hill 
activities of extremist organisations', held in the NA. . 33 The police estimate, in ibid., is 600, but Marika Sherwood puts the number at more than 1,000 in 
Claudia Jones: a Life in Exile (London, 1999), p. 97. 
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meaningfid way. Some decided to return to the Caribbean. Others began to evolve a 
new political identification with each other as black people in a racist white society. 
In doing this they could draw on a variety of indigenous traditions of radical 
dissent. Although most of Britain's black immigrants came from poor rural areas there 
were many precedents for political mobilisation in the histories of their home countries. 
For all West Indians' oft-invoked identification with and loyalty to the mother country, 
anti-colonialism, self-determination and labour militancy were central themes of 
Caribbean history, as well as current political concerns for several of the newly 
independent Caribbean states. Eric and Jessica Huntley, for example, who arrived from 
British Guiana in 1956 and 1957 respectively, had been heavily involved in the anti- 
colonial struggles of their homeland. Eric Huntley had spent time in prison for his anti- 
colonial activism and had come to Britain to avoid further political persecution. 
Although he and Jessica did not intend to stay in Britain for long, they immediately 
threw themselves into political organising. The Huntleys' anti-colonialism evolved into 
a broader anti-racist politics in reaction to their experiences in Britain. 'We came with a 
certain perception of the world: we were part of the anti-colonial struggle and we were 
fighting for independence, Eric Huntley remembers. It was their self-imposed exile in 
'the belly of the beast', as he describes living in London in the 1950s and 1960s, which 
gave the Huntleys, a new political perspective. 'We were isolated from the rest of the 
Caribbean', explains Eric 'and one thing that helped to inform our consciousness and 
broaden it was mixing with other Caribbean people here'. 34 
If the 1958 riots had convinced many black immigrants that Britain was fidl of 
racist people, the legislation passed by both Conservative and Labour governments 
34 Eric and Jessica Huntley, interviewed by the author, 19 November 2004. In 1969 the Huntleys joined a long British tradition of political dissent through radical publishing by setting up the Bogle L'Ouverture-ýA 
c publishing company, named after Caribbean slave revolt leaders Paul Bogle and Toussaint L'Ouv 5\ ý) ýV 
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between 1962 and 1965 convinced them that racism was not just a problem of 
individuals but something that was being knitted into the structure of the state. 35 
Although successive governments had been privately discussing how to control black 
immigration since before the arrival of the Empire Windrush, after the 1958 riots it 
became publicly acceptable to discuss immigration restriction. In 1961 Conservative 
Party members attending their annual conference, voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
introducing Hinn1ligration controls. The subsequent Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 
introduced by the Conservative government in October 1961 and passed in June 1962, 
overturned the equal citizenship rights conferred by the 1948 Nationality Act and 
introduced a strict quota system on immigration from New Commonwealth countries 
like India, Pakistan and Jamaica, but not on old Commonwealth nations like Canada and 
Australia, or Ireland, a foreign country that consistently provided the greatest nuraber of 
immigrants to Britain. 36 It was clearly designed to shut black immigrants out, while 
leaving the door open to whites. 
Immigration restriction was the issue that inspired the most organised political 
activity among black immigrants before 1965. 'Me rumoured introduction of a bill 
restricting IMMI'gration in 1961 was the inspiration for the first campaign of the newly 
created Coordinating Committee Against Racial Discrimination (CCARD) ý in 
Birmingham, while in London CAACO and WISC organised marches and petitioned 
the high commissioners of various Caribbean islands to pressure the government to 
withdraw the bill. Despite constituting a notable upsurge in black immigrant political 
activity, these were piecemeal protests that also showed, in the words of historian Paul 
35 For two convincing monographs on this transformation see A. Sivanandan, 'Race, class and the state: 
the black experience in Britain', Race & Class 17: 4 (1976) and S. Joshi and B. Carter, 61be role of 
Labour in the creation of a racist Britain', Race & Class 15: 3 (1984). 
36 See C. Holmes, John Bull's Island., Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (Basingstoke, 1988), 
p. 216. 
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Rich, that 'black political thinking was still governed more by the idea of asserting 
rights as citizens of the Commonwealth than as permanent members of British society. 
No overall black organisation existed politically at this stage to mount a strong 
opposition to the 1962 Commonwealth' Immigrants Bill, he concludes? 7 The 
Committee of African Organisations, having taken a leading role in the political 
organising around Kelso Cochrane's murder in 1959, seems to have refocused its 
attention abroad in 1961, particularly on Nknimah's Ghana. That said, it contributed to 
CAACO's campaign against the 1961 bill by making available for meetings its new 
West London premises, Africa Unity House, a gift from Nkrumah the previous year. 38 
It was hardly surprising that Asian immigrants, most of whom had been in 
Britain for less than two years when the immigration bill was introduced, did not think 
of themselves as settlers. Ironically, it was the introduction of immigration restriction 
that forced many of them to make the decision to stay in Britain. 'The Asian 
communities in Britain were much more heavily mobilised in fighting the plans to 
introduce restrictions to immigration than we were', remembers West Indian activist 
Trevor Carter . 
39 This was because it was Asian immigrants whose futures were likely to 
be most affected by the immigration act. While the overwhelming majority of Asian 
immigrants were young single men in the, early 1960s, West Indians, who had emigrated 
earlier, had already had time to bring their partners and children to Britain. Asian 
immigrants worried that the proposed restrictions 'Would mean they had to settle in 
Britain permanently or risk not being allowed back into the country if they went home 
to visit their families. It was this that provoked the rush to move their relatives to Britain 
before the act came into force on I July 1962. 
37 P. Rich, Race and'Empire in British Politics (Cambridge, 1986), p. 199. 38 See H. Adi, 'The Committee of African ftanisations', pp. 18-19. 
39 T. CarW, Shattering Illusions: West Indians in British Politics (London, 1986), p. 67. 
43 
Chapter 1: hmnigration, British race relations and the American civil rights movement, 
1955-1965 
Even after the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was passed, black immigrants 
were still prepared to give British democracy the benefit of the doubt, in part because 
they believed that the Labour Party would fight their comer. It had, after all, vigorously 
opposed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act and up until the publication of its 1964 
election manifesto, promised to repeal it once elected. 'For a while it was possible to 
construct an alternative theory of benevolence in the host community based on the 
Labour Party's resistance to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', noted the authors of 
Colour and Cidzenship! o Black immigrants continued to remain loyal to-the Labour 
Party throughout 1963 and 1964, when supporting the Conservative Party became an 
even less attractive option for them. During the run-up to the general election of 
October 1964, Peter Griffiths, the Conservative candidate for the West Midlands town 
of Smethwick, which had a black population of 6.7 per cent, ran a. virulently anti- 
immigration campaign. 41 Griffiths played upon the fears of local residents about black 
immigrants in order to win votes and tacitly encouraged his supporters' use of the 
slogan, 'If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Labour, telling The Times newspaper that 
'I would not condemn anyone who said that, I regard it as a manifestation of popular 
feeling'! 2 He was rewarded with a surprise victory over the incumbent Labour MP 
Patrick Gordon Walker, the Conservatives' first electoral win in Smethwick since the 
Second World War. After visiting the town on 12 February 1965, the African American 
radical Malcolm X was reported to have advised the local black community to start 
organising before the local fascists began building gas ovens !3 
40 E. J. B. Rose et al, Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969), p. 501. 
41 See J. Street, 'Malcohn X, Smethwick, and the Muence of the Afirican American Freedom Struggle on 
British Race Relations in the 1960s' unpublished paper, School of History, University of Kent, 2006, p. 4. 
42 Griffiths' comments in The Times reproduced in Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics 
armondsworth, 1965) p. 44. 
3HIbid., p. 9. 
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The Labour Party took quite a different lesson from the Conservatives' success 
in Smethwick. Realising that Griffiths' negative emphasis on immigration had been a 
significant factor in his victory, it quickly decided that, the benefits of being seen as 
tough on immigration outweighed its former objections to control. Having already 
reneged on its promise to repeal the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, in August 
1965 the Labour government published a White Paper on immigration which finther 
reduced the quotas from New Commonwealth countries, intensiPAng the 1962 act's bias 
against black immigrants. Commenting on the repercussions of Labour's U-turn on 
immigration policy, black journalist Edward Scobie wrote that 'Blacks have, in 
consequence ... lost their faith in Labour and, in fact, blacks in Britain are losing trust 
in whites'. 44Not even the fact that the same Labour government was concurrently 
shepherding Britain's first Race Relations Act through parliament tempered black 
people's disillusion. 45 A March 1966 editorial in the moderate, respectable British- 
Caribbean 4ssociation Newsletter reviewed the events of the previous year that had had 
the most impact on its members. It failed to even mention the Race Relations Act, but 
highlighted the White Paper 'and its effects on race relations in the United Kingdom', 
commenting that, 'there has' been widespread and serious firustration and bitter 
disappointment ... especially from immigrant communities, that the Government have 
appeared to make some concession to racial prejudice by their introduction of the White 
Paper'! 6 
Anxious to offset the tightening of immigration restriction with a measure that 
would promote integration, the White Paper's drafters included a provision to create a 
larger, better-funded version of the extant National Council for Commonwealth 
44 Scobie, Black Britannia; P. 265. 
4 -The Race Relations Act was passed in November 1965. 
46 Felicity Bolton, 'Editorial', British-Caribbean Association Newsletter 9 (March 1966), p. 2. 
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Immigrants. Although the beefed-up NCCI remained independent of government in 
theory, in practice it very rarely criticised government actions and pursued a moderate, 
integrationist line that served the interests of the state far better than it did Britain's 
black immigrants. Moreover, its strategy of co-opting onto its national committee the 
leaders of existing immigrant organisations often caused bitter divisions in the groups 
from which they came. By setting up a network of local liaison committees, it also 
undermined black people's attempts to organise independent local equality campaign 
groups. CARD member Nfichael Dummett believed it was not coincidence that th6 
creation of a new NCCI had had a negative impact on CARD. 'The government's 
fundamental aim is to keep the black minority under control, he wrote in 1968, 'In 
pursuing this policy, the N. C. C. I., with its hand-picked black members and its 
concentration on local liaison committees, has been an essential instrument'. 47 
According to Sivanandan, Labour's conversion to immigration control had a 
significant ripple effect in the race relations industry. He says that it was only after the 
Labour govermment published its White Paper that the IRR came out publicly in favour 
of immigration control, 'At first it said nothing', he explains, 'but when the [ 1962] act 
was endorsed by the Labour goverment in the White Paper of 1965, the Institute's 
director declared that there had to be immigration controls because the newcomers 
couldn't be easily assimilated. "We have to take them a mouthful at a time", was 
essentially how he put it in a Guardian article'! 8 On I July 1962 the National Socialists 
of Great Britain held a rally in TmfWgar Square to celebrate the enforcement of the new 
Commonwealth Immigrants Ac09 By the end of 1965, many black unnuigrants felt that 
47 M. Dtunmett, 'The travails of a British civil right movement', Patterns ofPrejudice 2: 5 (1968), p. 10. 48 L. Kushnick and P. Grant, 'Catching History on the Wing: A. Sivanandan as Activist, Teacher and 
Rebel', in B. Bowser, L Kushnick (eds) with P. Grant, Against 7he Odds. - Scholars no Challenged 
Racism in the Twentieth Century (Amherst and Boston, 2002), p. 230. 49 Hiro, Black British, p. 5 1. 
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the Labour Party had metaphorically joined their platform. Believing that they had been 
abandoned by both mainstream political parties and that formerly sympathetic white 
liberal opinion had hardened against immigration, they became more receptive to voices 
proposing militan4 independent black action. 
The impact of the American civil rights movement on Britain 
The civil rights movement was an obvious protest model for non-white people in 
Britain: it provided a potent example of the power of non-violent, direct action to affect 
positive change for black people oppressed by a racist state. Campaigns such as that in 
Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, which saw hundreds of African American protestors, 
many of them children, withstand water cannons and police dogs and endure mass 
arrests to protest their right to vote, led to the destruction of the racial caste system in 
the southern states. By 1965 African Americans' right to vote and receive equal 
treatment was enshrined in federal law. In spite of this, and politicians, and the media's 
predilection for portraying race riots in the United States as a warning vision of 
Britain's future, in the early 1960s the civil rights movement had a very limited impact 
on black people organising in Britain, Historian Mike Sewell has argued that 'British 
responses to the African American freedom struggle could not be viewed apart from the 
issues of race relations [in Britain] that were demanding more and more attention', but 
his essay on those responses contains more than one caveat that 'we should not 
overestimate the impact of the civil rights movement in Britain'. 50 It was only in the late 
1960s, when the civil rights movement moved into its Black Power phase that it began 
to exert a strong influence. Nevertheless, there were attempts to emulate the events and 
tactics of the African American freedom struggle, most notably the Bristol bus boycott 
50 M. Sewell, 'British responses to Martin Luther King Jr and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968, in 
Ward and Badger (eds), The Making ofthe Civil Rights Movement (London, 19961 p. 207. 
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of 1963 and the creation of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination in 1965, both 
of which are discussed in detail below. Despite the efforts of the organisers of both, 
however, non-violent direct action, the most important and effective tactic of the civil 
rights movement, failed to attract significant support from black people in Britain. This 
was because Britain did not have a strong network of independent black organisations in 
the 1960s, nor a large established, homogenous black population. Also, the state's 
attempts to combat racial discrimination, although not initially very effective, had the 
side-effect of inhibiting or disrupting independent black protest or redirecting its focus 
away from direct action towards lobbying parliament (for example, to influence the 
drafting of the 1965 Race Relations Act). 
Commenting on the March on Washington in August 1963, when a quarter of a 
million black and white Americans congregated on the capital to show their support for 
civil rights legislation and hear leaders like Martin Luther King speak, the editor of The 
Times declared that 'No country, in fact, can wholly afford to ignore the events in 
Washington. The colour problem is virtually universal in one form or another, even 
behind the Iron Curtain'. 51 This sentiment would have found favour with Birmingham 
IWA (GB) and CCARD leader Jagmohan Joshi, who kept a close eye on the African 
American the civil rights movement, especially when it concerned his adopted city's 
Alabama namesake. A handbill advertising a CCARD fund-raising concert on 5 
February 1964 declared, for example, that it was, 'in honour of the people of 
Birmingham, Alabama ... [whose] courageous struggle against racialism has been an 
example to 'people throughout the world'. 52 Joshi also wrote letters of solidarity to 
Mie Light in the Darkness', The Times, 30 August 1963, p. 9. 52 Unnamed document held in the CCARD file at the IM 
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President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King on behalf of the people of 
Birmingham praising advances in the civil rights movement. 53 
Africans in Britain, although more likely to be influenced by the political 
struggles in their native continent, regarded African American civil rights campaigners 
as part of the same struggle. They reserved their greatest enthusiasm, however, for 
activists who had a strong Pan-Afticanist perspective, such as WEB Du Bois and 
Malcolm Y, irrespective of their position in the civil rights movement. The Committee 
of African Organisations hosted visits from both Martin Luther King and Malcolm X. 
'Undoubtedly' the 'most important speaker' at the first congress of the renamed Council 
of African Organisations in February 1965, in the opinion of historian Hakim Adi, 
Malcolm X gave a speech linking the American civil rights movement with the national 
liberation struggles in Africa and emphasised, 'the importance of the African revolution 
as an inspiration for all African Americans'. 54 When he was assassinated just days later, 
CAO 'staged a protest march from Hyde Park to the US embassy ... and denounced the 
United States for the "racialist murdee, of Malcolm X'. 55 
In his essay on the British response to the Amýrican civil rights movement, 
historian Mike Sewell contends that 'Little British commentary treated the race issue in 
the United States as a uniquely American concern'. 56 News articles, however, usually 
reported the American civil rights movement as the domestic affhirs of a foreign 
country. Even the IRWs monthly in-house journal, The Institute of Race Relations 
Newsletter, did not judge the United States important enough to merit its own dedicated 
53 Drafts of these letters are held in the CCARD file at the IRR. 
m H. Ad4 'The Committee of African Organisations', pp. 254. 
53 Ibid., p. 26. 
-" M. SewelL 'British responses to Martin Luther King Jr and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968', in 
Ward and Badger (eds), The Making (19961 p. 195. Sewell's essay deals exclusively with print 
journalism. Although television ownership in Britam had almost caught up with the United States by 
196 1, until 1962 most sets could only receive one channel and broadcasting hours were limited, therefore 
most people still got their news in print. 
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section until 1964. Britain's most important black newspaper The West Indian Gazette, 
published monthly between 1958 and 1965, devoted roughly the same proportion of 
column inches to the American civil rights movement as the mainstream white press, 
giving the majority of space on its news pages to events in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean 
and Britain. This was in spite of the fact that its founding editor, Claudia Jones, had 
spent most of her life in the United States. 
The episodes from the civil rights movement that attracted the most mainstream 
press coverage were those which had an impact on the Cold War or foreign policy 
implications for Britain. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision in September 1957 
to send federal troops to protect African American schoolchildren trying to attend a 
segregated school in Little Rock, Arkansas, for example, elicited a great deal of 
newspaper coverage in Britain because in the depths of the Cold War the Little Rock 
crisis was considered to play into the hands of Communist propagandists. " Both the 
Guardian and the Daily Mirror reported that Arkansas governor Orval Faubus had 
compared Eisenhower's use of the National Guard to enforce a federal court order in 
Arkansas with the brutal Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. By way 
of comparison, neither the start of the student sit-in movement in February 1960, nor the 
Freedom Rides of May 1961, received anything like as much coverage in The Times or 
the Daily Mirror. 
Despite the lack of popular interest, British politicians regularly found it 
expedient to compare race relations in Britain and the United States. When rioting broke 
out in Nottingham and Notting Hill in August 1958, far-right Conservative MP Cyril 
Osborne was quick to compare the disturbances with the Little Rock crisis, even though 
'" See The Times, 24 September 1957, p. 8; 25 September 1957, p. 8; 26 September 1957, p. 10 (with 
picture); 27 September 1957, p. 10 and 28 September 1957, p. 9. 
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the two did not have much in common. 58 In the parliamentary context, the United States 
was most often used as a dystopian vision of what might happen in Britain if the 
government either did not heed the grievances of black people or repatriate them 
immediately, depending on one's political hue. 59 The 'could it happen hereT approach 
became more common as the 1960s progressed, with earlier complacency giving way to 
more nervous appraisals, as race relations in both Britain and the United States 
worsened. The outbreak of rioting in Watts, a very poor, predominantly African 
American district of Los Angeles, in August 1965, was reported widely in the British 
press and served as a timely reminder for British MPs, then in the process of debating 
the government's race relations bill, of the potential dangers of letting racial 
discrimination in Britain fester. 'It was the sudden awareness of the danger that the 
Second Generation might become a coloured underclass, given heightened 
consciousness by the racial crisis in the northern cities of the United States, which 
strengthened the case for new legislation', noted lawyers Anthony Lester and Geoffrey 
Bindman. 60 
In the late 1950s and early 1.960s a small but politically significant community 
of African Americans and West Indians who had been brought up in the United States 
congregated regularly at places like Africa House in north London to exchange views 
" Osborne's comments were reported in The Times on 28 August 1958. See E. Pilkington, Beyond the 
Mother Country (London, 1988), p. 128. 
" Ws who regularly raised the issue of immigrants' rights included Reg Sorenson, Labour MP for 
Leyton, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, Labour MP for Bristol South-East, Tom Driberg, Labour MP for 
Barking and Fenner Brockway, Labour MP for Eton and Slough. Brockway, who was made a peer in 
1964, introduced nine anti-discrimination private members bills between 1954 and 1965. On the other 
side of the house, Cyril Osborne, Conservative MP for Louth, Norman Pannell, Conservative MP for 
Kirkdale, Harold Gurden, Conservative MP for Selly Oak and Enoch Powell, Conservative MP for 
Wolverhampton South West, regularly argued that black immigrants were putting an unbearable strain on 
Britain's housing, employment and health services and urged stricter immigration control and assistance 
for voluntary repatriation. 
6() A. Lester and G. Bindman, Race and Law (Harmondsworth, 197 1), p. 17. 
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and talk politics. 61 Most of this group, which included Claudia Jones, Amy Ashwood 
Garvey and Paul and Eslanda Robeson, had been deported from the United States, or 
had chosen to leave, because of their left-wing beliefs. Claudia Jones, for example, a 
Trinidadian raised in Harlem, had been deported from the United States to Britain in 
December 1955, after spending 366 days in a federal penitentiary under the Smith Act 
because of her membership of the CPUSA. 62 The Robesons moved to London in 1958, 
after eight years of wrangling with the United States government to return Paul 
Robeson's confiscated passport. They stayed for five years and were active members of 
CAACO. Although Jones's political focus took in Africa and her native Caribbean just 
as much as the country in which she grew up, it was clear that her organisation CAACO 
drew inspiration and encouragement from the American civil rights movement. The 
same could be said for Jamaican Pan-Africanist Amy Ashwood Garvey's AACP, which 
was clearly patterned after the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) in the United States. On 31 August 1963, CAACO organised a march 
to the American embassy in London, to show solidarity with the March on Washington 
and protest against domestic discrimination, during which the marchers sang the civil 
rights anthem 'We Shall Overcome'. In July 1964, CAACO hosted a forum on the 
tactics of the Mississippi Freedom Summer, addressed by Eslanda Robeson. 63 The 
Robesons, Jones, Ashwood Garvey and other black political emigris also had close 
links with American civil rights leaders, activists and intellectuals like Bayard Rustin, 
WEB Du Bois, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. Pictures from the December 1961 
61 Affica House in Camden was a hostel, restaurant and meeting space run by the West Affican Students 
Union. 
62 A document concerning Claudia Jones in the archives of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
CPICENT/ORG/01110, held at the Labour History Archive and Study Centre, reports that she was 
deported straight to London rather than Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, at the request of the British Consulate 
because of her serious ill health. Upon arrival she immediately applied for a British passport so that she 
could leave to convalesce somewhere warmer, but was not granted one until 1962. 
63 See 'London Solidarity March', The West Indian Gazette, September 1963, p. 1. 
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edition of the West Indian Gazette show King at a social function at Africa House with 
Jone§ and Eslanda. Robeson, as well as other prominent politically active black 
immigrants like David Pitt, Communist Party member and West Indian Gazette deputy 
editor Abhimanyu Manchanda, and the West Indian novelist George Lamming. 
It was not just American expatriates who took an interest in the civil rights 
movement in the United States though. In May 1963, Paul Stephenson, a youth worker 
of African and white British parentage, called a boycott against the Bristol Omnibus 
Company (BOC) that deliberately mimicked the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955- 
1956. In December 1964, moreover, a hastily organised meeting between Martin Luther 
King and black community leaders resulted in the creation of Britain's most serious 
attempt at a 'civil rights' organisation, the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination. 
CARD saw itself as a British version of the NAACP and was also influenced by King's 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE). CARD and the Bristol bus boycott generated a great deal of media attention, 
despite their significant failings, because they gave the impression that Britain was 
developing its own civil rights movement and tapped into the sympathy Britons felt for 
the African American struggle before the emergence of Black Power. 
The Bristol bus boycott of 1963 was conceived as a protest against the Bristol 
Omnibus Company's refusal to hire non-white conductors and drivers. By deliberately 
evoking the Montgomery bus boycott - at the start of his campaign Stephenson posed 
for local newspaper photographers at the back of a bus, even though black passengers in 
Bristol could sit wherever they liked - Stephenson framed his protest as an extension of 
the American civil rights movement. This was a successful way of attracting media 
attention - the boycott received plenty of coverage in the pages of the local, national 
and even foreign press. Stephenson's failure to recognise the fundamental differences 
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between 1950s Montgomery and 1960s Bristol, however, meant that the boycott itself 
was poorly supported by black or white Bristolians, and was, tactically, a fOure. 
Bristol's demographics were completely different Erom. Montgomery's: the 
majority of bus passengers in Bristol were white and its black population was diverse 
and divided, with newly arrived Indian, Pakistani and West Indian immigrants joiriffig 
established West Indian communities from before the Second World War. The Bristol 
colour bar had been imposed on hiring bus staff, not seating passengers, and it was the 
result of a union ballot by the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), rather 
than a legal ordinance that could be challenged in court. As Britain had neither a written 
constitution against which to test its laws, nor legislation prohibiting, racial 
discrimination prior to 1965, the Bristol colour bar could not have been overturned in 
court, as Montgomery's had been by the NAACP's successful legal challenge to the 
constitutionality of Alabama's transport segregation laws in the 1956 test case Browder 
v Gayle. Furthermore, the Bristol boycott had very little grassroots support, a defming 
feature of the Montgomery boycott. 'Me demise of the Bristol colour bar was the 
cumulative result of negative publicity and pressure from journalists, MPs and 
Commonwealth diplomats and left Bristol's black community groups squabbling over 
whether a gradualist approach would have worked better. 
The Bristol Omnibus Company had operated a colour bar against employing 
non-whitc bus drivers and conductors for several years, mainly to appease the white 
conductors and drivers (passenger staff), who, through the TGWU, had balloted in 1955 
not to work alongside blacks. The BOC had acquiesced and no black people had been 
employed on Bristol's buses since. (In contrast, the BOC's garage staff, members of a 
different section of the TGWU, had voted against a colour bar and so Asians and West 
Indians were employed as mechanics by the company. ) The fact that the BOC was 
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operating a colour bar had been noted with disapproval on several occasions- by a 
Church Mission in the mid-1950s; 'by the Bristol Evening Post, which ran a series of 
articles alleging colour discrimination in 1961; and by a newly fortned local 
organisation, the West Indian Development Council (WIDC), set up in the same year. 
When pressed on the matter, however, the bus company had said that its hands were tied 
by the union and the TGWU claimed that the (entirely legal) colour bar was the policy 
of the bus company. 
Stephenson had joined the WIDC in 1962 and, under its auspices, called a 
boycott of the BOC the following year. Local historian Madge Dresser noted that 
'Stephenson was very much inspired by the example of Martin Luther King'. 64 
Stephenson's admiration for King meant that he tried to emulate his tactics without 
enough consideration of whether they were appropriate to Bristol. One example of this 
was Stephenson's attempt to canvas black churches as a source of support for the 
Bristol boycott. 'I knew it was the black churches that had ... given Luther King 
in the 
South that power', he told one interviewer, 'and so I was working on the black 
churches'ý5 Britain, however, had no tradition of West Indians organising through 
church networks. Many West Indians were devout Christians, but their faith was other- 
wordly and they were struggling to set up their own churches, having discovered that 
they were not welcome in white congregations. In 1963, most Asians also had not yet 
established their own places of worship and so prayed at home or in each others' 
houses. 'It wasn't that they weren't in sympathy with what I was doing', Stephenson 
64 M. Dresser, Black and White on the Buses: the 1963 Colour Bar Dispute in Bristol (Bristol, 1986), 
15. 
63 lbid, p. 32. 
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later conceded, 'but they weren't ready to get that involved on that ... social and 
political level'. 66 
By choosing to call an economic boycot4 Stephenson had made his protest's 
success dependent on the support and participation of white Bristolians, who made up 
the great majority of bus passengers. This reliance on whites was compounded by 
Stephenson's miscalculation of how willing black people in Bristol would be to 
confront racism head on. The reticence of many black Bristolians to risk a white 
backlash by making too many demands was encapsulated by the local West Indian 
Association when it asserted that, 'Negotiations got coloured men into the garages and 
would have got them onto the buses'. 67 Bristol's pre-war black communities had 
established a niche for themselves in the city and were reluctant to rock the boat 6y 
demanding equality. The post-war immigrants from Asia and the Caribbean were too 
fragmented and too preoccupied with establishing themselves to raise much enthusiasm 
for civil rights campaigning. 'In truth there were no groups or leaders who could claim 
the loyalty, bust and allegiance of what was a politically unorganised migrant 
population', concluded Dresser. 68 
The local whites who supported the boycott did not usually participate in it 
either. A May Day march past the main bus station and the headquarters of the TGWU, 
organised by Stephenson, attracted about a hundred participants, most of whom were 
students. Local white religious organisations that had previously campaigned against the 
colour bar thought the boycott was unnecessarily antagonistic. 'The Bishop of Bristol 
issued a statement today with the Church Council', noted the MP for Bristol South-East, 
Tony Benn, in his diary for 5 May 1963, 'It blamed the trouble on "an unrepresentative" 
66 Ibid., p. 32. 
67 'Bus bar - Bristol fashion', The Institute ofRace Relations Newsletter (June 1963), p. 6. " Dresser, Black and nite, p. 32. 
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group of West Indians, then deplored the attitude of the [white] busmen and called for a 
Christian approach. But nowhere did it say explicitly that the bus colour bar was wrong 
and should go'. 69 Benn and fellow Bristol MP Stan Awberry supported the boycott, with 
Bem particularly active, a further illustration of the fact that the campaign was being 
foughtfor black people, rather than by them. 
The high media profile of the boycott and its occurrence at a time of shifting 
relationships between Britain and its 'New Commonwealth' former colonies meant that 
Stephenson was significantly more successfid in attracting support from influential 
national figures, both black and white. Movement for Colonial Freedom-founder, 
Labour MP and civil rights campaigner Fenner Brockway showed his support by asking 
a question in parliament about why there was not a law to make such colour bars illegal. 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson compared the colour bar in Bristol to apartheid South 
Africa during a public speech, attracting 'good publicity in the local papers', according 
to Benn's diary. 70 The offices of the High Commissioners of Trinidad and Tobago and 
Jamaica also joined in the fray, couching their objections in terms of Britain's 
obligation to treat its Commonwealth citizens with equality and dignity. In fact, so 
involved was the High Commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago, Sir Learie Constantine, 
that shortly after the boycott's end he resigned his post, having been censured by his 
government for creating diplomatic disharmony by publicly intervening in a domestic 
British matter. 71 It was, therefore, at the level of national politics and international 
diplomatic relations, as well as local and national news coverage, that the campaign to 
revoke the colour bar was won. 
69 T. Benn, Out of The Wilderness. Diaries 1963-67 (1, ondon, 1987), p. 14. 70 Wilson's speech is reported in 'Bus bar - Bristol fashion', The Institute of Race Relations Newsletter 
(June 1963), pp. 4-7. Benn, Wilderness, p. 13. 
71 See 'Sir Learie Constantine makes it plain in that Bristol colour bar, West Indian Gazette, June 1963, 
p. I and 'Did migrants issue lead Sir Learie to quit? ', West Indian Gazette, October 1963, p. 1. 
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After much wrangling between the BOC and the TGWU, the end of the colour 
bar was finally announced on 23 August 1963. By the middle of 1965, however, only 
four bus drivers and thirty-nine conductors had been hired. 72 Although black Bristolians; 
were glad to see the back of the colour bar, because there had been so little grassroots 
support for the boycott the local black communities were neither more politicised nor 
united as a result of the campaign. Given the limited impact of the boycott and slow 
pace of progress after the colour bar's end, it is possible that the West Indian 
Association's gradualist approach may have achieved the same results, as it angrily 
claimed. But Paul Stephenson, bom and raised in Britain, was I ess inclined to negotiate 
for something he thought should have been his automatic right as an Englishman. It was 
a difference in outlook between non-white immigrants and British-bom blacks that 
would become more marked over the following decade. 
According to founding member Marion Glean, the idea for CARD was hatched at a 
meeting between Martin Luther King and a group of immigrant leaders during King's 
December 1964 visit to London. 73 Started as a temporary organisation on 10 January 
1965, CARD became a permanent body at a two-day founding convention in London on 
24-25 July 1965.74 Initially conceived as an umbrella organisation, it began by 
soliciting the membership of existing immigrant groups but later set up a network of 
local branches that individuals could join directly. A genuinely multiracial organisation 
from the beginning, CARD borrowed many of its tactics from the American civil rights 
movementý although it appears to have discounted the SCLC's main activity, direct 
action. It did, however, hold voter registration drives, lobbied the government for anti- 
72 Dresser, Black and White, P. 48. 73 M. Glean, "Whatever happened to CARD? ', Race Today 5: 1 (January 1973), p. 14. 
74 Tlhe founding date of CARD is often disputed. This date is taken from the 'CARD National Committee 
Secretary's Report' of 23 July 1965 contained in the CARD file at the IRR. 
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discrimination legislation and even sent students into immigrant areas during their 
summer holidays to collect evidence of discrknination. 
By far the most successful attempt thus far to form a national 'civil rights' 
organisation in Britain, CARD sought initially to influence the shape of the Race 
Relations Bill that was passing through parliament in early 1965. Its success in doing 
this was limited, but by the autumn of 1965 CARD had established itself as an 
organisation that had the ear, at least, of the ruling Labour government . 
75 This was 
demonstrated when two members of CARD's executive committee were asked to join 
NCCI in September 1965. By the time of its third annual convention in July 1967, 
however, CARD was bitterly divided. In the tense and hostile atmosphere of a 
November 1967 extraordinary general meeting, full of new delegates, virtually all the 
existing executive and national committee members were voted out and replaced by 
radical West Indian officials. Although the chairman, David Pitt, remained in his post 
and continued to describe himself as the leader of CARD until at least the end of the 
decade, it was a discredited and powerless organisation after 1967. A full-time 
volunteer in CARD's central London office, Diane Langford had helped to organise the 
1967 coup but left the organisation shortly afterwards. JI]n the end I just dropped out 
because there was nothing happening and it wasn't developing', she remembers. 76 
In his 1972 study of the rise and fall of CARD, sociologist Benjamin Heineman 
made the bold statement that, 'CARD was founded ... to speak for a social and political 
movement that did not exist'. 77 Heineman's assessment was correct, but it was a 
challenge of which the leaders of CARD were aware. Their goal in founding the 
75 Ibis was no doubt helped by the fact that much of CARD's leadership had close ties with the Labour 
Party. Leading CARD members David Pit4 Jocelyn Barrow and Anthony Lester all later became Labour 
peers. 
76 Diane Langford, interviewed by the author, I September 2004. 77 Dummett, "CARD Reconsidered', p. 42. 
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organisation was to create a national network of support that would strengthen their 
lobbying attempts in the corridors of Westminster. By the end of 1965, however, the 
idea of basing a campaign around lobbying the government seemed far less credible to 
black people, both because the new immigration legislation suggested that the 
government was turning against them and the new race relations legislation suggested 
that its goodwill did not translate into meaningfid protection. In fact, it was precisely the 
government's attempts to create an anti-discrimination fi-amework that thwarted 
development of the independent network CARD activists were trying to create. Writing 
about the National Committee for Commonwealth hmnigrants' impact on CARD, 
Michael Dummett concluded that, 'Merely by coming into existence, the NCCI had 
78 delivered one of the most damaging blows to the embryo civil rights movement'. 
Dummett believed it was the decision of CARD's chairman David Pitt and its 
vice-chairman Hamza Alavi to accept the invitation, at the end of 1965, to be co-opted 
onto the NCCI which started the decline in CARD's fortunes. The invitation was highly 
controversial, but neither Pitt nor Alavi discussed their decision to join the NCCI with 
anyone before announcing it as afait accompli. The depth of the anger this caused was 
clearly shown in a letter from the Secretary of WISC to David Pitt. 'We are at a loss to 
understand how CARD is on record as being militantly opposed to that nauseating 
document called "The White Paper on Immigration from the Commonwealth" and at 
the same time serve [sic] on a committee, which has been set up to implement the so- 
called Integration proposals laid down in the White Paper', wrote the Secretary. 'It is 
also obvious, even to a blind man, that the National Committee is unsuited to do the job 
it is supposed to do and will likely do more harm than good. Indeed there is a growing 
feeling that some prominent members of this Committee are directly responsible for the 
78 Durrmett, 'Tmvails', p. 11. 
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present climate of hostile racial feelings. 79 When several of CARD's key member 
groups, most notably WISC and the National Federation of Pakistani Associations 
(NFPA), disaffiliated in protest, Pitt and Alavi still refused to resign from NCCI saying 
that they had been asked to join as private individuals, not representatives of CARD, 
and therefore there was no conflict of interest. In Michael Dummett's opinion, 'This 
helped greatly to bring about the reduction of the National Council [of CARD] to 
complete ineffectiveness. CARD never again looked like obtaining the support en 
masse of the immigrant organisations'. 80 
At the end of 1965, CARD's leadership could point to the Race Relations Act to 
justify its methods of political lobbying and sitting on government committees. But the 
Race Relations Act, passed in November 1965 was only a faltering first step to curb 
racial discrimination. It banned pubs, restaurants, hotels and other places of public 
resort from refusing service on grounds of colour, while leaving the crucial areas of 
housing and employment untouched. This did not belie the genuine desire of some 
sections within the Labour Party to tackle what they saw as the moral wrong of racism, 
but the contrast between the Party's ability to legislate strongly and swiftly against 
immigration and their softly-softly approach to curbing racial discrimination was 
difficult to ignore. It was of little use to most black people to have the right to stay in a 
hotel when they could not afford to do so. Furthermore, the enforcement provisions of 
the act were so weak that it was virtually unworkable. Researcher Bob Hepple neatly 
summed up the flaws in the act, describing it as 'unnecessarily complicated while, at the 
same time, being toothless. 81 Complaints had to be reported by the aggrieved party 
within a limited period to the newly created Race'Relations Board, which then 
79 Letter from the Secretary of WISC to David Pitt, 22 October 1965, held in the CARD file at the IRR. so Dummett, 'CARD Reconsidered', p. 43. 
11 B. Hepple, R=4 Jobs and the Law (London, 1968), p. 13 6. 
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investigated very slowly, had no powers of subpoena, and could neither compel the 
offending party to stop their discriminatory practices nor seek reparations for the mjured 
party. Prosecutions could only be brought with the permission of the Attorney-General, 
hence very few were instigated. From the moment the Race Relations Act entered the 
statute books it was widely criticiscd, not only by black people but also by journalists 
and even members of the Labour Party. 82 In June 1966, the Home Secretary received a 
letter signed by eighty-seven clergymen urging him to extend the act to cover 
employment, housing and fmancial services. 83 CARD's association with the Race 
Relations Act, therefore, did little to enhance its reputation in the eyes of many of its lay 
members. 
The reason that CARD's leaders differed so greatly in perspective from the 
general membership was because they were largely well-meaning, middle-class white 
people like Julia Gaitskell and Anthony Lester or middle-class Asians and West Indians, 
like David Pitt, Haniza Alavi, Raniana Ash and Jocelyn Barrow. 'The leadership, the 
chair, they never came [to the CARD office] and they were people who were living 
completely different kinds of lives', remembers former volunteer Diane Langford. 'It 
was basically run by posh white people and they had David Pitt there as a sort of a 
figurehead'. " The leaders believed that the best approach to race relations was to 'open 
the door from within, according to Langford, a strategy that had the convenient side 
effect of enhancing their own personal prestige and political power. By 1966 white 
people like Michael Dummett were as over-represented in the lower echelons of CARD 
as in the leadership: 'Many of the representatives of the local CARD branches on the 
National Council were white', he wrote in 1973. 'West Indian members of CARD quite 
12, Sections from Hansard and articles in the Times and Sunday Times criticising the act were reprinted in 
CARD's own joumal Campaign. See Campaign, I (undated), p. 5, held in the CARD file at the IRR. 
13 See Lester and B indman, Race and Law, P. 123. 
" Diane Langford, interviewed by the author, I September 2004. 
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85 
rightly thought that CARD no longer represented them'. Although the American civil 
rights groups that were inspirational to CARD, such as the NAACP and the Congress of 
Racial Equality, had white members, neither organisation would have dreamt of 
allowing its leadership to be dominated by white people. Certainly it was not what 
Marion Glean had envisioned when she described CARD as an organisation that would 
Gensure that immigrants, West Indians, Pakistanis, Indians and Africans could 
themselves decide their own strategies, decide on their own priorities, build their own 
organisation and in doing those things break the circle of dependency'. 86 She felt that on 
those terms it had already failed by the time of the founding convention in July 1965. 
Conclusion 
A turning point in the British political approach to immigration, 1965 also represented a 
watershed in black immigrants' perception ofthe state. The period between 1955 and 
1965 had been a time of settlement and orientation for black immigrants to Britain. 
Their unavoidable encounters with white racism, however, forced them to start 
engaging with each other to find ways to defend their personal safety and political 
interests. The continuing individual racism, expressed daily in subtle ways and during 
crises like the 1958 Nottingham and Notting Hill riots, divested them of any romantic 
notions about the benevolence of the mother country. The political consensus on the 
need for immigration control that first emerged in the run up to the general election of 
October 1964, showed them that individual prejudice was just the surface manifestation 
of an underlying racism that inhered in the structures of the state. Political 
representation would therefore have to be created independently, as it had by African 
15 Dummett, 'CARD Reconsidered, p. 44. 
86 Glean, TARDT, p. 14. 
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and West Indian students campaigning against British imperialism in the 1930s and 
1940s. 
In spite of interest from politicians, journalists and the race relations industry, 
most black immigrants did not look to the United States for inspiration. Mimetic 
. itiatives such as the Bristol bus boycott of 1963 and the creation of CARD floundered hu 
and non-violent direct action was not widely adopted as a protest tactic in black 
communities. The mainstream political discourse on race relations before 1965 was 
bound up with a specificafly British debate on immigration. Britain's first Race 
Relations Act was not the result of an American-style civil rights campaign, but the 
positive element of the formula, by 1965 agreed on both by politicians and the race 
relations industry, that less immigration plus more integration would equal good race 
relations. By the time black immigrants to Britain realised that they could not rely on 
mainstream political processes to represent their interests, the American civil rights 
movement had already started its transition from non-violent direct action to Black 
Power militancy. 
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CHAPTER2 
'In the belly of the beast': from black disillusionment to Black Power 
Introduction 
Between Febnjary 1965, when Malcolm X's visit to Britain attracted a moderate 
amount of media attention, and July 1967, when the arrival of Black Power's pre- 
eminent spokesperson, Stokely Carmichael, prompted a slew of hysterical articles 
and a government ban on him returning, British society became increasingly 
polarised around the issue of race. The Labour Party competed with the 
Conservatives to be seen as toughest on immigration, alienating its black 
supporters in the process. At the same time, immigrants from Asia and the 
Caribbean, having realised that their original intention to work in Britain for a few 
years before returning home with a nest-egg was unrealistic, and that they had, in 
fact7 become settled in Britain, began to pay more attention to domestic events. 
Immigration as a political issue was less prominent in the election year of 1966 
because the 'increasing consensus of stringency between the two major parties' 
made it a poor campaign topic. ' By mid-1967, however, the possibility that several 
thousand British passport-holding Asians from Kenya might exercise their right to 
live in Britain had made it an urgent concern once again. The Labour goverment's 
hasty legislative response, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of I March 1968, 0 
which took just a week to be debated and approved by parliament, became 
popularly known as the Kenyan Asians Act The most racially discriminatory piece 
of legislation to enter the statute books thus far, it was later ruled unlawfid by the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
I The Institute ofRace Relations Newsletter (January 1967), p. 2. 
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The government had announced in July 1967 that it planned to fortify the 
1965 Race Relations Act, but had not yet done so by the time the Kenyan Asians 
Act was passed. Britain's second Race Relations Act was drafted in response to a 
major study of racial discrimination in Britain, jointly commissioned by the Race 
Relations Board and National Council for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), 
which had revealed that in virtually all areas of British society racial discrimination 
was thriving. 2 But although the Political and Economic Planning (PEP) report 
Racial Discrimination in Britain was published in April 1967, it took several 
months of debate before the 1968 Race Relations Act entered the statute books the 
following November. The 1968 act was an improvement on its predecessor in as 
far as it extended its anti-discrimination provisions to cover the vital areas of 
employment and housing. Compared with the swift decisiveness with which MPs 
had deprived the Kenyan Asians of their legal rights as British citizens earlier in 
the year, however, it appeared a half-hearted and ineffectual sop. 
The hard line taken by the Labour government over the Kenyan Asians did 
not, as might have been expected, steal the thunder of the political far right, but 
actually encouraged its demands. Enoch Powell's notorious 'Rivers of Blood' 
speech, delivered in Birmingham on 20 April 1968, was but the first of many 
apocalyptic perorations, full of apocryphal stories of outrageous immigrant 
behaviour, which journalists reported as fact. Despite being sacked from the 
Conservative shadow cabinet and censured by party leader Edward Heath, Powell 
set the pace and tone of political discussion on immigration for the next decade. 
Applauded or deplored, but never overlooked, the media reported Powell's every 
word: 'For the mass media Powell was race relations, remembered one 
2 Political and Economic Planning (PEP), Racial Discrimination in Britain (London, 1967). 
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contemporary observer. 3 Most importantly, the extremism of Powell's views 
dragged the discourse on immigration to the right and made liberalism an 
untenable political position. 'The tone of his [Rivers of Blood] speech', explained 
historian Richard Thurlow, 'brought the language and arguments of the neo-fascist 
4 political fdnge into the heart of the establishment'. Evidence of this was 
inadvertently acknowledged by Powell himself in 1971, when he commented that 
the Conservative government's recently introduced immigration bill, which 
proposed to allow only patrial citizens (that is, British passport holders with a UK- 
born parent or grandparent) the automatic right to live in Britain, reminded him of 
Nazi Germany's categorisation as Jewish anyone with a Jewish grandmother. 5 The 
1971 Immigration Act did not go far enough, however, for the National Front, 
founded in February 1967. Finding itself suddenly sharing respectable political 
ground with the extreme right wing of the Conservative Party and encouraged by 
public displays of support for Enoch Powell, such as the marches of hundreds of 
dock workers and Smithfield meat porters to the Houses of Parliament in the week 
after his 'Rivers of Blood' speech, it redoubled its campaign to rid Britain of black 
people by constitutional or other means and printed the slogan 'Enoch was right' 
on badges, flyers and placards. 6 Richard Thurlow believes that 'There can be little 
3 J. Bourne, The Powell EffecV, Race & Class, 39: 4 (1998), p. 60. 
4 IL Thurlow, Fascism in Britain (New York, 1987), p. 246. 
sPowell's comments were reported in P. Evans, 'Immigration: British-Style', Transftlo, % 40 
P)(Zember 197 1), p. 40. 
' -er a thousand dock workers from the East End of London marched to the House of Commons 
on 23 April 1968, bearing placards reading 'Don't Knock Enoch. The following day, around 400 
porters from London's Smithfield meat market also marched to parliament, bearing a petition with 
over 2,000 signatures urging Heath to reinstate Powell. A Gallup poll at the end of April 1968 
purported to show that 74 per cent of respondents agreed with Powell's views on immigration, 
while a write-in poll undertaken by the Wolverhampton &press and Star produced 35,000 
postcards expressing support for Powell and hardly any against him. For more details on all of these 
events see D. Sandbrook, "ite Heat: a History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties (London, 2006), 
pp. 642-5. 
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doubt that the National Front would not have survived if Enoch Powell had not 
unwittingly given it such a helping hand in its infancy'. 7 
In such a racially polarised and hostile atmosphere, the American Black 
Power movement gained credibility as an organisational blueprint for black 
resistance in Britain. In June 1967, a small group of British activists who had been 
regularly meeting at Speaker's Comer on Sundays to discuss racism in Britain, set 
up Britain's first Black Power group, the Universal Coloured People's Association 
(UCPA). When radical African American leader Stokely Carmichael, head of the 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and co-author of Black 
Power. the Politics ofLiberation in America, visited Britain the following month, 
he was introduced to the UCPA, along with other immigrant groups in London and 
activists including Nfichael X. 8 Cannichael's short visit gave Britain's nascent 
Black Power movement a tremendous boost. A sensationalising media broadcast 
his words to black people around the country, but also provoked fear in many 
politicians, policemen, journalists and judges, who worried that the new spirit of 
black militancy in Britain might lead to American-style race riots. 
The phrase 'Black Power' had been first popularised as a rallying call for 
African Americans by Carmichael in the summer of 1966. A highly flexible term 
that could be used as a justification for both black capitalism and revolutionary 
pan-African socialism, -Black Powees appeal among disillusioned African 
Americans stemmed from its militant assertion of pride in being black. Groups 
such as Ron Karenga's US, Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale's Black Panther 
Party and Carmichael's a-black SNCC often disagreed vehemently, even 
7 Thurlow, Fascism, p. 249. 
3 S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, Black Power. Me Politics of Liberation in America (New York, 
1967). 
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violently, on the correct path to black liberation, but none would have disagreed 
with the dictum 'Black is beautiful' or the need for black people to unite and lead 
their own organisations. Having evolved from the southern-based, non-violent 
phase of the civil rights movement, which was in terminal decline by the end of 
1966, Black Power spoke to the disillusioned African American residents of the 
ghettoes. These people had seen no improvement in their dire economic and social 
circumstances during the 'King years' and perceived no benefit in voting for a 
white-dominated political system that seemed determined to 'keep them down. 
Although not a movement born of desperation, Black Power did speak to the 
desperately poor and disillusioned and, by 1967, black immigrants in Britain were 
beginning to identify with them. 
The overwhelming majority of Black Power activists in Britain came from 
tile Caribbean, although there were also African and southern Asian members, 
some of whom, for example Nigerian Obi Egbuna, president of the UCPA and 
founder of the Black Panther Movement (BPM), and Indian Ajoy Ghose, UCPA 
member, founder of the Malcolm X Montessori School and editor of Black Power 
newspaper the TrIcontinental Outpost, held significant leadership positions. Black 
sociology student Susan Craig, who infiltrated several London Black Power groups 
in 1969 to research her final year thesis, found that 'For the purposes of the Black 
Power organisations, the two significant immigrant groups in Britain are the 
Asians and the West Indians', although qualified the remark with the observation 
that, 'the number of Asians in most groups that I have seen is negligible'. 9 A 
UCPA membership list from 1967, though, contained seventeen immediately 
recognisable Asian surnames (for example Krishna, Mohamed, Khan and 
9 S. Craig, 'Black Power groups in London, 1967-1969', unpublished BSc thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1970, pp. 15,7 1. 
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Chowdhury) out of a total of seventy-six. 10 Anecdotal evidence the former Black 
Power activists interviewed by the author indicates that Africans represented a very 
small minority of the overall membership of the London groups surveyed, and as 
the highest concentration of Africans in Britain was in London, it is unlikely that 
Black Power groups outside the capital had a higher percentage of African 
members. Black Power groups were not interested in racially classifying their 
members, however, as long as they were not white. A UCPA leaflet made no 
distinction between Africans, West Indians and Indians, seeing the only opposition 
as between oppressors and the oppressed: 'The history of the oppressed peoples of 
Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Americas over the last four hundred years has 
demonstrated that the world has been divided into two irreconcilable camps. "' The 
idea of blackness as a political colour crystallised, and was most clearly articulated 
during the Black Power movement, but it had deep historical roots in three 
continents. 
Black Britain between 1965 and 1967: disillusionment with liberalism 
After 1965, being associated with the Labour Party became increasingly 
problematic for anyone claiming to represent the interests of the black community. 
The Labour government's authorship of the 1965 Race Relations Act did little to 
change this position. Criticised from its inception by MPs, the press, liberal whites 
and most black people, the act began to display its inadequacies immediately. At 
the end of 1965 the Birmingham branch of the Indian Workers' Association (GB) 
published a booklet, 'The Victims Speak', which quietly condemned the act. 'The 
Race Relations Act was in many ways a disappointment to us, it declared, 'as we 
10 UCPA membership list from Tony Soares' private collection. II UCPA, 6U. C. P. A. Black Power', undated two page leaflet, held uncatalogued at the EM 
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had hoped to see it as an effective weapon against racial discrimination'. 12 In More 
radical quarters the act's ineffectiveness was interpreted as quite deliberate. '[T]he 
Labour governm passed the Race Relations Act in 1965, and set up the Race 
Relations Board in 1966, to fiustrate black people and prevent us from taking 
effective organised action', contended a Black Panther Movement (BPM) leaflet. 
'Under the Race Relations Act, several black people have been prosecuted and sent 
to prison for speaking up for the rights of black people, but white fascists are 
allowed to refuse black people jobs, homes and insult and humiliate us, and are not 
prosecuted under this so-called Act'. 13 One of several black orators at Speaker's 
Comer to feel the sharp end of the 1965 act, when he was prosecuted for inciting 
racial hatred in 1967, Ajoy Ghose echoed the BPM's cynicism. 'The 'ýrace 
relations act7 was a carefid scheme which was well engineered by the white liberal 
racists and their sympathisers, which will continue to show its vicious and subtle 
oppression of the Black people in the U. Y, ', he predicted. 14 
By November 1966, a full year after the act's passage, only three of the 
new Race Relations Board's regional conciliation committees had been set up. The 
London, Manchester and Birmingham committees had few opportunities to try out 
their conciliatory powers because most of the complaints they received concerned 
discrimination by employers, landlords or estate agents, none of whom fell within 
the act's purview. In January 1967, the editor of The Institute of Race Relations 
Newsletter noted that, 'of the two hundred or so complaints sent in' to the 
Birmingham office, 'about three-quarters were outside the committee's field of 
12 IWA (GB), 'The Victims Speak', November 1965, p. 9, held uncatalogucd at the IRR. 13 BPK 'Black People Don't Vote', June 1970, p. 3. Leaflet held in Black groups file at the MIL 14 'Attacks on Black Activists, Tri-Continental Outpost 19 (January 1972), p. 2. 
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reference". 15 Ile Attorney-General also seemed reticent to use the new powers of 
prosecution vested in him by section six of the Race Relations Act, that made 
incitement to racial hatred illegal. In May 1966, six MPs were so fiustrated by the 
Attorney-General's repeated refusals to initiate proceedings against various far- 
right groups that they tabled an all-party motion amending the act to allow the 
police to instigate prosecutions. 16 The first trial under section six of the Race 
Relations Act eventually took place in October 1966, but although British National 
Socialist Christopher Britton was found guilty (for pinning racist material to his 
local MP's door and throwing a bottle wrapped in racist propaganda through his 
window), his conviction was promptly quashed on appeal, as it was decided the 
MP's family did not constitute a section of the public. 17 
In 1966 the most visible body campaigning for racial equality was the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) and its demise, seemingly at the 
hands of a Black Power cabal, the following year was the subject of many 
newspaper headlines. CARD spent most of 1966 collecting evidence of 
discrimination in order both to test the effectiveness of the previous year's Race 
Relations Act and to persuade the government of the need to extend its provisions. 
Having damaged its reputation in some black communities by getting involved in 
the process of drawing up the less-than-comprehensive 1965 act, CARD needed to 
prove that it was having a beneficial impact to avoid losing even more credibility. 's 
In April 1967, however, the inadequacy of the Race Relations Act was 
unequivocally confirmed by the hard-hitting PEP report, Racial Discrimination in 
S. Patterson, 'Review of 1966', Me Institute ofRace Relations Newsletter (January 1967), p. 1. 
11iis was reported in The Institute ofRace Relations Newsletter (June 1966), p. 9. 
17 See A. Lester and G. Bindman, Race andLaw (Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. 367-8. 
'a See previous chapter for an account of the disaffiliation of the National Federation of Pakistani 
Associations and the West Indian Standing Conference from CARD following leaders David Pitt's 
and Hamza Alavi's decision to accept positions on the government-created and funded NCCI. 
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England. Reprinted as a best-selling paperback the following year, the report made 
the damning finding that '[A]ll but those with totally closed minds must accept the 
fact that in Britain today discrimination against coloured members of the 
population operates in fields not covered by the existing legislation and that it 
operates on a substantial scale'. 19 There had always been competing views on the 
political course CARD should steer, and many black CARD members became 
increasingly suspicious of those white liberal members who continued advocate 
using the machinery of the state to secure racial equality after it had been shown to 
be ineffective. 
The previous chapter outlined how the chair and vice-chair of CARD 
alienated a considerable section of the organisation's black membership at the end 
of 1965 by agreeing to sit on the statutory body, the National- Committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants. Other black groups, such as the IWA (GB), had 
reffised even to join CARD because of its tactical focus on lobbying the 
government. 'Me inability of progressive white CARD members like the 
organisation's legal adviser, Anthony Lester, to empathise with the fiustration and 
impatience for equality of black members, was exemplified in a December 1967 
newspaper article giving reasons for Lester and others' resignation from CARD. 
'Those moving in, [Lester] said, were losing sight of the true purposes of the 
organisation and trying to turn it into a political movement instead of a social and 
democratic one'! O 
The politics of many of those who had joined CARD in anticipation of its 
annual general meeting in 1967 was Black Power, but this was not the reason for 
19 W. Daniel, Racial Discrhnination in England- Based on the P. EP. Report (Harmondsworth, 
1968)ý p. 13. 
20 'Six quit executive of anti-racialist body', Daily Telegraph, 4 December 1967. 
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the organisation's demise. Benjamin Heineman, an American sociology 
postgraduate in London during the mid to late-1960s, wrote that 'Because there 
were no clear guideposts for British activists promoting the immigrants' cause, the 
American experience had a distorting effect since it was often assumed that British 
race relations would go through similar stages'. 21 Heineman's 1972 book on 
CARD also fell foul of trying to fit the organisation's history to an American 
script, however, blaming its disintegration on the black nationalism of a West 
Indian faction heavily influenced by American Black Power. 22 His conclusions 
chimed with those of the contemporary British press, which noted with disapproval 
the presence of the newly formed UCPA at CARD's 1967 annual convention. In a 
Times article headlined, 'Tbreat to Card [sic] From Extremists', American Black 
Power was blamed implicitly. 'Mhere are always heavy dangers in riding tigers', 
concluded the journalist, 'and these dangers are not reduced when the animal 
changes to a black panther'ý3 
Some CARD members clearly were influenced by the burgeoning Black 
Power movement in the United States after 1966. A press statement issued in 
November 1967 by Johnny James, one of the organisation's newly-elected militant 
black leaders, had all the hallmarks of a Black Power perspective. 'Let it be quite 
clear that I do not like speaking to the white imperialist press reporters', James 
began, 'because by nature they have to lie and distort everything one says to carry 
out the orders and wishes of their masters'? 4 The rest of James's statement paid 
homage to Mao and the various anti-colonial movements in Africa which, although 
" B. Heineman. The Politics of the Powerless: a Study of the Campaign Against Racial 
Discrimination (London, 1972), p. xL 22 Ibid., p. 219. 
23 77je 7-unes, 7 November 1967, p. 11. 
24 J. James, 'Press interview statement', 9 November 1967, p. 1. Document held in CARD file at 
Institute of Race Relations (IRR). 
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common Black Power themes, were also independent political causes in Britain. 
Former CARD member Diane Langford attests to this. 'I think [the 1967 CARD 
coup] was an effect of the American situation', she says, 'but the political climate 
was also very exciting in the sense of anti-colonial struggles. There were some 
people who were Maoists and China was standing up to the West - they were 
tremendous role models'. 25 CARD disintegrated in 1967, therefore, not because of 
a Black Power-inspired split between black nationalist and white and Asian 
members, although that certainly helped. T"he goal of the angry black members 
who packed CARD's annual conference in July 1967 and the extraordinary general 
meetings that followed it in November and December, was not necessarily to 
reorient CARD to Black Power, but to stop it from continumg: as a white- 
dominated, reformist, lobbying organisation whose policy was decided at the top 
and imposed on the lower ranks and in which the chair and vice-chairman were 
viewed by the lay membership as lackeys of the state. 
By the summer of 1967 the British press had developed a keen interest in 
Black Power and the pathology of American race relations. The reports, from the 
summer of 1965 onwards, of rioting by economically and socially disadvantaged 
African Americans in the major northern cities of the United States had a greater 
impact on British politicians' views of race relations in Britain than previous non- 
violent civil rights protests. The riots in the United States convinced many white 
Britons in positions of power that British race relations were on a potentially 
disastrous course. A further outbreak of rioting in Detroit in July 1967 was 
reported extensively in the pages of British newspapers and on its television 
screens, accompanied by debates on whether such scenes would ever be seen in 
25 Diane Langford, interviewed by the author, I September 2004. 
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Britain. 'Dark prophecies and warnings of American-style riots continued to be 
uttered in the late summer - or at least appear in the headlines', noted the IRIVs 
news cuttings round-up in September 1967.26 By 1967 most British homes 
contained a television set and advances in technology had made transatlantic 
broadcasting much easier. A team of 7"Imes journalists described the impact this 
had in 1968. . 'For on the TV screens of those who can afford them, ' they wrote, 
'America's race riots are brought as a hideous example into our own homes. It ig 
no longer possible to view Britain in isolation. 27 
The rioting in the United States was seen as particularly relevant to British 
society in the mid-1960s because it was believed that the children of the first 
generation of black immigrants, who had either been born in Britain or brought 
over as children, were approaching school and home-leaving age and were, 
therefore, about to have their first experiences of Britain's (entirely legal) racially 
discriminatory employment and housing markets. Most MIs and race relations 
researchers believed that although a colour bar might have been tolerated by first 
generation immigrants, their British-born or raised children would expect a much 
greater degree of equality. The potential fall-out from the gap between black 
teenagers' hopes and expectations and the reality of their adult lives in Britain was 
therefore considered to be a pressing social problem. In two separate 1966 
speeches, Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins indicated that this was one of the 
reasons the government was considering extending the 1965 Race Relations Act to 
cover housing and employmenO 'The next generation, who will not be 
immigrants but coIoured Britons, ' Jenkins explained, 'will expect full opportunities 
26 The Institute ofRace Relations Newsletter (September 1967), p. 334. 27 S. Clarke, P. Evans, M. Knipe, G. Lloyd, D. van der Vat and W. Norris, 7he Black Man in Search 
Vlýýo! f (London, 1968), p. 17 1. 
Ile speeches were at the NCCI on 23 May 1966 and the UM on 10 October 1966. 
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to deploy their skills. If we fiustrate those expectations ... we shall irreparably 
damage the quality of life in our society by creating an American-type situation. 29 
On 26 July 1967 Jenkins finally announced the government's intention to 
introduce legislation that would significantly extend the scope of the 1965 Race 
Relations Act. The flip side of this legislative coin was that the government was 
also determined to clamp down on signs of militant agitation in the black 
community. It was no coincidence that on the same day as he announced the 
government's proposed extension of anti-discrimination legislation, Jenkins also 
announced that Stokely Carmichael had been barred from Britain. It was not Black 
Power per se, though, that the British government was worried about. Carmichael 
was banned because American-style race riots were considered a real and present 
danger by mid-1967, not because the British government saw him as the harbinger 
of a Black Power revolution. 
Between 1965 and 1967, however, the domestic conditions that black 
people would one day riot over - police brutality, the differential treatment of their 
children at school and discrimination in housing and employment - continued to 
worsen. Abroad, the British government's reftzal to send troops to Rhodesia to 
overturn white supremacist leader Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of 
independence in November 1965, and its opposition to sanctions against apartheid 
South Africa, convinced many black people in Britain that the state had no real 
commitment to racial equality. Reviewing the events of 1965, the Institute ofRace 
Relations Newsletter commented that 'The hardening of national and local opinion 
on the immigration issue, and the continued (and highly publicised) activity of 
white racialist guerilla-groups, evoked a corresponding mood of hurt, bitterness, 
29 R. Jenkins, 'Address by the Home Secrctmy to the Institute, Race 8: 3 (1967), p. 216. 
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and recoil among many'? o Later commentaries from Black Power newspapers 
show how the feelings described by the IP. R Newsletter fuelled the disillusionment 
upon which the Black Power movement fed. 'That Britain would eventually settle 
its "differences7' with the Pigs in Salisbury, we all knew', commented a Black 
Power newspaper in 1972, 'We knew it when Britain failed to take any action 
against that racist pig Smith and his gang'. 31 By the time Stokely Carmichael 
arrived in London on 18 July 1967 to speak at a counter-cultural gathering, the 
Dialectics of Liberation conference, many black people in Britain were ready for a 
new voice and a new, militant, direction. 
Stokely Carmichael and the birth of a British Black Power movement 
Born in Trinidad, Stokely Carmichael was brought up in New York and 
Washington D. C., where he graduated from Howard University, a prestigious 
African American college. A member of SNCC from its birth, he was its chairman 
by 1966. A middle-class intellectual radicalised by his experiences in the civil 
rights movement, Carmichael advocated black unity, socialism, Pan-Africanism 
and armed resistance to white racism. His book, Black Power: The Politics of 
Liberation in America, written with political scientist Charles Hamilton, had just 
been published in the United States when he came to London in July as part of a 
tour of Europe and Africa. Those who actually read the book would have found it 
surprisingly measured in tone, but the power of the title alone to inspire or 
intimidate should not be underestimated, and in July 1967 that was the only part of 
the book of which anyone in Britain was likely to be aware. It is hard to overstate 
7he Instinde ofRace Relations Newsletter (January 1966), p. 2. 
$Zimbabwe (Rhodesia - as they call it)', Resistance 1: 2 (November 1972), p. 1. Resistance, held 
at the IRR, was the newspaper of the Coventry-based Black Power organisation, the Afro-Asian 
Peoples Liberation Movement. 
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the impact of Carmichael's eleven-day visit to Britain in July 1967. Trinidadian 
intellectual CLR James gave a lengthy analysis of Carmichael's importance in a 
speech on Black Power he wrote a month after attending the Dialectics conference. 
'It is undoubtedly his presence here, and the impact that he has made in his 
speeches and his conversations', said James, 'that have made the slogan Black 
Power reverberate in the way that it is doing in political Britain'. 32 Declaring 
Carmichael to be the latest West Indian intellectual in a succession that included 
Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Aimd Usaire and Frantz Fanon, James praised 
both Carmichael's message and his mode of delivery. 'I was so struck by what he 
was saying and the way he was saying it', remarked James. 'He speaks with a 
scope and depth of range of political understanding that astonishes me'. 33 
Angela Davis, who also attended the Dialectics of Liberation conference, 
described the personal impact of Carmichael's speech in her autobiography. 'As I 
listened to Stokely's words, cutting like a switchblade, accusing the enemy as I had 
never heard him accused before', she wrote, 'I admit I felt the cathartic power of 
his speech'. 34 Obi Egbuna described Carmichael's arrival in Britain as being 'like 
manna from heaven' and argued that, 'It was not until Stokely Carmichael's 
historic visit in the Summer of 1967 ... that Black Power got a foothold in 
Britain'? 5 His visit was still being talked about in Britain's black communities a 
year later. John La Rose, a Trinidadian writer and political activist who, in 1966, 
had set up both independent black publishing house New Beacon Books and West 
Indian cultural association the Caribbean Artists' Movement (CAM) in London, 
32 CJ. JL James, 'Black Power Its Past, Today and The Way Ahead', 1968. p. 1. The pamphlet 
does not list a publisher and is held in the Black Documents file at the IRR. 33 Ibid., pp. 2,4. 34 A. Davis, Angela Davis. an Autobiography (New York, 1974), p. 150. 33 0. Egbuna, Des&W 77zis Temple. ý the Voice of Black Porwer In Britain (London, 197 1), pp. IS, 
16. 
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noticed the impact of Carmichael's visit on both of his organisations. 'I feel that 
the effect of Stokely Carmichael's presence ... last year was a catalyst 
in a way 
that nothing before had been", La Rose told fellow CAM members at the 
organisation's second annual conference in August 1968, 'and you can see within 
that one year's experience, a fantastic development has occurred'? 6 Carmichael's 
visit did not just make an impact on black Britain though. The editorial team of the 
Anti-Apartheid News were so impressed with Carmichael's linking of domestic 
racism with neo-colonialism and imperialism in the Third World, and particularly 
southern Africa, that they adorned the front cover of the September issue with a 
drawing of his face. 37 The British government's reaction to Carmichael stood in 
contrast to its toleration of militant African American leader Malcolm X who had 
been allowed to return to Britain in February 1965 despite making public 
statements during his December 1964 visit that could not possibly have been 
regarded as less inflammatory than Carmichael's words. 
Carmichael's speech at the Dialectics of Liberation conference fell far short 
of the blood-curdling tocsin call to race revolution it was portrayed as in the 
press? s It attempted to link domestic racism and the economic exploitation of 
black minorities with imperialist and neo-colonialist exploitation of the Third 
World, explaining that 'The proletariat has become the Third World, and the 
bourgeoisie is white Western society'? 9 Carmichael finther argued that racial 
equality was not possible under capitalism because 'Capitalism by its very nature, 
36 John La Rose's comments from the second CAM conference at Kent University in August 1968 
are recorded on p. 36 of uncatalogued transcripts held at the George Padmore Institute (GPI). 
17 Anti-Apartheid News, September 1967, p. 1. 
3" For example the preamble to an interview with Carmichael published in The Observer Review 
described him as a 'man to hate and fear'. C. McGlashan, 'Mainspring of Black Power Colin 
McGlashan Talks to Stokely Carmichael', 7he Observer Review, 23 July 1967, p. 1. 
" S. Carmichael, Stokely Speaks: Black Power Back to Pan-Africanism (New York, 197 1), p. 9 1. 
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cannot create structures free from oppression'! O He also urged black people to 
create an independent self-image, saying, 'The people of the Tbird World are 
going to have to stop accepting the definitions imposed on them by the West'! ' 
Rejecting white people of all political hues as unable to see or dispense with the 
inherent advantages their skin colour bestowed, Carmichael placed his call for 
black people to use violence in defence of their rights within a historical context of 
social, economic and physical violence inflicted on them by white capitalist 
societies. 'Wherever you go in Africa today, the Africans are suffering from 
violence inflicted on them by the white West', he argued, 'be it that they are 
stripped of their culture, of their human dignity, or of the resources of their very 
land'! 2 Unwittingly condemning the activities of CARD chairman David Pitt and 
his organisation, Carmichael made it clear that in his opinion conciliation and 
collaboration with a white power structure was pointless. 'Because of the 
integration movement's middle-class orientation, because of its subconscious 
racism, and because of its non-violent approach, it has never been able to involve 
the black proletariat', he lectured! 3 ' Tbe only thing a white liberal can do for me is 
to help civilise other whites, because they need to be civilised . 
'44 
Although persuasively argued and elegantly interspersed with literary 
references to Camus, Sartre, Kipling and even Lewis Carroll, Carmichael's speech 
was not groundbreaking in its originality. 11is themes of Pan-Africanism, black 
unity, the inherent corruption of capitalism and the need for black people to use 
violence to resist violent oppression had been articulated in Britain more than two 
years earlier by Carmichael's hero Malcolm X. In July 1967, however, black 
40 
1 p. 7. 41 Ibid, p. 80. 42 Ibid, p. 92. 43 lbicL, p. 88. 44 Ibid., pp. 85-6. 
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Britain seemed particularly ready to receive the message of Black Power and white 
Britons seemed far more disturbed by it than they had been at the start of 1965. 
Malcolm X's visit had inspired the creation of one militant organisation, the Racial 
Adjustment Action Society (RAAS), which garnered far more press attention than 
it did members. Carmichael's visit, on the other hand, heralded a paradigm shift in 
black protest. 
This could not be explained simply by the brilliance of Carmichael's fiery 
oratory. By July 1967, British and American race relations had reached a stage of 
comparative synchronicity that made black people in Britain look to African 
Americans for guidance far more than before. Discussing this change in 1968, John 
La Rose told his fellow CAM members that, 'The reason why I think the Afro- 
West Indian in Britain looks to the United States is because you have the same 
Idmd of urban experience which he is now forced up against. '43 The inspirational 
value of the non-violent phase of the American civil rights movement had been 
negated by the very different context of the southern movement in the United 
States, the inapplicability of its aims to Britain and the relative unity and 
homogeneity of its followers. But the racial polarisation of British society after 
1965, an increasing disillusiomnent with white liberals and refonnism and the 
coming of age of a new generation of black Britons combined to persuade black 
people, particularly West Indians, that there were real parallels between their 
situation and that of African Americans in the United States. 
Such similarities were not only perceived by black people in Britain. 
Recalling a visit to London in July 1967, Angela Davis wrote in her autobiography 
that she was struck 'by the degree to which West Indian communities in Britain 
4-5 La Rose is quoted on p. 39 of uncataIogued transcripts of the second CAM conference, held in 
the GPI. 
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were mirror images of Black communities at home. These warm, receptive, fiery, 
enthusiastic people were also searching for some way to avenge themselves'. 46 
Richard Small, a founding member of CARD and an active participant in the West 
Indian Standing Conference (WISC) and CAM, concluded that it was African 
Americans' success that particularly attracted black immigrants' attention. 'We 
are looking to America simply because black people in America are finding a way 
of dealing with their situation', he declared in 1968. 'If black people in South 
Africa were finding a way to deal with their situation we would look there too., 47 
The anti-colonialism and class-based analysis that underpinned Black 
Power philosophy made it particularly well-suited to the British context. Whereas 
invoking Marxism and aspiring to socialism were politically beyond the pale to the 
majority of African Americans, in Britain it placed Black Power within a long 
tradition of radical intellectual dissent. Africans in Britain had already created an 
anti-colonial, anti-imperialist movement in Britain earlier in the twentieth century, 
that complemented and collaborated with home-grown white organisations. As 
well as setting a precedent for black protest, there was a direct crossover between 
groups like the Committee of African Organisations, (CAO) and the later Black 
Power movement. As previously mentioned, UCPA president and BPM founder 
Obi Egbuna had been (and possibly still was) a member of CAO and Malcolm X's 
final visit to Britain in February 1965 had been at CAO's behest. Intellectually, 
there was a clear line of descent from pan-African, anti-colonial activists like Ras 
Makonnen, who was both preaching and practising 'Black Powee in his adopted 
cities of London and Manchester long before the 1960s. Makonnen, a pan- 
46 Davis, Ange4 p. 150. 
47 Small is quoted on p. 40 of uncatalogued umscripts of the second CAM conference, held in the 
GPI. 
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Afficanist who thought that anti-colonial organisations should only have black 
members, wrote that 'this [self-]defence business was almost a daily concern' and 
refused to pay taxes because he 'felt that in this colonial struggle paying income 
tax would be a crime'! 8 He did not believe in working with black middle-class 
organisations like Harold Moody's League of Coloured Peoples, whose activities 
he dismissed as 'mild protest, or if you like, harassing the goody-goody elements 
in Britain! 9 Makonnen also wrote eloquently about the liberating experience of 
mounting a soapbox at Speaker's Comer in London. 'Imagine what it meant to us 
to go to Hyde Park to speak to a race of people who considering themselves our 
masters, ' he wrote, 'and tell them right out what we felt about their empire and 
about them'. 50 It was precisely this practice that led to the formation of Britain's 
first Black Power group, the UCPA, just under a decade after Makonnen had left 
the country to work for Nkrumah in Ghana. 
Anti-colomalism was a concrete and contentious political issue across the 
Commonwealth, where struggles for independence had either recently been fought 
and won, as in the case of recently-liberated African nations like Ghana'and 
Kenya, or were ongoing. In Mozambique, Angola and Guind-Bissau struggling 
against the yoke of Portuguese colonialism, and in Southern Africa, where the 
acquiescence of western European countries resulted in its continued subjugation 
by white supremacist regimes, high profile guerrilla resistance movements were 
active and actively supported by black people and radical whites in Britain. In the 
Caribbean, anti-imperialist movements in Guyana, Trinidad, Anguilla and 
Bermuda, among others, campaigned for the end of British rule or sought to 
48 R. Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within (Oxford, 1973), pp. 143,14 1. 
49 Ibid., p. 126. 
" Ibid., p. 123. 
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destabilise their post-independence, pro-British governments. Many first 
generation black immigrants to Britain had been involved in anti-colonialist 
movements in their home countries. Some, like Guyanese husband and wife Eric 
and Jessica Huntley and Tony Soares, who grew up in Mozambique, had come to 
Britain specifically to escape persecution for their anti-colonial activities at home. 
Thus, Carmichael's explicit linking of domestic racism with foreign imperialism 
and his exhortation to oppose oppression on a global scale resonated with the 
global, anti-colonial perspective which already had an intellectual and practical 
heritage in Britain. His speech resonated so profoundly because he addressed 
contemporary racial discrimination in Britain and analysed it in a global 
fi-amework that incorporated immigrants' anti-imperialist struggles, past and 
present. 
Finally, the need for a Black Power response to racism had already been 
recognised by some black people in Britain by the time Carmichael visited in July 
1967. Britain was already home to two militant black political organisations before 
Carmichael's visit - RAAS, founded in February 1965, and, from June 1967, the 
UCPA. Tony Soares, a founding member of the latter, believed that Carmichael's 
visit coincided almost exactly with the point at which black people in Britain had 
decided to take militant action. 'By 1967 there was a certain amount of 
consciousness among the non-white people in London, and in other parts', he 
remembers, 'we were ... just starting to get organised". 
51 Before solidifying into a 
formal organisation, the future members of the UCPA had congregated at 
Speaker's Comer where RAAS and UCPA co-founder Roy Sawh built his 
reputation on the witty put-downs he delivered to white people there. A team of 
51 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
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investigative journalists from The Times reported that, by the time of Carmichael's 
visit, there was a harder edge to what was being said in this leafy comer of 
London. 'The speeches by the coloured men at Speaker's Comer in Hyde Park 
were already violent', they noted. 52 Carmichael was also aware of the rumblings of 
discontent among Britain's ethnic minorities. "'Black Power" formations had 
begun to emerge in the African/Caribbean immigrant communities in Britain', he 
later wrote about his 1967 trip to London, 'This seemed the perfect opportunity to 
establish contact and exchange ideas with these emerging forces'. 53 Carmichael 
had accepted the invitation to speak at the Dialectics of Liberation conference 
because he wanted to make connections with a Black Power movement in Britain 
that he had been told ah-eady existed. 
Black Power groups in Britain 
The largest and most important Black Power groups were, like the largest 
communities of black people, based in London. They were the UCPA, which 
reconstituted itself as the Black Unity and Freedom Party (BUFP) in 1970, the 
Black Panther Movement (BPM) and its offshoot the Black Liberation Front 
(BLF). As well as their headquarters in London, the UCPA and BUFP had sister 
branches in Manchester and the BPM had Birmingham and Hull branches as well 
as an offshoot organisation, the Black People's Action Collective with branches in 
s2 Clarke et al, Black Man, p. 145. 
53 S. Carmichael with E. M. Thelwell, Ready for Revolution: the Life Struggles of Stokely 
Carmichael (Kwame Ture) (New York, 2003ý p. 572. 
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Birmingham, Nottingham, Leeds and Londomm Another group, the Fasimbas, was 
set up in South London by George Campbell at the end of the 1960s and had 
around 500 members, according to Tony Soares. Fasimbas was a non-hierarchical 
organisation and worked closely with the BLF, eventually merging with the latter 
at the end of 1972, but as it was an underground organisation with no official 
membership and did not keep written records, it is very hard to tram its activities. " 
An article in the Sunday Telegraph on Black Power reported the existence of 
another group, the Black Eagles, in August 1970. Based in Notting Hill, the Eagles 
had approximately 150 members, the newspaper claimed, and were non-violent, 
their motto being 'Get a brick and build 9.56 
Most regional towns and cities with significant black populations also had a 
self-proclaimed Black Power group. We know of their existence mainly because of 
their newsletters and journals, which were passed around between activists and 
therefore ended up being circulated beyond their immediate localities, finding their 
way into a number of larger repositories. 11us, the librarian at the Institute of Race 
Relations in London, friendly to Black Power, mana ed to collect not only the 
journals of London-based groups like the UCPA (Black Power Speaks), BUFP, 
(Black Power Speaks and Black Voice), Black Eagles (Black Dimension), Black 
Liberation Front (Grass Roots), Black Regional Action Movement (Black Ram) 
and the Black Panther Movement (Black Life, Black People's News Service and 
Freedom News) but also Black Chat, newsletter of the Leicester-based Black 
"4 The I-RR holds UCPA letterheads and copies of Black Power Speaks with a branch address in 
Manchester. When the UCPA split and its rump became the BUFP, the same address was given as 
the branch address for the Manchester BUFP. Linton Kwesi Johnson remembers traveffing to 
Birmingham to meet up with another branch of the Black Panther Movemem Colin Prescod, who 
studied at Hull University remembers the exWence of a group called the Black People's Action 
Collective. 
'53 The 1972 merger of Fasimbas and the BLIF is reported in a potted history of the BLY in Grass 
Room 4.4 (January 1976). p. 2. 
56'Black Power and Michael X, 7he Sunday Telegraph, 2 August 1970. 
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People's Liberation Party, BPFM Weekly and Uhuru, organs of Nottingham's 
Black People's Freedom Movement, Resistance, the paper of the Afro-Asian 
Peoples Liberation Movement in Coventry and the Manchester edition of the 
BUFP's Black Voice, covering the group's activities in the city. Documents in the 
Indian Workers' Association archive in Birmingham and the Institute of Race 
Relations in London refer to the existence of a Black Defence Organisation in 
Bristol, a United Black People's Organisation and a West Indian Association in 
Sheffield, a United Caribbean Association in Cardiff and an Afro-Caribbean 
Liberation Movement in Manchester, but tell us little more. $7 
The official membership of even the largest London Black Power groups 
never reached more flm about three hundred, although greater numbers could be 
mobilised for demonstrations. This was perhaps because membership of a Black 
Power group required a great deal of commitment, especially of time, as members 
were expected to take part in almost daily book, politics and philosophy discussion 
groups, self-defence training, newspaper-selling and door-to-door recruiting and 
fundraising. Membership, as opposed to active support, was therefore not for 
everyone. The groups were also highly prone to splintering over differences in 
ideology and tactics. The UCPA, for example, split twice in its first year of 
existence. The regular name changes of the organisations to reflect their new 
ideological positions, the fluidity of membership and the lack of written records 
kept by groups in constant fear of being raided by the police makes establishing the 
basic facts of the Black Power movement in Britain difficult. The rest of this 
chapter is therefore devoted to delineating, as far as possible, the membership, 
aims and activities of the four largest Black Power organisations in London to 
57 See MS 2141/8, IWA archive, Birmingham Central Library for all groups except the Afi-o- 
Caribbean Liberation movement, correspondence with which is held, unfiled at the MR. 
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provide an empirical basis for the next chapter's analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Black Power movement. It also includes a short history of 
Michael X's RAAS which, although it predated the Black Power movement in 
Britain by two years and was not a serious, grassroots Black Power organisation, 
was treated as significant by both the media and the police. 
The Universal Coloured People's Association 
The UCPA was founded on 5 June 1967 at a meeting in Notting Hill, although 
many of those who would become its members had been meeting regularly at 
Speaker's Comer in Hyde Park for several months beforehand. The seventy-six 
(mostly) men at the founding meeting agreed to pay membership dues and elected 
Nigerian playwright Obi Egbuna as their president and Roy Sawh as his second in 
command. 58 Sawh and Egbuna did not work well together though, perhaps 
because, as Ajoy Ghose remembers, 'there was quite a group who didn't like all 
[Sawh's] comical way of making it light-hearted. He was a funny man and used to 
pull a crowd in and when the crowd was in he wouldn't let anybody else have their 
say'. 59 By September 1967 Sawh and his supporters had left to form a tiny splinter 
group, the Universal Coloured People and Arab Association (UCPAAA). This did 
not stop the vicious in-fighting, as Egbuna recalled in his 1971 biography: 'Our 
first shock was to discover that we were too much of a mixed bag to constitute one 
political movement', he wrote. 'The new recruits who attended our meetings for 
the first time were so horrified by the snarling and bickering that went on they 
58 Information taken from the document 'Names and addresses of financial members of UCPA', 
held in Tony Soares' private collection. 
5' Ajoy Ghose, interviewed by the author, 20 August 2004. 
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never showed up again'. 60 Egbuna himself left the UCPA in April 1968 to start the 
more ideologically rigid and hierarchical Black Panther Movement. In May 1970 
the UCPA's Manchester branch leader, Ron Phillips, was acrimoniously expelled 
for 'conduct prejudicial and injurious to the U. C. P. A. and to Black people in 
general' . 
61 Two months later the entire organisation split and the bulk of the 
membership reformed as the BUFP. 
In September 1967 the UCPA set out its philosophy in a fifteen-page 
pamphlet called Black Power in Britain: a Special Statement b the Universal y 
62 Coloured People's Association. Featuring a drawing of a black panther on the 
front and a photo of Stokely Carmichael on the inside back cover, the pamphlet 
borrowed heavily from both the style and content of American Black Power. Its 
critique of white, capitalist society was derived, however, from a disillusioned 
analysis of contemporary British politics. 'We know that the only difference 
between the Ian Smiths and the Harold Wilsons of the white world is not a 
difference in principle but only a difference in tactics, ' the pamphlet proclaimed, 
'it is not a quarrel between fascism and anti-fascism, but a quarrel between 
frankness and hypocrisy within a fascist fi-arnework. 963 Given the UCPA's diverse 
membership and self-confessed lack of ideological coherence, the strict adherence 
of the rest of the pamphlet to the American Black Power orthodoxies of unity, self- 
help, cultural self-detem-Anation, the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and 
defensive violence, points to the authorship of Egbuna. He had spent time in the 
United States on an academic exchange programme in 1966 and was by far the 
60 Egbuna, Des&qy, pp. 19,20. 
61 UCPA, 'The exposure and expulsion of a con (Ron Phillips) by U. C. P. A. ', May 1970. Document 
held in the Black documents file at the IRIL 
62 UCPA, 'Black Power in Britain: a Special Statement by the Universal Coloured People's 
Association', 10 September 1%7. Held in the Black groups file at the UM 
63 Ibid., p. 4. 
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UCPA's most knowledgeable and enthusiastic advocate of American-style Black 
Power. 'Me pamphlet's concluding list of 'aims and objects' fell short of the 
strident rhetoric of the middle section, though, reflecting a more pragmatic side to 
the organisation and a strong focus on social and welfare issues. Using the same 
format as the original demands of the Black Panther Party, the UCPA's ten stated 
aims included setting up nurseries, advice bureaux, cooperatives and study groups 
for black people and the vague goal of 'propagat[ing] solutions of our problems on 
an international level'. 64 Violence, revolution and the overthrow of capitalism were 
not mentioned in the UCPA's aims and objectives at all - unless one regarded as 
threatening the aim 'to provide protection ... to our people who suffer because of 
their colour, faith or unwarranted racial disturbances' . 
65 Later statements by the 
UCPA did call for 'revolutionary socialism' in the 'Third World' but its domestic 
programme remained essentially reformist. 66 
Although it was started in London, the UCPA aspired to create a national 
network of loosely federated branches. 'The UCPA was a community movement', 
remembers Ghose, 'We said don't be top heavy, don't be centralised, use our 
67 name, do something where you are'. Its biggest branch outside London was in 
Moss Side, Manchester, which produced its own edition of the Black Power 
Newsletter. In keeping with its Black Power philosophy, white people were not 
allowed to join the UCPA, but Tony Soares was one of several Asian men who 
signed up. 'From the beginning', Soares recalls, 'it was very much an Afro-Asian 
64 Ibid., p. 14. 63 Ibid., p. 14. 
" '[T1he basis of BLACK POWER of the Third World, therefore, must be ... REVOLLMONARY SOCULISM', UCPA, 'U. C. P. A. Black Power', undated, uncatalogued leaflet held at the MR. 
Original qpography. 
67 Ajoy Ghose, interviewed by the author, 20 August 2004. 
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organisation'ý8 'Me front-page headline of the first edition of the Black Power 
Newsletter read, 'Indian Lynched in Wolverhampton' and included a notice asking, 
'Africans, Asians, Caribbeans' to join a forthcoming protest. 69 A later leaflet 
entitled 'Black Power is Black Unity' defmed black people as 'Africans, West 
Indian, Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Arabs and all non-white peoples, and drew 
members' attention to a spate of attacks on Pakistani people in London as evidence 
of the need for unity. 70 Members also came from diverse economic backgrounds. 
'[T]hey were from all walks of life as far as UCPA was concerned', says Soares. 
'There wasn't any particular class distinction or class consciousness. 71 It Was 
eventually this lack of emphasis on class struggle that led the organisation's more 
Marxist-leaning elements, led by George Joseph and Communist Party member 
and former West Indian Gazette journalist Alrick (Ricky) Cambridge, to campaign 
to restructure and rename the organisation in the summer of 1970. 
The UCPA's activities consisted of weekly discussion groups, 'work 
sessions' in which members were taught skills such as 'canvassing, duplicating, 
poster-making, anti-thug patrols etc. ', film screenings, public meetings, 
demonstrations, door-to-door and street-comer canvassing and, from late 1969, the 
production of a newspaper, the Black Power Newsletter. 72 Cultural activities 
included events such as 'Black Is Beautifid', a free night of 'soul music, poetry, 
films and recordings on black culture', held at Lambeth Town Hall, while the 
" Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
69 Black Power Newsletter, 1969, p. 1. The story concerned the trial of eight white youths for the 
murder of an Indian man in Wolverhampton on 20 October 1968. 
70 UCPA, 'Black Power in Black Unity, undated, uncatalogued leaflet held at the RM 
71 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
72 This followed on from the short-lived Black Power Speaks, which came out monthly between 
May and July 1968 and was edited by Egbuna. Black Power Speaks claimed to be the work of 'the 
UCPA editorial team' despite the fact that Egbuna had left to start the Black Panther Movement in 
April 1968. The details of the UCPXs 'work sessions' were advertised on back page of the first 
edition of Black Power Speaks. 
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Newsletter featured inspirational poems and satirical cartoons. 73 UCPA flyers show 
that the group mobilised. its members to demonstrate in support of a wide variety of 
causes, from the republican movement in Northern Ireland to the Black Panther 
Party in California, and its newspaper charted the events of the Vietnam war and 
the progress of the African liberation movements, alongside reports on British and 
American Black Power activity. 74 It also involved itself in domestic politics in a 
more direct way by urging its members to vote tactically against Conservative 
candidates during the 1970 general election, on the basis that 'Labour is the lesser 
of two evils'. 75 T'he UCPA had not been in existence long when it achieved 
notoriety in the white press and fmnly established its Black Power credentials by 
helping to create a majority of new members at a CARD meeting in November 
1967 that subsequently voted out all the white committee members. The Daily 
Telegraph name-checked the UCPA in an article headlined 'Six quit executive of 
anti-racialist body: "Maoist take-over" fear' and The Times reported that the 
UCPA, 'an organisation standing openly for Black Power', had helped bring 
CARD to 'crisis point9.76 
The Black Unity and Freedom Party 
The BUFP was formed from the remains of the UCPA at a conference on 26 July 
1970 and former UCPA member George Joseph was elected its general secretary. 
Its two branch headquarters in London and Manchester remained at the same 
addresses as the former UCPA offices. Joseph explained the reasons why the 
73 UCPA flyer, February 1967, held in the Black Documents box at the EM 
74 See flyers, 'U. S. Fascism - "Law and Ordee" and 'U. C. PA. fidly support the Irish people in 
theirjust struggle for self determination! ', both undated, held in the Black Groups file at the EM 75 See undated UCPA flyer, 'A message to black voters', held in the Black Groups file at the IRR. 76 Ae Sunday Telegraph, 'Six quit executive of anti-racialist body- Maoist take-over fear', 4 
December 1967, p. 9 and The Times, 'Threat to CARD from extremists', 7 November 1967, p. 11. 
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UCPA had become the BUFP in an August 1970 letter. 'We have decide I is 
absolutely necessary to draw a line between ourselves and all the bourgeois and 
petit bourgeois elements floating around', he wrote. 'Our party takes Marxism- 
Lemmism as the basis of its thinking. As black people we believe the people and 
the people alone make history'. 77 Like many Black Power organisations, the BUFP 
was particularly inspired by Chinese Communism and Chairman Mao. It was this 
that attracted Sivanandan to the organisation. 'I became a sort of unofficial 
member of the BUFP because, although my politics as a university student might 
have been Trotskyite, by the time I left I was more leaning towards the Chinese 
revolution', he recalls. 79 qn the 1970s, BUFP described its ideology as Marxist- 
Leninist with Mao Tse Tung thought', explains former member Lester Lewis, 'The 
6d' Pan-African Congress was held in Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania in 1974 and the 
BUR could have participated but it did not because it was not Pan-Africanist, it 
espoused Marxist-Leninist, Mao Tse Tung thought' . 
79 Distancing itself from what 
it viewed as reactionary black nationalism, therefore, the BUFP placed class above 
racism as the primary source of oppression in society. The first two points of its 
manifesto made this explicitly clear. 'We recognise the class nature of this 
society', stated the first clause. 'We recognise the necessity for class struggle and 
the absolute necessity for the seizure of state power by the working-class and the 
bringing about of socialism' added the second. 80 
There is no evidence that the BUFP accepted white members, however, 
despite the implicit acceptance in its manifesto that the black and white working 
classes would eventually have to unite to overthrow capitalist oppression. The 
77 Letter from BUR general secretary George Joseph to IRR assistant librarian Hazel Waters, dated 
17 August 1970. Contained in the Black Documents file at the IM 
7' A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 
79 Lester Lewis, interviewed by the author, 14 September 2004. 
80 'Manifesto: long term programme' reprinted in Black Voice, August 1970, p. 4. 
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UCPA had actively supported Irish Catholics in what it viewed as an anti-colonial 
struggle, so most members must, on some level, have already accepted that white 
people could also be oppressed by capitalist imperialism. The BUFP manifesto 
argued, however, that the white working classes had been duped by capitalism into 
seeing black people as their enemy, which made it difficult to work with them, 
even though they were black workers' natural allies. 'While we recognise the 
necessity to struggle against racism in general, it is essential to treat the 
contradiction between ourselves and the working-class as a contradiction among 
the people', explained the manifesto, 'Whilst the contradiction between ourselves 
and the ruling class is a contradiction between the people and the enemy'. 81 
Nonetheless, in practice BUFP members only worked with white people at one 
remove. The BUFP's definition of black included Asians and it actively sought 
solidarity with groups like the Indian Workers' Association of Great Britain. 'The 
B. U. F. P. feels that at this moment in time of the Black presence in Britain, 
BUFP leader Roger Loftus explained in a letter to IWA (GB) general secretary 
Jagmohan Joshi, 'that groups such as ours should develop and maintain links with 
,, 82 each other on the question of "Black Survival in Britain' . That the BUFP felt it 
needed to formally propose a collaborative effort, however, could be interpreted as 
evidence of a growing gulf between West Indian and Asian activists at the start of 
the 1970s. 
Despite its explicitly revolutionary Marxist-Leninist-Maoist outlook, the 
second half of the BUFP's manifesto was a list of eleven demands for government 
reforms. Eight dealt with issues specific to black people, among them a public 
a' 'Manifesto: long term programme' reprinted in Black Voice, August 1970, p. 4. 82 Undated two-page letter from BUFP member Roger Loftus held in the IWA archive at Birmingham Central Library. 
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enquiry into racism in the police, better treatment of black people by immigration 
officers, repeal of the 1968 Race Relations Act and scrapping the Race Relations 
Board, refimding national insurance contributions to black immigrants who moved 
back to their home countries, trial of black defendants by black juries and judges, 
the release of all black prisoners who had not been tried by their ethnic peers and 
more black history on the school curriculum. The other three demands were for fidl 
employment (specified, possibly mistakenly, for black people only), decent 
housing and 'bread, peace and social justice for all men'. 83 
The BUFP's short-term aims, therefore, did not represent a radical break 
from those of the UCPA. Nor did its methods. Former UCPA members would have 
been quite familiar with the BUFP's discussion groups, demonstrations and 
pamphlet-producing activities and comfortable with new initiatives like summer 
schools for black children. 'We met regularly and we did a lot of campaigning. For 
example we did a campaign on the [1971] Immigration Act and we did various 
things with children - we used to have an annual Christmas party', recalls Lewis, 
'We were also always involved in solidarity work with the African liberation 
movements at the time because Angola and Guind were Portuguese colonies, Ian 
Smith had declared UDI and there was an armed struggle for national liberation 
there. South Africa was under apartheid, so we were active participants in the 
South African liberation movements'. " From August 1970, the BUFP also began 
publishing a newspaper, Black Voice, which replaced the Black People's 
Newsleuer, and continued to be printed until at least the end of the 1980s. 85 
83 'Black Unity and Freedom Party Manifesto", 26 July 1970, contained in the Black Groups file at 
the MR. 
" Lester Lewis, interviewed by the author, 14 September 2004. 
ts The IRR has issues of Black Voice stretching from 1970 to 1989. 
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As befitted a revolutionary organisation, the BUFP strove to become more 
disciplined and implemented a strict hierarchy and rules of membership. "Ibe 
BUFP is an organisation of revolutionaries', stated a 1974 internal paper, 'which 
adheres to discipline and ... sees conclusively the necessity for various levels of 
leadership within its structure for the mere reasons of proficiency and efficiency'. 86 
It also made an effort, at least on the surface, to pay more attention to the issue of 
sexism and the role of women in the movement A Black Women's Action 
Committee was set up within the BUR by female member Gerlin Bean and in 
1971 it published a pamphlet called 'Black Women Speak Out, which gave a 
female perspective on racism and the workers' struggle. 87 Black Voice also 
regularly carried articles with titles like, 'Male Chauvinism is Counter 
Revolutionary' and 'The Role of Women in the Vietnamese People's 
Resistance'. 88 Although it afforded women space to express themselves politically, 
the BUFP's extremely strict ideological discipline made other members feel very 
constricted. 'I began to realise that the kind of Marxism that they had ... was 
another kind of religion, with the same strictures', Harry Goulbourne explains, 
'They were extremely authoritarian, extremely intolerant and if, since then, I've 
described myself as a liberal it's something I say not lightly'. 89 Having helped set 
up the BUFP's South East Summer School in 1971, Goulbourne left the BUFP and 
embarked on a highly successful career in acade ia. 
The BUFP continued to exist and publish an impressively professional- 
looking Black Voice well into the 1990s, but it had long stopped identifying itself 
with Black Power. Black Voice dropped the phrase 'Power To The People' from its 
86 BUFP, 'What is the B. U. F. P. [sic]', 3 May 1974, p. 40. Document held, unfiled, at the MR. 87 Black Women's Action Committee, 'Black Women Speak Out', 197 1, p. 11. Document held in 
the Black groups file at the EM 
See Black Voice, September 197 1, p. 10 and August 1970, p. 6. 
Harry Goulbourne, interviewed by the author, 6 September 2004. 
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masthead at the start of 1973 and its reporting on the Spaghetti House Siege in 
1975 referred only to the 'Black movement' or 'Black struggle' and described the 
BLF, BUFP, Fasimbas and various other groups simply as 'Black organisations 
and black community workers". 90 Even an article commemorating the death of 
American Black Panther Party leader Huey P. Newton, published in 1989, made no 
reference to Black Power, fi-aming the BPP's work in terms of the anti-imperialist 
struggle and describing Newton as the leader of a 'revolutionary Black 
MovemenOl From the early 1970s onwards, therefore, Black Power became a 
banner the BUFP no longer wished to wave. Following its own identification, from 
1973 onwards the BUFP should be considered as a radical black workers and 
community organisation. 
77ze Black Panther Movement 
The Black Panther Movement was founded by Obi Egbuna in Notting Hill in April 
1968. Inspired by the American Black Panther Party, with which it corresponded, 
the British Black Panther Movement was an independent organisation. Unlike its 
American namesake, the British Black Panthers were extremely publicity-shy: of 
the four major Black Power organisations in London they kept the fewest written 
records and were the most suspicious of outsiders. The BPM's origins were 
humble. 'We began the Panthers with only three or four members, Egbuna wrote 
in 19702 Although responsible for its creation, Egbuna was not active in the 
BPM for long. In July 1968 he was arrested for publishing a pamphlet titled, 'What 
90 The List time 'Power to the People' appeared on a Black Voice masthead was volume 4, number 
1, which one can deduce from the subjects of the articles, was published at the start of 1973. See 
also, 'The truth about the Spaghetti House Siegel, Black Voice 5: 3 (1975), back page. 
91 'We Pay Tribute to Huey P. Newton', Black Voice 20: 3 (1989), pp. 1,8. 
92 Egbuaa, Des&oy, p. 2 1. 
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to do if cops lay their hands on a Black man at the Speaker's Cornee. 93 Held on 
remand for five months, Egbuna was convicted on 10 December under the 
Offences Against The Person Act of 1861 and sentenced to a year in gaol, 
suspended for three years. Cowed by the conditions of his sentence, which 
prevented him from engaging in radical political activity, Egbuna curtailed his 
career as a Black Power activist at the end of 1968. Althea Lecointe, a Trinidadian 
postgraduate student, became the Panthers' new leader. After Egbuna's departure 
the organisational centre of the BPM moved from Portobello Road in Notting Hill 
to Shakespeare Road in Brixton and separate branches were started in Acton and 
Finsbury Park. Being rooted in the middle of a poor black community like Brixton 
was an important source of strength and inspiration to an organisation that had a 
high number of middle-class, well-educated members, but prided itself on being of 
the people. 
To join the BPM one had first to prove one's commitment to the 
organisation and its aims, as Brixton teenager Linton Kwesi Johnson discovered. 
'In those days you couldn't become a Black Panther just like that', he recalls. 'You 
had to join the youth league and show that you were serious and be involved in the 
organisational activities and then someone would nominate you for membership'. 94 
IMe youth league was the bottom tier of a rigidly hierarchical structure, which rose 
upward through members and senior members to the central committee, which 
formulated policy and kept ideological and behavioural discipline. The dedication 
required to become a Black Panther meant that the actual membership remained 
small. Tony Soares estimates that in 1970 the Finsbury Park branch had just twenty 
93 See Metropolitan Police file UEPOII 1409: 'Benedict Obi Egbuna, Peter Martin and Gideon 
Ketueni T. Dolo charged with uttering and writing threats to kill police officers at Hyde Park, W21, 
held at the National Archive (NA). 
94 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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members. 95 JohnsoWs estimate of the size of the Brixton branch's membership is 
similarly conservative. 'We weren't a large organisation, ' he recalls. 'I'd say that 
at our peak we'd probably be about fifty people in the South London branch, but 
we could mobilise hundreds. 96 An outsider could, therefore, misjudge the 
Panthers' mime cal strength. A 1968 Metropolitan Police report that estimated the 
number of British Black Panthers at more than 800 cannot have differentiated 
between members and supporters ý7 
Although the BPM was predominantly West Indian, it also had African and 
several prominent Asian members. Cambridge University graduate Faroukh 
Dhondy was a member of the Brixton branch and Tony Soares joined the North 
London branch in 1970. Brixton branch member Darcus Howe, CLR James's 
nephew from Trinidad, thought that the BPM's Asian members came from a higher 
social class than most of the West Indian teenagers who signed up. 'The Asians 
who came in were young intellectuals, ' he said. '[W]hereas one had rank and file 
West Indians in itý one did not have rank and file Asians. '98 (Howe was equally far 
from being a 'rank and file West Indian', however, having been educated at 
Trinidad's most prestigious school. ) Linton Kwesi Johnson remembers several 
Affican students being members of the Brixton branch of the BPM until they were 
deported following an altercation with the police. The BPM was prepared to accept 
support from radical white organisations and publicly proclaimed solidarity with 
the struggle of Irish republicans against British occupation and striking British 
miners, but white people were not allowed to join, or come to meetings, as BUFP 
member Harry Goulbourne inadvertently found out. 'I recall ... going to a Black 
" Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 96 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 97 See MEP02/11409, p. 2. 
" Transcript of an unpublished interview with Anne Walmsley, 16 January 1986, p. 4. The document is part of the CAM papers held at the GPI. 
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Panther meeting at Shakespeare Road in Brixton with a girlfriend at the time who 
was Persian', he says, 'and after a while I was beckoned to a dark room and asked 
what did I think I was doing bringing this white woman to a meeting? I said this 
person is from Persia and she might look white but I don't think she sees herself as 
thaO9 
Women were only a small minority of the membership, but the BPM was 
the only Black Power organisation to have a female leader. Sexism was regarded 
as equivalent to racism and not treating black sisters with the requisite respect was 
an offence the central committee took very seriously. 'Althea [Lecointe] wasn't 
backward in coming forward in ... opening a discussion on what she felt was 
disrespectful behaviour on your part', remembers Brixton branch member Tony 
Sinclair. 100 The BPM's militant stance against sexism was typical of an 
organisation that took a holistic approach to activism. Being a Black Panther was a 
way of life rather than a political affiliation. Members underwent rigorous 
ideological training and were supposed to adhere to a strict moral code. According 
to former member Tony Sinclair, Panthers were not supposed to take drugs or be 
unffithful. They probably didn't have time to anyway: the back page of each Black 
People's News Service featured a column, 'What we do in practice', that made for 
exhausting reading: 
1. Working among black people in the community, going from door to door, 
on the streets and in the market as a means of exchanging information ... 2. Holding weekly studies and discussion on the history of black people. 
3. Holding weekly classes on political education in order to have a better 
understanding of the racist capitalist system that oppresses us... 
4. Cultural activities .... 5 (a) attending courts in order to identify ourselves with any black person 
appearing for trial ... (b) providing any possible assistance needed in the 
" Harry Goulbourne, interviewed by the author, 6 September 2004. "0 Tony Sinclair, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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le al defence of black people (c) Keeping contact with black people in prison fol 
I 
Anoýer five headings went on to describe the Panthers' work with children, public 
meetings, production of the Black People's News Service (and later Black Life and 
Freedom News), book groups and library services. 
During its early years the BPM was the most active of the Black Power 
groups in promoting black culture. 'The Black Panther Movement believes that it 
is only by getting to know ourselves and our history that we will be able to 
effectively fight to liberate ourselves', proclaimed a BPM leaflet in September 
1969.102 Linton Kwesi Johnson agreed. 'Culture was important' he explains. 'It 
was part of our ideology that culture and politics worked together hand in glove in 
a culture of resistance'. 103 The BPM hosted regular plays, poetry readings, concerts 
and other cultural events that often attracted audiences of several hundred people. 
Police notes on a raid of a Black Panther carnival at the Oval House in South 
London on 31 August 1970, for example, record that 400 people were present. 104 
Cultural events were also held at the BPM's two Black People's Information 
Centres at 38 Shakespeare Road, Brixton and (until 1971) 54 Wightman Road, 
Finsbury Park. Black Panthers toured youth clubs and arts centres lecturing black 
teenagers about their history and Linton Kwesi Johnson ran cultural workshops for 
the Black Panther youth league. 105 Female Panthers wore their hair in a natural, 
Afro style which, even in the late 1960s, was a bold and unusual statement of black 
cultural pride. In spite of all this, the BPM was never a cultural nationalist 
organisation. 'We were very much opposed to the ideology of cultural nationalism 
'01 'What we do in practice', Black People's News Service, March 1970, p. 8. 
102 BPM, 'Black People Get To Know Yourselfl I [sic]', September 1969. Contained in the Black 
Documents file at the EM 
'03 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
104 See DPP2/4890: 'Rupert James Frank, Leonard Anderson, Edmund Lecointe and Keith Spencer 
(Black Panther Movement members) riot and incitement on August 31,1970 in SEI 1. Convicted'. 
105 Johnson went on to become a successful poet, reggae musician and record company owner. 
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that was being expounded by certain sections of the black movement in America', 
Linton Kwesi Johnson recalls. 'We were opposed to Ron Karenga, and Kwanzaa 
and all of that. ' 106 
The BPM's political ideology became increasingly rigid during the 
organisation's lifespan. The BPM had always believed that racial equality was not 
possible under a capitalist imperialist system and instructed its members not to 
bother participating in electoral PolitiCS. 107 This conclusion was initially justified 
on the grounds of the British government's failure to protect black people from 
police harassment and discrimination in education, housing, employment and 
immigration. The BPM's original statement of aims, 'What We Want', noted these 
failings and concluded, almost reluctantly, that '[W]e have no alternative but to 
reject the entire capitalist establishment of Britain'. 108 By the 1970s, the same 
conclusion no longer needed to be justified because it was a theoretical imperative 
of the Marxism-Leninist line to which the group adhered. For the Panthers, class 
revolution became the only accepted solution to the problem of racial 
discrimination, bringing it closer to the position of the BUFP. 
The internal organisation and discipline of the BPM, always strict, became 
intolerable in the opinion of many members, as Trotskyite politics took hold and 
the movement became ideologically inflexible. Darcus Howe described the central 
committee as IStalinist type. It was built on the same structure as the Bolshevik 
Party, it was a kind of vanguard party organisation'. 109 Tony Soares; believes the 
organisation had been completely taken over by the far left by 1970. '[T]he BPM 
106 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interview with the author, 17 September 2004. Kwanzaa is an invented 
African American festival celebrated between 26 December and January 1. 
107 See BPM flyer 'Black People Don't Vote: organise against exploitation and British institutional 
racism', June 1970, held in the Black Groups file at the MR. 
108 BPK 'What We Want', undated document held in the Black Groups file at the IRK 109 Transcript of an unpublished interview with Anne Walmsley on 16 January 1986, p. 4. Ihe 
triuncript is part of the CAM papers held at the GPI. 
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was ... being increasingly controlled 
by the Marxist elements: black Trotskyites, 
Socialist Labour League, the International Marxist Group', he remembers. They 
had come in and were basically running the show and the people were not 
comfortable with that'. 110 Soares, along with all the other members of the North 
and West London branches, left the BPM in protest in 1970 after the central 
committee suspended four members of the North London branch because of an 
ideological disagreement. In June 1973, the BPM changed its name to the Black 
Workers' Movement to reflect its changed ideological position, but the defection 
of so many members and the accusation of being in thrall to white Marxist 
organisations had taken the Movement far from its Black Power roots. Arrested on 
a Sus charge in November 1972, Linton Kwesi Johnson looked to former Panther 
Darcus Howe and the charity Release for help defending his case because, as he 
recalls, 'The Black Panthers had more or less ceased around the same time'. 
I think like all movements, historically, there is a need; an organisation 
comes along to fulfil that need and, once certain things have been put in 
place, that organisation ceases to fimction, it has done its work and it is time 
to move on to another stage ... And we'd moved on from the ideology of Black Power to a more black working class ideology. ' 11 
Yhe Black Liberation Front 
The Black Liberation Front was founded at the start of 1971 by the former 
members of the North and West London branches of the Black Panther Movement. 
Its headquarters were at 54 Wightman Road, formerly the BPM's North London 
branch address. The BLF maintained close links with the Black Panther Party in 
the United States and was organised on the same lines, with separate divisions for 
areas such as self-defence, propaganda and youth. Having split from the BPM 
110 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
111 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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because of its increasingly rigid Marxism-Leninism, the BLF took its political lead 
from Mao Tse Tung and Chinese Communism. Eschewing hierarchy and 
dismissing 'Orthodox Marxism' as 'irrelevant to the Black struggle', because it 
was 'drawn exclusively from Western proletarian experience, the BLF argued that 
'Real communism represents a way of life that was already in existence in parts of 
Africa and Asia before the coming of the white man'. 112 Identifying closely with 
Africa, BLF members attended the e Pan African Congress in Dar-es-Salaarn in 
1974 and a 1975 issue of Grass Boots announced that the BLF was a member of 
the Pan African Committee (U. K. ) and that it 'work[ed] closely with the liberation 
movements of Southern Affica! 13 
The BLF represented the more cultural-nationalist vein of Black Power 
thought Tony Soares remembers that There was a great deal of sympathy with 
v 114 Ron Kmnga! s type of cultural nationalism, though no great links . The BLF's 
cultural nationalism also sprang from a grave disillusionment with white society at 
all levels. This was a result of the widening racial polarisation in British society, 
exacerbated at the time of the BLF's foundation by the passage of the 1971 
Immigration Act, which convinced many black people in Britain, not just BLF 
members, that they were being victimised by a racist state. Therefore, although the 
BLF continued to make similar demands for domestic reform as the UCPA, BUFP 
and BPM, its tone was more urgent, confrontational and occasionally even 
apocalyptic. Describing Britain as a 'fascist lunatic asylum', one BLF leaflet 
explained that white Britons '[D]on't mince words any more. They are giving it to 
12 BLF, 'Revolutionary Black Nationalism: a paper for discussion', 197 1, p. 7. 
1: 3 T. L. F. Projects', Grass Roots 4: 1 (1975), p. 15. 
114 Tony Soares, e-mail to author, 26 March 2005. 
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us straight. They hate us because we am black and they are gunning for us'. ' 15 The 
BLF welcomed Asian members but, unlike the BPM and BUFP, saw no benefit in 
collaborating with radical white groups. Neither did it count among its goals a 
socialist revolution in Britain. 'As a small minority in Britain, we cannot claim we 
will liberate the country or change its system. That is something the native working 
class must do for itself, announced an editorial in Grass Roots, '[Our] sole 
concern is survival for Black people in Britain and socialism in their 
homelands'! 16 
This separatist perspective meant that the BLF focused entirely on 
organising within the black community and withdrew from activities, such as 
demonstrations, that were intended to provoke a response from the white 
community. It also attracted a different demographic. 'The BLF at the time 
attracted the younger, more black nationalist, more black conscious youths', 
remembers Soares, 'The Marxist organisations, like the BPM, were into heavy 
Marxism and that had very little appeA to ordinary young black people - they 
didn't want to know about Trotsky or whatever'. 117 Youth work was given 
particular prominence by the organisation. Boosting black children's knowledge of 
their own culture and history was the major focus of the BLF's youth wing, the 
Black Berets, which was non-political and had approximately 300 members by 
mid-1971, according to Tony Soares. The Black Berets, and later also the Makonde 
Youth Club, met as many as three times a week to play sports, do drama, watch 
films, learn karate and even go to discos. On Sunday mornings, until the end of 
113 Undated BLF leaflet from Tony Soares' private collection. 
116 'Mtorial', Grass Roots 1: 2 (7 July 1971), p. 2. 
117 Tony SoaMS, interviewed by the audior, 23 August 2004. 
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1972, the BLF's North London headquarters was also home to the independently- 
run Headstart supplementary school. 
Discussions for adult BLF members were held on Sunday evenings, where 
the perennial issues of black identity, culture versus politics, and race struggle 
versus class struggle were hotly debated. On Friday nights a two-hour drop-in 
advice service for local black people was provided. Three community bookshops 
were also started by the BLF - two Grass Roots Storefronts, at 54 Wightuan Road 
and from December 1972 on Golborne Road in Notting Hill, and a Headstart 
Bookshop in West London. 118 A list of BLF activities from a 1974 Grass Boots 
also lists the 'Ujima Housing Association', providing affordable housing to black 
families and a 'Prisoner's Welfare Committee' which corresponded with and 
visited black prisoners! 19 
Outside of the black community the BLF was best known for its newspaper 
Grass Roots, which was edited by a variety of different people including Tony 
Soares and Ansel Wong. Started in mid-1971, by its third issue, Grass Roots was 
being distributed in Bristol, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Bradford, Liverpool, 
120 ItS f Urth iS Hull, Sheffield and London. 0 sue circulated in September 1971, 
contained a reproduction of a page from the American Black Panther Party 
newspaper, which featured instructions on how to make a Molotov cocktail. 
Although The Black Panther, from which the 'recipe' was taken, was legally 
available in radical book shops and even some libraries, in March 1972 the BLF's 
Tony Soarcs was charged with attempted incitement to arson; bomb-making; 
possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life and murder of persons 
1 'a Information from interviews and email correspondence with Tony Soares. 119 See 'BLF activities, Grass Roots 3: 3 (May 1974), p. 2. Ujima was still in existence in the 21st 
century. 
1" Information on the national distribution of Grass Roots provided by Tony Soares. 
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unknown - all of which were potentially punishable by life imprisonment. In 
response to what looked suspiciously like victimisation of their organisation, the 
BLF set up a Grass Roots Defence Campaign which brought it a great deal of 
publicity and sympathy both within the black community and from outside. 'Me 
BLF was seriously disrupted, however, by the loss of one of its most active 
members. Tony Soares had already spent over a year in prison in the 1960s 
because of his anti-Vietnam war protest activities. Fearing a further spell in gaol, 
he left Britain in early 1972 and spent several weeks in Algeria as a guest of 
American Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver, before boredom compelled him to 
return. Arrested while signing on in West London, shortly after his return, Soares 
spent four months on remand in Brixton prison, before being granted bail in July 
1972. He devoted the rest of the year to preparing the defence for his trial at the 
Old Bailey, which started on 20 February 1973 and is discussed in detail in chapter 
four. 
The Black Liberation Front hit the headlines again, in October 1975, when 
three young black men claiming to be part of the Black Liberation Army, a 
supposed adjunct of the BLF, attempted to rob the Spaghetti House restaurant in 
Knightsbridge and ended up taking eight members of its staff hostage for five days. 
As the BLF had no official membership procedure it was impossible to prove or 
disprove their claim, but the organisation issued a statement of support. 121 -Ibe 
BLF continued to champion the cause of Black Power in Grass Roots, and the 
organisation's black self-confessed black nationalism and emphasis on African 
culture meant that it continued to promote a Black Power cultural agenda. Issues of 
Grass Roots from 1976, however, reveal an organisation which, although still true 
121 Ile untitled, undated BLF press release is held in the Spaghetti House siege file at the EM The 
Spaghetti House siege is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
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to Black Power, was increasingly paranoid and shrill. The September/October 
edition carried the front page banner, 'Death camps for blacks', referring to 
government camps in South Africa, while inside lurid stories such as 'Holloway 
lesbians assault 15 Year old', and 'TINS OF Baby KILLER' made headlines such 
as Tricklewood to Leeds: the Cross-Country legal conspiracy', seem positively 
sensible by comparison. 122 Content to run with the Black Power baton long after 
other organisations had dropped it, the BLF found itself preaching to an 
increasingly circumscribed coterie of the converted. 
Racial Adjustment Action Society (RAAS) 
RAAS was accorded a significance during its six-year lifespan that was out of all 
proportion to its tiny membership and limited organisational achievements. It was 
founded in 1965 by Trinidadian immigrant Michael de, Freitas, who was inspired to 
start his own organisation after hearing Malcolm X speak at the London School of 
Economics on II February 1965.123 A charismatic and intelligent but menacing 
and unpredictable man, who had worked as an enforcer for slum landlord Peter 
Rachman, de Freitas had been present during the Notting Hill riots of 1958 and had 
joined various of the short-lived campaigning immigrant organisations; set up in its 
wake, before starting RAAS. In May 1965, RAAS launched its first campaign, 
supporting the striking Asian and West Indian workers at the Courtaulds Red Scar 
mifl near Preston. Ile strike lasted from 24 May to 12 June and Michael X (as de 
122 Grass Roots, September/October 1976, pp. 1,2,4. 
123 Michael X claims in his autobiography to have spent four days with Malcolm X in February 
1965. See M. Malik, From Michael de Freitas to Michael X (London, 1968), p. 148. Investigative 
reporters Derek Humphry and David Tindall wrote in their biography of de Freitas that he met 
Malcolm X at Africa House the day before the LSE speech and that Malcolm visited him at home 
the following evening. See False Messiah: The Story of Michael X (London, 1977ý p. 48. Both 
accounts are contested, however, by Jan Carew in Ghosts In Our Blood- With Malcolm X in Africa 
England and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1994), p. 106, who maintains that Malcolm X and Nchael 
de Frcitas did not meet at all. 
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Frcitas was by then known), Roy Sawh and fellow founding member Abdullah 
Patel spent two weeks in Preston speaking at strikers' meetings and raising funds. 
RAAS gained a great deal of publicity in the process, but Mchael X's firebrand 
speeches about racial exploitation played into the hands of a management that was 
trying to dismiss its workers' economic grievances as racially-motivated. 'Both 
[Sawh and Michael X] spoke consistently in racial terms about the black man's 
burden and the white exploiter', noted a report for The Institute of Race Relations 
Newsletter. 'They were respected by strikers for their interest and wish to help but 
their views, in general, did not impress'. 124 Michael X remembered the incident 
somewhat differently in his autobiography, claiming that RAAS's support of the 
strike had resulted in it receiving 400 new membership applications per week. 123 
Both Patel and Sawh left the organisation shortly after the Courtaulds strike, 
however, the fonner referring pejoratively to Nfichael X as 'a myth' in a 
subsequent newspaper article. 126 
Michael X explicitly cultivated comparisons with Malcolm X, but the two 
shared very few qualities. 'The only thing that Michael had in common with 
Malcolm', wrote Jan Carew, a former associate of both, 'was that they had both 
begun as outlaws in their respective societies, but here the comparison has to end 
127 
abruptly'. Certainly, if Michael X was a disciple of Malcolm Y, he was not a 
very good one. Michael made no distinction, for example, between Malcolm's 
independent pan-African, multiracial political programme and his earlier black 
nationalist, politically conservative views while in the Nation of Islam. Michael X 
was more interested in the image of Malcolm X than the substance of his politics, 
124 p. Foot 'The strike at Courtauld's, Preston', The Institute of Race Relations Newsletter 
sy? lcment (July 1965), p. 1. 12 , Malik, Michael, P. 153. 
'26 D. Knoy, 'Britain's Black Powerhouse: Michael V, Life, 16 October 1967, p. 17. 127 Carew, Ghosts, p. 99. 
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though, because his own political commitment was skin deep. 'Nfichael never 
believed in any of the things he was saying', asserts another former 
contemporary. 128 In spite of Malcolm X's profound criticisms of the Nation of 
Islam, as well as his belief that the organisation was trying to have him killed, 
Michael X wrote to the Nation's leader Elijah Muhammad after Malcolm's death 
in February 1965 asking to join the organisation. Michael X may well have 
become a member of the Nation of Islam, and was often described in the press as 
the leader of the British Black Muslims (the colloquial name for the Nation of 
Islam), but there is no evidence that there were any other British members for him 
to lead. He did, however, meet Nation of Islam members Herbert X and 
Muhammad Ali in Stockholm at the request of Elijah Muhammad and chaperoned 
Muhammad Ali when he came to Britain to fight Henry Cooper in May 1966.129 
By the time of Stokely Cannichael's visit in July 1967, RAAS had long 
been little more than a media vehicle for Mchael X and he was regarded by many 
of his non-white contemporaries as, in Linton Kwesi Johnson's words, 'a 
charlatan'. 130 Nfichael X's reputation in the black community was significantly 
resuscitated in September 1967, however, when he became the first non-white 
person to be tried for inciting racial hatred because of a fiery speech he had given 
in Reading on 24 July 1967.131 Convicted on 9 November 1967, he served eight 
months of a one-year prison sentence and was released in July 1968 to a martyes 
welcome. For a year after his release Michael X held the position of Minister of 
Defence for a small London-based cadre of Black Panther-style activists called The 
128 A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 
'" Information on Malik's relationship with the Nation of Islam taken from Humphry and Tindall, 
False Messiah, pp. 54-6. 
130 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 131 Michael X's Reading speech and the trial that followed are discussed in detail in chapter four. 
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Black Eagles, led by 'Prime Minister' Darcus Awusu. 132 At the start of 1969, with 
the financial backing of white publishing heir Nigel Samuel, RAAS bought the 
buildings at 95-101 Holloway Road in order to turn them into a cultural centre, 
shopping complex and hostel called The Black House. 
Conceptualised as a project run by and for the black community, The Black 
House attracted many committed people who took its principles of self-help and 
self-determination to heart. It also served a useful function as a meeting place and 
organising space for local black groups. Even providing the most basic place to 
stay was an essential service for many black youths and a strem of people lived at 
The Black House, swapping their labour for food and a place to sleep. Brother 
Herman (Edwards), an Antiguan builder who lived, worked and taught at The 
Black House for two years, saw its value not only in terms of the practical help it 
offered to the hundreds of homeless black teenagers he said stayed there, but also 
in psychological terms as, 'One of the fa-st times we built something for black 
133 
people in England'. Former Black House Information Officer Vince Hines 
agreed. The Black House was the pioneer to Black self-help in social and welfare 
work in Britain, he wrote in 1997.134 Although the Black House project and 
particularly Michael X's leadership of it was, at best, deeply flawed, it provided an 
important source of inspiration to other, more committed people. After leaving the 
Black House, Brother Herman started Harambee in Islington, which attempted to 
provide accommodation, training and employment for wayward black youths. 
Vince Hines founded a homeless refuge and rehabilitation centre called Ile 
132 Darcus Awusu is now better known as Darcus Howe. 
133 Brother Herman quoted in W. Wood, 'Brother Herman: tribute to a founder of black self-help in 
Britain', Race & Class 37: 4 (1996), p. 73. 1-14 V. Hines, How Black People Overcame Fifty Years of Repression in Britain, 1945-1995 
(Volume one. 1945 -1975) (London, 1997), p. 187. 
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Dashiki Council and Ashton Gibson, The Black House's 'Industrial Officee, 
started a cultural centre called The Melting Pot Foundation. 135 
The Black House's work with disaffected youth brought it praise and 
donations from people and organisations that would otherwise have avoided 
association with a Black Power organisation. CND founder Cannon Collins, anti- 
apartheid campaigner Bishop Trevor Huddleston and the World Council of 
Churches all donated funds to the project and praised its work. 136 It soon became 
clear, however, that The Black House's public profile and financial backing were 
not being reflected in its progress. The project had received a great deal of funding 
from rich, sympathetic donors like Sammy Davis Jr, Muhammad Ali and John 
Lennon, but photographs contained in the report of a police investigation into a fur 
at the building in January 1970 showed that it was nowhere near ready to be used 
as a supermarket and provided only the most rudimentary accommodation. The 
report concluded that the fire had been the result of arson, possibly to cover up the 
lack of building progress-137 The project was further derailed when Michael X and 
seven other RAAS members were arrested during a police raid on The Black 
House on 17 April 1970, following allegations of robbery and assault by 
businessman Mervin BrowrL 138 At the end of November 1970 Michael X resigned 
from RAAS and on 2 February 1971 moved to Trinidad to avoid facing trial for the 
charges relating to his April 1970 arrest. A letter fiorn, the Foreign and 
133 A newspaper cutting on the foundation of the Melting Pot foundation and the annual reports of 
he Dashiki Council are held in the Black Groups file at the MR. 
136 Tindall and Humphry, False Messiah, p. 85. 
137 See MEPO 28/4: The "Black House", headquarters of the Racial Adjustment Awareness 
Society, at 95-101 Holloway Road, N7: damage caused by fire on 15 January 1970. 
Unsubstantiated allegations made by Malik, MA, alias Michael Y., against the police and fire 
brigade', held at the NA. 
138 See MEPO 31/4: 'Malik MA, alias Michael Y, of the Racial Adjustment Action Society. 
complaints of intimidation, victimisation and harassment by police following a raid on the Society's 
headquarters, the "Black House", 95-101 Holloway Road, N7 on 17 April 1970. Malik and others 
arrested for robbery and blackmail 1970-1971', held at the NA. 
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Commonwealth Office to the British High Commissioner in Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad, dated 30 July 197 1, explained that the British govemnent was more than 
happy not to seek an extradition order for his return 139 Trinidad did not prove to be 
a safe haven for Michael X for long though. In 1972 he was convicted of the 
murders of two of his followers, Gale Benson and Joseph Skerritt, crimes for 
which he was hanged in May 1975. 
Conclusion 
British society polarised, sharply over the issue of race during the second half of the 
1960s. Racial discrimination became enshrined in law in the form of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants (Kenyan Asians) Act, which created a second class of 
(non-white) British citizens, while Enoch Powell's inflammatory populist racism 
dominated the media's coverage of British race relations. Powell's speeches gave 
succour to far-right organisations such as the newly formed National Front, and 
brought the views of the far right into the frame of respectable debate on 
immigration. During the same period, the British media and politicians were 
uneasily observing events in Los Angeles, Washington D. C., Detroit, and other 
major cities in the United States that were being set aflame by their Affican 
American residents in retaliation for years of discrimination and neglect The 
question on both the Home Secretary and the editor of 77ie Times's lips was could 
it happen here? 
The disillusiomnent black people felt after the Labour Party abandoned its 
opposition to immigration control in 1964 gave a militant minority the impetus to 
organise their own radical political organisations. 'Me ineffectiveness of the 1965 
139 See FCO 63/613: 'Black Power movement in Caribbean', held at the NA. 
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Race Relations Act discredited the liberal politics and lobbyist methods of 
Britain's only national civil rights organisation, the Campaign Against Racial 
Discrimination (CARD), as well as statutory bodies like the National Council for 
Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI). Inspired and encouraged by the advent of the 
black nationalist phase of the African American freedom struggle, Britain's Black 
Power activists also built on previous generations of black immigrants" struggles 
against colonialism and for an inclusive political unity among non-white people in 
Britain. As CLR James enthusiastically noted, Black Power was just the cutting 
edge of over a hundred years of black political and intellectual insurgency. 
Britain's first Black Power group was founded in London in June 1967, but 
it was the visit of American Black Power doyen Stokely Carmichael to London the 
following month which gave the fledgling movement a great boost. This was partly 
because of his inspirational speaking and partly because of the media and 
government's attention-generating reactions to his words. The intense media 
coverage of Carmichael's controversial speeches carried his message to a much 
wider, national audience. An inspirational speaker, Carmichael was venerated by 
Britain's Black Power advocates and by the end of the decade most cities with 
substantial black populations had their own Black Power organisation. By far the 
largest and most important groups were based in London, however, just as were the 
largest communities of black immigrants. These London groups - the Universal 
Coloured People's Association, the Black Panther Movement the Black Unity and 
Freedom Party and the Black Liberation Front - could probably claim no more 
than a thousand members between them and were riven by political disagreements, 
but nevertheless had a substantial impact on race relations in Britain. This is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER3 
6A revolutionary conspiracy"? Black Power's strengths and weaknesses 
Introduction 
Black Power passed over Britain like a comet: an intense burst of fiery energy 
followed by a diminishing trail of fragments and activity. Of the four self- 
professed Black Power groups in London used as case studies in the previous 
chapter, all were set up between 1967 and 1971. Although two of the four 
continued to exist in some form into the 1990s, of the others, one had dissolved in 
1970 and the other had moved away fi-om Black Power by mid-1973.1 It would be 
misleading, however, to assess the importance of Black Power solely in terms of 
the size and longevity of its politipal organisations. 'Actual membership of the . 
whole movement may be small', commented a journalist fi-om. The Times in 1968, 
2 , but the appeal of what these black politicians preach is astonishingly wide'. A 
movement can be politically marginal but still have an important impact on the 
wider society. This was the case with the Black Power movement in Britain. 
In the nine years between 1967 and 1976 Black Power went through three 
roughly distinct phases. 'Me first of these, which stretched from the foundation of 
the Universal Coloured People's Association (UCPA) in June 1967 to about the 
end of 1968, was the period of the greatest polarisation in British race relations. 
Black Power was interpreted by the white press, but also by many black people, as 
a political and psychological counterbalance to the dramatic anti-immigration 
speeches of Enoch Powell and the increased activity of the National Front. ne 
1 Harry Goulbourne reports that the BUFP was still meeting in the early 1990s - H. Goulbourne, 
Caribbean Transnational FExperlence (London, 2002), p. 80. The IRR holds copies of the BLF's 
ýurnal Grass Roots dating up to 1988. 
S. Clarke, P. Evans, M. Knipe, G. Lloyd, D. Van der Vat and W. Norris, The Black Man in Search 
ofPower (London, 1968), p. 147. 
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second phase, which lasted until about 1972, represented a period of greater 
political sophistication, activity and support. This was the period during which 
Black Power reached its critical mass and achieved its greatest successes: its high 
water mark was, perhaps, the Mangrove Nine trial of October to December 1971. 
Thereafter, the movement began to fragment and decline in political influence and 
public profile, although groups continued to exist and undertake valuable work in 
their communities. A victim of its own success, as well as of myriad failures, and 
the actions of a hostile state, Black Power became a political slogan that still had 
resonance but also an increasing air of belonging to a bygone era. 'In 1976 ... after 
a two year absence from Britain, I came back to London and the whole black scene 
appeared to be in turmoil', wrote Roy Sawh, 'The impact "Black Power" had made 
on British society appeared to have been curtailed, if not manipulated by the 
establishment'. 3 However, Black Power's message that 'Black is beautiful' had 
soaked into the collective psyche of, at leastý African and West Indian people in 
Britain: culturally Black Power had achieved what it had set out to. Politically, it 
was divided by an acrimonious debate between, on the one hand, "heavy socialism' 
(to use Colin Prescod's phrase), which subsumed the black struggle under the class 
struggle, and, on the other, cultural nationalism, which rallied black people in 
terms of their relationship to the Third World, especially Africa, and rejected white 
society. 
The Black Power movement achieved a number of things during all three 
phases and beyond. Politically, it did not engage many ordinary black people 
directly, but the challenge it made to the liberal orthodoxies of integration and 
moderation led many of them to re-examine, the aims and tactics of the 
3R Sawh, From Where I Stand (London, 1987), p. 13. 
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organisations of which they were members, or even to start new, militant ones of 
their own. Groups like the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) and 
the West Indian Standing Conference (WISC) were either taken over, as in the 
former case, or significantly influenced, as in the latter, by advocates of Black 
Power. By April 1968, for example, WISC, which had been set up as a social and 
welfare organisation by the High Commission of the West Indian Federation ten 
years earlier, was one of the founding organisations of the militant, socialist Black 
Peoples' Alliance (BPA). Black Power's political influence did not stop at the 
black community. Its propagation of a culture where black was beautifid and its 
contention that the problem affecting British race relations was white racism rather 
than black immigration contributed significantly to the radicalisation. of the race 
relations industry. Its threats of revolt and vociferous highlighting of the injustices 
and inequalities facing black people in Britain combined with other factors to 
persuade the govenmient to introduce a programme of urban aid for inner city 
areas with high concentrations of black immigrants in 1968 and to pass its first 
effective Race Relations Act in 1976. 
'Me need for militant black community organising was a central plank of 
Black Power philosophy and the practice of community self-help proliferated long 
after the political groups had folded or retreated into the background. Black Power 
groups set up nurseries, youth centres, law centres, advice bureaux, hostels for the 
homeless and numerous educational projects. Supplementary education was one of 
the highest priorities for Black Power groups, reflecting the importance placed on 
it by the wider black community. Furthermore, the supplementary education 
movement, which continues to thrive today, was the main area where the Black 
Power tenets of cultural self-determination and self-education could be practically 
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applied to benefit the whole black commupitY. Direct participation in Black Power 
groups had an enormously beneficial personal impact on members, as former 
activists readily attest. Black Power organisations tended to attract highly 
motivated, creative, intelligent, public-spirited people and imbued in them a great 
self-discipline and a thirst for knowledge. Many of them later used their 
experiences in the movement to fuel successfid careers in both the private sector 
and public scrvice. 
The years in which the Black Power movement developed also witnessed a 
growing militancy in Britain's black communities. It would be misleading to 
suggest that Black Power was the main cause of this radicalisation, but it served to 
dramatise and publicise the most important issues affecting Britain's black 
communities. In inner-city areas like Notting Hill and Brixton in London, where 
the relationship between young black men and the police was most intense and 
volatile, local Black Power groups helped give black people the confidence to 
stand as a community against police harassment and also provided individuals with 
legal advice and practical support when they were arrested and put on trial. 
Immigration, education and policing were the three major areas that mobilised 
widespread black political activity between 1967 and 1976. In 1971, an 
Immigration Act was passed that introduced the concept of patriality - that the 
right to live in Britain was only available to British passport holders with a British- 
born parent or grandparent. Ilose, mostly black people, who could not trace an 
immediate bloodline back to the country were treated as second class citizens, 
subject to immigration control. In the same year, the publication of a book called 
How The West Indian Child is Made Educationally Subnormal in the British 
School System: The Scandal of the Black Child in Schools in Britain brought 
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national attention to the structural racism in the British education system. 4 Also, by 
1971, Britain's newspapers were full of alarmist reports of the crime-wave of 
6muggings' in London, responsibility for which was laid at the door of the West 
Indian community, giving the Metropolitan Police an excuse to increase its use of 
the 'Sus' law to harass and arrest young black males simply for looking as if they 
might be about to commit a crime. 5 Furthermore, the increasing activity and 
boldness of far right groups like the National Front and the continued public 
prominence of the intemperate pronouncements of MP Enoch Powell persuaded 
many formerly reticent black people that if they did not stand up soon for their 
right to live in Britain without fear of physical attack, discrimination or 
deportation, they might lose it in the future. In this context, by making an extreme 
critique of British society, Black Power activists enabled other black people to get 
involved in more moderate political organisations without feeling that they were 
standing on the frontline. 
Numerous external pressures militated against the survival of Black Power, 
not least the state's highly effective campaign of surveillance, arrest and 
prosecution of Black Power activists. 6 Black Power groups were quite capable of 
imploding on their own, however, and the second half of this chapter looks at the 
internal factors that contributed to the demise of organised Black Power politics. 
The problems that beset the movement changed significantly between 1967 and 
1976. Initially, the lack of ideological coherence and the leadership of men more 
interested in seeking personal publicity than building a movement hampered Black 
1 
4 B. Coard, How ne West Indian Child is Made Educationally Subnormal in the British School 
System: The Scandal of the Black Child in Schools in Britain (London, 197 1). 
5 The treatment of young West Indian males by the police is discussed in the following chapter. See 
also S. Hall, C. Critcher, J. Clarke and B. Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging; the State and Law 
and Order (London, 1978). 6 111iS is discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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Power organisations like the UCPA and the Black Panther Movement (BPM). 
Later, the influence of revolutionary socialism on the Black Power movement led 
to a serious cleavage over whether race or class was the true source of the 
oppression of black people. Bitter debates over whether it was possible and 
desirable to, show solidarity with white working class organisations or whether 
having a cultural focus on Africa was a bourgeois invention designed to divide the 
black working class into ethnic enclaves, turned the movement in on itself and 
discouraged Asian members from continuing to participate in the Black Power 
movement. 
Furthermore, the inherent contradictions' in Black Power groups that 
claimed to be socialist and revolutionary, but whose members were solicited on a 
racial basis and who did not have access to guns or the inclination to use armed 
violence, caused damaging confusion and misunderstandings both within and 
outside the movement. British Black Power groups relied heavily on American 
Black Power for inspiration and too easily glossed over the important differences 
between the two movements. Black Power groups in the United States were armed, 
racially homogenous, publicity-seeking and under siege from a coordinated and 
7 deadly state attack in the form of the FBI's COINTELPRO programme. Black 
Power groups in Britain contained West Indian, Asian and African members, 
largely avoided publicity after 1968, were never armed and only became involved 
in violence during confrontations with the police. Although they were under 
constant surveillance by the Special Branch (the intelligence-gathering branch of 
the Metropolitan Police), their lives were not under threat. - 
7 COINTIELPRO was an FBI domestic counter-intelligence operation that was aimed at radical 
African American groups between 1967 and 197 1. 
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British Black Power groups' propensity to echo the revolutionary rhetoric 
of their American counterparts led to two problems. Firstly, an organisation which 
states that revolution is the only answer to society's ills risks demoralising its 
members if that revolution does not materialise. British Black Power groups 
claimed to be aiming for revolution - both at home and abroad in the case of the 
BUFP, or just in the Third World for the BLF, which had discarded the idea of 
trying to rouse Britain's, in their view, irredeemably racist white working class - 
but concentrated on activities like consciousness-raising and community 
organising that were unlikely to result in the overthrow of the state. Secondly, and 
far more damagingly, their violent language was taken at face value by the British 
state, which used its powers of prosecution to silence them. Surveillance and 
infiltration, police raids, frequent arrests and long periods spent in prison on 
remand were regular occurrences for Black Power activists and a number of 
political trials punctuated the late 1960s and early 1970s. This did have some 
advantages - one of the ways the BPM recruited new members was from the 
steady stream of young black men who came to the organisation. asking for help 
with police harassment and the resulting court cases against them. The manifestly 
unjust police treatment of black people served as excellent recruitment propaganda 
for Black Power groups. Nonetheless, these tactics also disrupted Black Power 
organisations by diverting their funds and energy into defending their members in 
court. Fundraising for the 'defence committee' of an activist facing prosecution 
became a mainstay of black political organising in the 1970s, which meant that 
campaigning on other issues and community organising had to take a back seat. 
The state response to Black Power is the subject of the next chapter, but it is 
necessary to flag here the significance of its role in the movement's decline. 
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Black Power's strengths and achievements 
Although the Black Power movement in Britain had only a modest number of 
followers, it can claim some significant achievements. By far the most important of 
these was to send out the message that being black was something to be proud of. 
In making this statement it challenged the paternalistic assumptions of the white 
liberal race relations industry and, to a lesser extent, the government, and changed 
the way they thought about and treated black people. The insurgent politics and 
raw anger of Black Power activists, coupled with their insistence that having black 
skin did not automatically make one a social problem, fed a wider militancy in the 
black community, particularly among young black males. Their refusal to accept 
quietly the harassment of the police and discrimination of the education system and 
job market eventually shook the government out of its complacent belief that it 
only needed to make token efforts to tackle racial discrimination. 
The 1976 Race Relations Act, although the third of its kind, was the first to 
attack racial discrimination in British society with a sharp set Of teeth. This was in 
no small part due to the government's fear that, if the racial discrimination they 
faced were allowed to fester, an increasingly disaffected and volatile generation of 
young black Britons would actually stage the violent rebellions the Black Power 
movement had only threatened. But even as early as 1968, the government clearly 
had one eye on the Black Power movement when Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
announced the introduction of an Urban Programme during a speech on race 
relations in Birmingham on 5 May. Designed to channel money into disadvantaged 
areas with large black immigrant populations, the idea of urban aid was directly 
borrowed from the United States where some of President Johnson's Great Society 
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measures were explicitly designed to prevent African American disaffection 
turning into radical political activity and rioting in the northern cities. 8 
Impetus for reform of the inadequate anti-discrimination legislation also 
came from a race relations industry that, in the face of Black Power militancy, 
found it increasingly difficult to justify playing 'the numbers game' and approach 
race relations in terms of finding the magic formula for how many dark-skinned 
immigrants could assimilate into the white host society without challenging the 
status quo. The challenge to their faith in liberalism that Black Power represented 
for the well-meaning, overwhelmingly white, middle-class people who had joined 
the race relations industry, was powerful and tmnsformative. This was especially 
true after the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants 'Kenyan Asians' Act in 
March 1968, which made many government race relations advisors and the 
employees of statutory bodies like the NCCI and the Race Relations Board feel 
that their remit to improve domestic race relations was being irreparably 
undermined by the government's racially discriminatory immigration policies. 
'Tbe hostile expression of our immigration law casts doubt upon the friendly 
expression of our race relations law', wrote lawyers Anthony Lester and Geoffrey 
Bindman in the introduction to their 1971 book Race and Law, 'However much 
our legislators might wish it were otherwise, the hostility is taken more seriously 
than the friendliness - on both sides of the colour line. '9 
White race relations workers' crisis of confidence in the sincerity of the 
government's moderate, conciliatory approach to race relations, made Black Power 
activists' depiction of white liberalism as racism in sheep's clothing seem more 
palatable. In 1968, people like Oxford don Michael Dummett, who had been a 
" For a fuller discussion of the Urban Progrmme see chapter 4. 9 A. Lester and G. Bindman, Race and Law (Harmondsworth, 197 1), p. 14. 
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founding member of CARD, the Oxford Committee for Racial Integration and the 
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), were coming to the 
conclusion that, 'From the point of view of the racial minorities, the whole official 
structure, the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants and the liaison 
committees, stands clearly exposed as a confidence trick'. 10 Durnmett found 
himself sharing common ground with Black Power activists when he surmised that 
'[O]nly finther demoralisation and despair can come until the whole shabby 
paternalist structure has been dismantled'! 1 
The most dramatic example of a white, liberal race relations body re- 
examining its principles and radically redefining itself, in the light of Black 
Power's critique of white liberalism, was the Institute of Race Relations (IRR). In 
1972 its largely white staff voted against the wishes of their board of directors and 
financial backers to transform the organisation from 'a policy-orientated, 
disinterested research body into a progressive think-tank in the service of the black 
community. 'We were doing very different kind of work before then', recalls 
Jenny Bourne, who joined the IRR as a junior researcher in 1970. 'It was all 
arguing about the projected numbers of people that were coming. It was a very 
reactionary debate'. 12 Britain's oldest and largest non-governmental race relations 
organisation, the IRR changed beyond recognition - losing its premises and the 
majority of its funding and staff in the process. Black Power was not the sole cause 
of this transformation. By 1972 the old-fashioned, hierarchical structure of the 
Institute was being challenged by the junior - and particularly the female - 
research staff. There was also an increasingly acrimonious debate between the 
10 NIS 2141/l/2: 'Immigrant Organisations, a JCWI paper delivered by Michael Durnmett at the 
IRR third annual race relations conference on incipient ghettoes and the concentration of minorities, 
1969', P. 15. Document held in the IWA archive at Birmingham Central Library. 
11 Ibid., p. 16. 
12 Jenny Bourne, interviewed by the author, 28 July 20(9. 
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IRR's management and its staff about their journalistic freedom, which centred 
around the editorial content of the Institute's monthly journal Race Today. This 
arose out of an increasing unease about who was benefiting from the research that 
the Institute was undertaking. This intensified after the 1969 publication of the 
IlMs 'Myrdal for Britain, Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race 
Relations, which some staff members viewed as little more than an exercise in 
spying on the black community. 13 Researcher Robin Jenkins put his doubts about 
the benefit to black people of the Institute's work very bluntly in a paper delivered 
to the British Sociological Association in 1971. 'When in future IRR researchers 
come knocking at their door', he told the audience, 'the immigrant should tell them 
to 'Itick off-)%14 Jenkins's was not the only rebellion. I[fln our unit we had been 
asked to do research for what was then the Community Relations Commission and 
we said, "no we've not been set up to do work for the government". much to the 
embarrassment of our director, remembers Jenny Bourne. 'There was such a 
massive difference between what we were studying, what we said, and what was 
actually the lived experience of black people. Very hard lives people were leading 
and our researchjust seemed completely at odds with that experience'. 15 
Unbeknown to senior management, the IRR had maintained a symbiotic 
relationship with Black Power activists since 1967. 'After six o'clock my library 
was always a venue, though the bosses may not have known it', explains former 
head librarian Sivanandan. 16 In the process he became familiar with the 
developments in grassroots black political organising. 'I was closest to the BUFP, 
but I was a go-between all these people because I had a library and they wanted 
13 E. J. B. Rose et al, Colour and Citizenship. A Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969); G. 
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York, 1944). 
14 Jenkins quoted in A. Sivanandan, Race and Resistance. the IRR Story (London, 1974), p. 20. 15 Jenny Bourne, interviewed by the author, 28 July 2004. 16 A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 
126 
Chapter 3: 'A revolutionary conspiracy'? Black Power's strengths and weaknesses 
literature and to discuss things, he recalls. Hence, through this link between Black 
Power activists, Sivanandan and other sympathetic staff, the militant views from 
the Black Power movements in both Britain and the United States had been 
allowed to infiltrate the IRR and challenge its liberal orthodoxies. 'I can't stress 
enough how the whole black scene began to affect all our political development', 
says Jenny Bourne, 'All of us would be reading Cleaver, Malcolm X and later 
George Jackson: those were the books we were all giving each other for Christmas 
and birthday presents, the debate that we were all informed by' . 
17 'The palace 
revolution didn't come out of thin air', Sivanandan confirms. 18 In response to its 
radicalisation, by 1974 the IRR had lost all its old sources of fimding and its 
premises and consisted of just a library and three members of staff, Sivanandan, 
Bourne and assistant librarian Hazel Waters. They kept the Institute going with the 
help of unpaid volunteers from the black community, including several Black 
Power activists such as the BLF's Tony Soares, the BUFP's Roger Loftus and the 
BPM's Darcus Howe, who was asked to be the editor of Race Today. 
If the Black Power movement could bring about a radical cultural shift in the 
largely white race relations industry, its impact on those who actually joined its 
ranks was even more profound. For many of the young black men and women who 
joined the various Black Power groups, their involvement in the movement became 
a defining point in their lives. The sense of personal agency, confidence and 
political engagement conferred by being part of the movement was powerful: its 
alumni include many people who went on to achieve wealth, status and even fame. 
To take the Brixton branch of the Black Panther Movement as an example, former 
leader Althea Lecointe is now a doctor, Darcus Howe is a journalist and TV 
17 Jenny Bourne, interviewed by the author, 29 July 2004. '8 Ibid. 
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presenter, Faroukh Dhondy is a film scriptwriter, Linton Kwesi Johnson is a well 
known poet and owns his own record label, Neil Kenlock co-founded London 
radio station Choice FM and is a respected photographer, and H. 0. Nazareth is a 
playwright, film director and journalist. Activists from other organisations, such as 
Herman Edwards, Ashton Gibson and Vince Hines of RAAS, and Tony Soares of 
the BLF, were inspired by their experiences as Black Power activists to take up 
less glamorous but no less important and successful careers in social care. 
Linton Kwesi Johnson describes his participation in the Black Panther as 'a 
catalyst for self-discovery': 
The Panthers shaped my worldview. I came into contact with them at a very 
formative time of my life - in my late teens - and it had a lasting impact on 
me. I was grounded in politics, I discovered black literature, I discovered 
black poetry: it's had the most profound impact on my life. That's how I 
found out who I was, that's where I learned how to locate myself in history 
and society. 19 
Joining a Black Power group acted as a psychological counterweight to the low 
expectations of teachers and career advisors, unexplained job rejections and poor 
living conditions that demoralised and alienated many black people from British 
society. Its emphases on personal worth and community action provided a 
constructive alternative to 'hustling' on the streets. The type of people who had the 
motivation, discipline and political commitment to join Black Power groups were 
ipsofacto the sort of people who wanted to be active in society, but Black Power 
gave them support, confidence and direction. 
Black Power groups were small and localised which meant that the areas in 
which they were based felt the strongest impact of their activities. This was 
reinforced by the fact that a major part of the Black Power groups' programmes 
concerned consciousness-raising and providing essential services for their usually 
'9 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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poor and under-resourced neighbourhoods. Nurseries, housing projects, youth 
clubs, supplementary schools and social events were set up by activists. Black 
Power youth groups taught local black teenagers to direct their energies into their 
families, communities and politics rather dm drink, drugs and crime. Black Power 
activists, who were often parents themselves, had been involved in supplementary 
education since its inception in the late 1960s. They believed that racial pride and a 
revolutionary consciousness could only be developed through extra-curricular 
classes because on the rare occasions that black children in British schools were 
taught about people who looked like them, they were either depicted as slaves or 
savages. 'British education purposely distorts our history and never teaches us of 
the greatness and dignity of our people and their brave struggle against European 
domination', charged a 1970 article in the BPM newspaper, the Black People's 
News Service. 20 Black Power newspapers reflected the need for a positive 
representation of Africa in a continuous stream of articles about people and places 
from African history, which featured alongside regular reports on contemporary 
anti-colonial struggles in places like Angola and Mozambique. The idea of Africa 
as the touchstone for a positive black identity became increasingly important as the 
Black Power movement matured. For West Indians, 'Mother Africa' could offer 
them the pride and sense of belonging that the 'mother country' had denied them. 
'People loved the idea of Africa and they loved the African-ness in themselves 
because it countered the mirror white society was holding up in which black is 
seen as bad', explains Colin PrescWýl 'But it was a critical engagement ... and it 
tended to be people who were politically active, who were activists, who had this 
20 BPM, 'What we stand foe, Black People's News Service, March 1970, p. 7. 21 Colin Prescod, interviewed by the author, 23 January 2008. 
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culturalist response - it was another part of the trappings of militancy and 
conftonting the status quo'. 22 
The primary aim of supplementary schools was to teach black children 
about their heritage and engender in them a sense of pride. '[P]art of the Black 
Power movement was talking about the curriculum, not just the three Rs but also 
the cultural content", remembers BUR member Harry Goulbourne, who after 
leaving university helped set up the organisation's first South East Summer School 
in 1971 ý3 The London groups used as case studies in this thesis started a number 
of other educational projects catering for pre-school children through to adults. 
Examples of these initiatives included the Headstart project and a Sunday school 
for struggling West Indian children, both run from the BLF's headquarters; the 
BUFP's annual South East Summer Schools; the Malcolm X Montessori School 
started by former UCPA member Ajoy Ghose and his wife Kathy for the children 
in their Notting Hill street; 
I 
and, from September 1969, the Free University for 
Black Studies, which catered for adults of any colour who wanted to find out more 
about black CUItUre. 24 The Malcolm X Montessori School (later known by the 
rather gentler name of Fun With Learning) took as its motto its namesake's maxim 
that, 'A child is not born stupid, but made stupid'. 25 This neatly encapsulated Black 
Power activists' belief that the British education system was deliberately designed 
22 Ibid. 
23 Harry Goulbourne, interviewed by the author, 6 September 2004. Goulbourne is now a professor 
at South Bank University. 
' Headstart and the BLF Sunday supplementary school were advertised in Grass Roots; BUFP 
press releases about their South East Summer Schools are held, unfiled, at the MR; an article 'Fun 
With Learning project is in the balance' about the Fun With Learning/Malcolm X Montessori 
Project appeared in the Kensington Post on 4 February 1972; and for the Free University for Black 
Studies see the 1971 Gemini News Service press release, 'Where they educate whites and blacks 
about blackness, held in the Black Groups file at the MR. 
" This quote and a picture of Malcolm X adom the back cover of an undated pamphlet about Fun 
With Learning by Ajoy Ghose called 'Towards a Black Tomorrow', held4 unfiled, at the Institute of 
Race Relations (IRR). 
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to leave black children ignorant and demoralised. They were determined to reverse 
this process. 
The supplementary education movement was the area in which Black 
Power groups' insistence on knowing about and having pride in one's heritage had 
I 
a practical significance for the everyday lives of the majority of the black 
community. Much of the militancy of the supplementary education movement 
came from the strength of West Indian parents' concerns about the way their 
children were schooled. The way the movement developed however, was 
influenced by the pre-existence of a Black Power movement which placed a high 
emphasis on education, said that black people should actively take control of their 
communities, and argued that without a sense of self-worth gained through a 
knowledge of one's history and heritage, black people were inherently 
disadvantaged? 6 Those West Indian parents who were naturally inclined to defer to 
their children's teachers' authority and believe that their children were lazy or 
stupid, had to re-examine their assumptions in the light of the criticisms Black 
Power activists were tenaciously making about the British school system. The 
supplementary education movement is one of the longest-lasting and most 
successful aspects of black community action from the 1960s and Black Power 
played a significant role in the formation and development of that movement. 
Achieving unity among such a diverse range of ethnic groups was the most 
challenging problem that faced the Black Power movement in Britain and one for 
which it could not look to the United States for guidance. The movement's 
26 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, information about the Black Parents Movement, 
which was founded in April 1975 and was active until the mid-19809ý can be found at the George 
Padmore Institute (GPI) in north London. The Black Parents Movement grew out of the political 
activity and supplementary education initiatives, from 1968 onwards, of activists (and parents) John 
la Rose and Eric and Jessica Huntley, among others. Archival material about this can also be found 
at the GPI. 
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response was to create an inclusive political identity based on non-white people's 
shared experiences of oppression, both in the past, as Britain's colonial subjects, 
and in the present, as the targets of white racism in the 'mother country'. To do this 
it appropriated the term 'black' and used it to signify a political identity rather than 
a physical description. '[B]Iack was the colour of our fight, our politics, not our 
skins', explained Sivanandan. 27 Political blackness did not replace ethnic, religious 
and national identities but rested on top of them allowing people from disparate 
backgrounds to come together to campaign on issues that affected them all. 'We 
might have, in our lifestyles and our beliefs, defined ourselves culturally', 
remembers A. Sivanandan, 'but in our fight against racism we defined ourselves 
politically'. 
28 
The debate over political blackness was alive throughout the Black Power 
period and beyond, with attacks both from cultural nationalists, who tended to link 
blackness with Afficanness, and Asians who felt uncomfortable with identiPjing 
themselves as black for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, the idea of political 
blackness was broadly accepted. A 1974 article in the newspaper of one of the 
most cultural nationalist Black Power groups, the BLF, showed how the 
organisation could both support African nationalism and the idea of political 
blackness. 'Black people can be Brown, dark Brown, Jet Black ... in fact, all 
shades of Black, yet we're all defined as BLACK. From that you can see how the 
definition unites us', explained the article, 'When we define a person as Black, the 
word for one describes the non-white race, the people that person springs from; in 
-" Bowser, Kushnick and Grant, 'Catching History on the Wing: A. Sivanandan as Activist, Teacher 
and Rebel', in B. Bowser and L Kushnick (eds) with P. Grantý Against the Odds: Scholars who 
Challenged Racism in the Twentieth Century (Amherst and Boston, 2002), p. 237. 23 Ibid., p. 237. 
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our case The African Race and the African People'. 29 The idea of political 
blacknessý in fact, achieved such hegemony that, nearly thirty years later, journal 
articles devoted to arguing why Asians were not black were still being published? o 
Simplifying race relations into a binary opposition between black and white was 
also an attempt to keep attention focused on white racism rather than the details of 
how it affected each ethnic minority differently and whether some groups were 
surviving better than others. It forced the post-war immigrants from Asia to ask 
themselves whether they were 'black' and, if so, where they stood in relation to 
white society. Even those who did not accept the definition of themselves as black 
could only reach this conclusion through a process of thinking about their ethnic 
identity and its relationship to white society, which often heightened their political 
awareness. 
One significant attempt to organise around this new black political identity 
was the formation of the Black Peoples' Alliance (BPA) on 28 April 1968. The 
brainchild of the general secretary of the Indian Workers Association of Great 
Britain, Jagmohan Joshi, the BPA was born at a conference in Leamington Spa 
attended by fifty-one delegates from twenty militant African, Asian and West 
Indian organisations, including various Pakistani Workers' Associations, the 
Pakistan Democratic Front, WISC, the West Indian Association, the Caribbean 
Socialist Union, the Group for Nigerian Revolution, the Afro-Asian Liberation 
Front, BPM, IWA (GB) and the Black Regional Action Movement (BRAM)? ' 
Groups with white members or reformist goals were not allowed to join, although 
29'Black Is... ', Grass Roots 3: 3 (May 1974), p. 7. 
30 See T. Modood, 'Political blackness and British Asians', SocioloSy 28: 4 (1994). 
31 A list of sixteen member groups is included in a CPGB report, 'Racialism and "Black Powee", 
10 May 1968, in CPILON/RACE/02/01.1he involvement of BRAM is discussed in its newspaper 
Black Ram, held at the EM and the Black Peoples'Alliance Newsletter, JmTeb 1970, contains a 
report from the United Black People's Organisation in Sheffield. 
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the BPA was prepared to 'seek allies from [the] majority community' by working 
alongside militant white organisations. 32 The creation of the BPA was an explicit 
attempt to unite different ethnic minorities. 'National minorities [have] been 
suspicious of one another and have sometimes seen their interests as conflicting, 
read the printed notes from the founding conference. 'This meeting is one of the 
33 most concrete signs of us overcoming these difficulties'. The BPA was equally 
explicit, however, in its exclusion of middle-class reformists of any ethnicity. 
'Obviously the support of all sections of the Black Communities should be sought". 
agreed -the delegates, 'but not at the cost of taking the soft line preferred by many 
of the middle-class Immigrants. 34 The members of the BPA saw blackness as a 
radical political identity, inextricably linked with class struggle. ne member 
groups disagreed over whether it was a Black Power organisation: 'That an 
organisation of the composition of [the] BPA could have such wide and varied 
views on Black Power points to one thing, that a public discussion has to be carried 
out ... to enable the whole question to be cleared', reported BRAM's chairman in 
35 February 1969. Nonetheless, all were happy to organise under the banner of 
political blackness. 
Despite its resolution to undertake 'the kinds of activities which will 
mobilise our own people and not necessarily the kinds of things which the British 
tradition finds most acceptable', the BPA largely relied on the same old tactics of 
petitions and marches ?6 That said, the BPA's first demonstration, a 'march for 
dignity' to Downing Street on 12 January 1969, attracted eight thousand marchers, 
32 BPA, 'Documented and adopted at the inaugural meeting 28/4/68', p. 2. Two-page documept 
held in Tony Soares' private collection. 33 Ibid., p. 1 34 Ibid., p. 1. 
35 'View of meeting', The Black Ram 1: 3 (15 February 1969), p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 2. 
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two thirds of whom were Asian, by Joshi's estimate. 37 The marchers converged on 
Downing Street, delivered a petition and then symbolically turned their backs on 
No. 10 and set fire to an effigy of Enoch Powell. Despite these big public displays 
of unity, the BPA did not achieve a great deal and the solidarity between its 
constituent African, West Indian and Asian member groups waned when there was 
not a big issue, such as the 1971 Immigration Act, to focus their opposition 
outwards. Nonetheless, the concept of political blackness remained for many years 
a usefid tool to promote unity in the anti-racist movement. 
A serious and much commented upon flaw in the American Black Power 
movement was its dismissive treatment of women, and it is worth noting that the 
British movement had a prouder record in this respect. By the start of the 1970s, 
many Black Power groups were attempting to take a strong stance against sexism, 
although this may have worked better on paper than in practice. The Black Power 
movement's position on sexism was, however, far more progressive than the 
nascent women's movement's stand against racism. Sexism and misogyny, 
particularly against white women, had been rife at the start of the Black Power 
movement. RAAS leader Michael X openly admitted in his autobiography to 
having been a pimp in his former days as a Notting Hill hustler and continued to 
boast that he lived off rich white women's patronage. 38 The UCPA had very few 
female members and its original leaders Roy Sawh and Obi Egbuna were hardly 
progressive thinkers when it came to gender issues. Both objectified white women 
as the sexual property of the white man and as such professed their disdain for 
them. A police transcript of one of Sawh's flamboyant Hyde Park speeches 
37 See MS2141/2: 'Report of the General Secretary presented by J. Joshi at the National Conference 
of the IWA (GB), 7-8 November 1970 at Nottingham, p. 2 1. Document held in the IWA archive at 
Birmingham Central Library. 
31 See M. MaRk, From Michael de Freitas to Michael X (London, 1968). 
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reported him as saying, 'I make a living here by selling white women. They are 
easy to sell because they are stupid and silly'? Sawh's words, as ever, were meant 
to shock rather than reflect reality, but they also pointed to an underlying lack of 
respect for women. Egbuna's posturing on the subject of white women was equally 
atavistic, but his sentimental eulogising of black women as the human embodiment 
of Mother Africa was more pernicious! 0 By the early 1970s, however, openly 
denigrating women was no longer acceptable in the movement and the BUFP, BLF 
and the female-led BPM all had written policies on the correct treatment of their 
female members. A two-day National Conference on the Rights of Black People in 
Britain in May 1971, jointly organised by the BUFP and BPM, included a 
dedicated women's session entitled '"Black women want freedom" - Black sisters 
speak out! 941 The conference programme contained a page on women in the 
movement written by the BUFP's Black Women's Action Committee (BWAC), 
which asserted: 
Women must not be relegated to the role of kitchen troops, secretarial slaves 
(for typing, circulating addresses or passing ashtrays) or house servants. Our 
women must guard against male chauvinism and arrogance, and must be 
allowed to participate fidly in the running of the party. 42 
The fact that this still needed to be stated showed that the deeply 
entrenched chauvinism among male Black Power activists had not disappeared. It 
was, however, an issue that was being addressed and fought against ideologically. 
39 'Transcript of shorthand notes taken by Det. Sgt. Battyc, Special Branch, of parts of a speech by 
Roy Sawh at a meeting under the auspices of the Universal Coloured People's Association at 
Speaker's Comer', p. 3. Document part of DPP2/4428: 'Alton Watson, Roy Sawh, Ajoy Shankar 
Ghose, Michael Ezekiel, RAAS and UCPA, 23d/24'b August 1967', held at the National Archive 
(NA). 
' For a lengthy example of this see Egbuna's 'Letter from Brixton Prison', in which Egbuna 
serenades a Harlem prostitute with Marcus Garvey's poem 'The Black Woman' after he has paid 
her for sex. 0. Egbuna, Destroy 77ds Temple: the Voice of Black Power in Britain (London, 197 1), 
pp. 61-93. 
" 'National conference special issue', May 197 1, p. 8. Document held in black organisations file at 
the IRIL 
42 BUFP, 'National Conference: Struggle for our human rights', May 22-23,197 1, p. 11. Document 
held in the black groups file at the IRFL 
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A BLF pamphlet from 1971, reprinted in 1977, recognised that sexism was an 
issue that needed to be addressed. 'Black women in Black society are oppressed 
not only by white society but also by the attitudes of Black men', it stated, adding 
that if Black Power did not recognise and remedy its sexist attitudes, black women 
would be dmwn into the white women's libemtion movement. 43 A new 
introduction in 1977 noted, however, that 'The section on Black women and 
womens [sic] lib was condemned and discredited from the start'! 4 It was not 
discredited enough to be removed from the pamphlet though. Black feminists and 
former activists Beverley Bryan, Stella Dadzie and Suzanne Scafe recalled that, 
'Although we worked tirelessly, the significance of our contribution to the mass 
mobilisation of the Black Power era. was undermined and overshadowed by the 
men. They both set the agenda and stole the show'. 45 Despite this dig 
judgement, they conceded that Black Power had offered black women an early 
path to self-respect. 'As an ideology that expanded pride in our African heritage, 
they wrote. 'Black Power gave rise to one of the earliest conscious and collective 
expressions by Black women of cultural self-respect'. 46 
Black Power's internal weaknesses and decline 
Although all three phases of the Black Power movement contained elements of 
strength and weakness, the latter was exhibited most obviously at its start and 
during its decline. Like any political movement, Black Power in Britain did not 
spring into life fully-formed and with infhllible leaders. During its first phase, 
43 A- Hassan, Revolutionary Black Nationalism: Unity and Struggle Against Domination (2 nd 
edition, London, 1977), p. 6. 
" Ibid., p. 1. 
45 B. Bryan, S. Dadzie and S. Scafe, The Heart of the Race: Black Women's Lives in Britain 
(London, 1985), p. 144. 
46 Ibid., p. 222. 
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groups like the UCPA were going through the process of thrashing out their 
ideologies and goals and trying out different protest strategies. Concerning the 
latter, former UCPA member Tony Soares recalls wryly that 'I don't think there 
was any idea about tactics at the time'! 7 The first Black Power organisation in 
Britain, the UCPA published a fifteen-page 'Special Statement' in September 1967 
that offered only the vaguest of solutions to the problems it detailed at length. 48 
The aim 'to propagate the solution of our problems on international levels', for 
example, was so vaguely defined as to be virtually meaningless! 9 Even the more 
concrete goals, such as 'To take immediate action for the establishment of 
nurseries for coloured children', were included without any explanation of how 
they would be achieved. 50 The statement was also littered with contradictions. 
'Black people of the world can no longer afford to fight White oppression as 
individuals or in isolated little groups', it explained, before adding that 'Black 
Power is a revolutionary conspiracy ... The less the number of people involved, 
the more secure the conspiracy'. 51 The document's attitude to white people was 
similarly confused. "The Black man has no choice today. Either he smashes that 
[white capitalist] system with active POWER or the system will take advantage of 
his passive powerlessness and smash him', it declared, before stating that, 'Where 
we stand depends on the attitude of the White man'. 52 The contradictions and 
vagueness of terms contained in the UCPA's Special Statement gave it a flexibility 
that could mediate between the different vantage points of the group's members, 
who were drawn from a variety of countries and classes, but it also meant the 
47 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
48 UCPA, 'Black Power in Britain: a Special Statement by the Universal Coloured People's 
Association', 10 September 1967, contained in the Black groups file at the EM 
49 Ibid, p. 14. 
50 Ibid., p. 13. Capitalisation original. 
31 Ibid., pp. 4,9. Capitalisation original. 
51 Ibid., pp. 7-8,10. Capitalisation original. 
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initial surge of organisational energy was not very usefully directed. In an 
environment as politically hostile to black people as Britain in 1968, this was a 
significant weakness. 
Early Black Power leaders were also lacking in the skills to build and 
sustain a grassroots movement. Leadership was claimed by those with the most 
personal ambition and who sought the most publicity. Tbree men were publicly 
identified as Black Power leaders at the start bf the movement and they attracted 
the majority of the media attention. They were RAAS leader Michael X and UCPA 
leaders Roy Sawh and Obi Egbuna. 53 All three were skilful media manipulators, 
ever ready with a flamboyant soundbite for journalists, who made them their first 
ports of call for information on Black Power. This gave them a public profile that 
was entirely out of proportion to their influence in the black community and often 
led to their personal opinions being reported as the policies of their organisations. 
A four-page feature in The Sund; ay Telegraph Magazine from May 1969 perfectly 
exemplified this trend. 54 A generally sober and thoughtful survey of Black Power 
in Britain, the article's major focus was, nonetheless, on Egbuna, Sawh and 
Michael X. This was despite the fact that within the article Egbuna admitted he 
was no longer politically active and it was reported that Roy Sawh's maverick 
behaviour had recently caused him to be disowned by his latest organisation, the 
Black Peoples' Alliance (BPA). 'The criticism most often levelled against [Sawh] 
is that he wants to be a leader of black people in the eyes of white people', the 
article's author reported, apparently without irony. 55 
33 As Michael X's character has been discussed at length in the previous chapter the following 
section concentrates on Sawh and Egbuna. 
' B. Cox, 'White is a state of mind', The Sund4 Telegraph Magazine, 23 May 1969, pp. 14-18. 53 Ibid, p. 16. 
139 
Chapter 3: 'A revolutionary conspiracy'? Black Power's strengths and weaknesses 
Sawh was a former Communist who had briefly lived in Moscow in 1962, 
but was appalled by the racism there. Returning to Britain, he became a regular 
orator at Speaker's Comer and, after 1967, an active campaigner for Black Power. 
Sawh co-founded RAAS in 1965, the UCPA in 1967, the BPA in 1968 and the 
Free University for Black Studies in 1969, as well as a number of less significant 
organisations such as the Universal Coloured People and Arab Association 
(UCPAAA) and the Black Power Party. 56 In November 1967 he was the second 
black man in Britain to be prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred for his rabble- 
rousing speeches at Speaker's Comer, receiving a L120 fine. 57 His natural aptitude 
for making witty and highly entertaining speeches, good looks and boundless 
energy for new ventures made Sawh an asset for attracting attention and whipping 
up enthusiasm for new groups. His enjoyment of the limelight, however, meant 
that he was less interested in the prosaic task of day-to-day organising and 
favoured flippant bon mots over thorough analysis. Sawh's unilateral, attention- 
seeking behaviour led, for example, to his expulsion from the Black Peoples' 
Alliance within a year of him being made the chairman of the organisation. 'The 
BPA decided to expel Roy Sawh from the organisation at Sunday's meeting 
because he made statements in the name of the BPA which were not true, that BPA 
had called a mass black strike for May Ist', reported the chairman of BRAM in 
February 1969.58 Sawh's desire to offer up a sensational story to the press had got 
the better of him again. Harry Goulbourne, a member of the BUFP in 1970, also 
detected a degree of hypocrisy between Sawh's words and his deeds. 'Roy had a 
thing about whites, white women', remembers Goulbourne, 'but the moment he 
' For biographical information on Sawh, see ibid., pp. 14-19. 
57 Fellow UCPA members, Speaker's Corner orators and co-defendants Alton Watson, Ajoy Ghose 
and hfichael Ezekiel were also convicted of incitement to racial hatred at the same trial. See 
DPP214428 at the National Archive (NA) 
3" The Black Ram 1: 3 (15 Febnmry 1969), p. 3. 
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came off the rostrum [at Speaker's Comer] he would go for a drink and he was 
surrounded by his white friends. And that was how it was with a lot of these 
59 
chaps'. Sawh's mastery of a charismatic and entertaining style ultimately 
undermined the substance of his work with Black Power organisations. 
A respected playwright and writer from Nigeria, who won a scholarship to 
study in London, Obi Egbuna had been an active member of the Committee of 
African Organisations before an educational exchange to the United States in 1966, 
organised by the British Council, introduced him to Black Power. He had been 
very impressed by the activists he met in the United States and returned to Britain 
determined to start a Black Power movement. Black people in Britain, however, 
were not ready for Black Power in 1966, 'So, ' Egbuna explained in his 
autobiography, 'biding our time, we contented ourselves with our old activities in 
the Pan-African movement'. 60 By July 1967 his wait was over. Elected as the 
president of the newly formed UCPA because of his eloquence and knowledge of 
American Black Power, Egbuna's stewardship quickly led to splits in the 
organisation and he himself left to form the Black Panther Movement in April 
1968. 
Egbuna's musings on Black Power and his role in it were published in a 
1971 book called Destroy This Temple: The Voice of Black Power in Britain, 
which revealed his egotism. 61 Furthermore, anyone who had read Eldridge 
Cleaver's Soul on Ice, published in Britain two years earlier, would have found 
Destroy This Temple highly derivative in style and content. 62 For example, 
although he was not serving a sentence for rape, as Cleaver had been when he 
59 Harry Goulbourne, interviewed by the author, 6 September 2004. 60 See 0. Egbuna, Destroy, pp. 17. 61 Another semi-autobiographical tome, Dhvy of a Homeless Prodigal (Enugu, Nigeria, 1978), 
reprised part of Destroy This Temple. 62 E Cleaver, Soul On Ice (New York, 1969). 
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wrote Soul On Ice, Egbuna also included a political justification for raping white 
women. 'Tbe relationship between the White woman and the Black man is not a 
normal one', he explained in a chapter entitled 'The Little Boy of Brussels', 'T'his 
makes her, to the Black man, the target of Black vengeance. As a symbol of 
63 European womanhood she deserves to be raped'. The book also contained a long 
open address (Tetter From Brixton Prison') to a Harlem prostitute that was clearly 
inspired by Soul On Ice's chapter of love letters from Cleaver to his lawyer 
Beverley Axelrod and his meditations on black men's difficulties in forming 
relationships with black women. In case positioning himself as Britain's answer to 
Eldridge Cleaver failed to cement his Black Power credentials, Egbuna had a final 
trump card up his sleeve. 'As I write at this very moment', he declared near the end 
of the book, 'I am thinking in my African language and translating very fast into 
English'. 64 
In 1968, Egbuna had also written another, rather different, letter from 
Brixton prison, while spending five months on remand there with fellow activists, 
Peter Martin and Gideon Dolo, awaiting trial for 'uttering or writing threats to kill 
65 police officers at Hyde Park. The charges derived from a speech Egbuna had 
given at Speaker's Comer titled, 'What to do when cops lay their hands on Black 
men at the Speaker's Comer', the transcript of which he then arranged to be 
printed. The printer took the speech to the police and Egbuna was subsequently 
arrested. The heavy-handed reaction to what amounted to little more than Egbuna's 
habitual posturing and the refusal of bail to a middle-class playwright with no 
previous convictions were punitive in effect and, one suspects, intent. Having 
63 Egbuna, Destoy, pp. 56-7. 
" lbidL, p. 155. 
63 See Metropolitan Police file MEP02/11409: 'Benedict Obi Egbuna, Peter Martin and Gideon 
Ketucni Dolo charged with uttering and writing threats to kill police officers at Hyde Park, WT, 
held at the NA. 
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publicly declared that he would neither seek bail nor offer a defence, Egbuna 
eventually did both, using the justification that, although he wanted to 'puke fires 
of revolutionary venom on the white system', his two co-defendants could not take 
the pressure of prison. 66 'Some of you might think this was the wrong decision', he 
wrote to his fellow activists, 'but if you were here and see [sic] what even the fore- 
taste of prison is like, and what it can do to a man like Peter, you might think 
67 
again. I just couldn't do it to him'. Convicted and sentenced to a year in gaol, 
suspended for three years, Egbuna withdrew from activities that might have landed 
him back in prison. By the time Destroy This Temple came out in 1971, after his 
suspended sentence had been served, Egbuna's reputation in the Black Power 
movement had been severely damaged and his flamboyant publicity-seeking style 
had gone out of vogue. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, Black Power activists had begun to explore 
Marxism much more seriously and develop much firmer ideas about their goals. 
By 1969, their tactics and leadership had changed too. The fht wave of self. 
aggrandising leaders were castigated by most Black Power supporters as self- 
serving traitors who were - even worse - not of the people. A statement by the 
BPM distancing itself from Egbuna made this its first accusation. '[H]e has never 
participated in the community activities of the Movement, and has never identified 
68 himself with our people at grassroot level', it thundered. Furthermore, Egbuna 
kept bad company: 'He seeks alliance with the arch tricksters and traitors and 
opportunists Michael de Freitas [Michael X] and Roy Sawh, who represent no 
66 0. Egbuna, 'Letter from 0. B. Egbuna in Brixton prison to his brothers and sisters', undated, p. 1. 
Held in Tony Soares' private collection. 67 lbidL, p. 2. 
" BPK 'A statement on Obi Benedict Egbuna (0. B. E. )', undated, p. 1. Single page document 
held in the IWA archive at Birmingham Central Library. 
143 
Chapter 3: "A revolutionary conspiracy'? Black Power's strengths and weaknesses 
genuine movement of black people', castigated the BPM . 
69 Having public 
figureheads who spoke to the press or campaigned to influence the white power 
structure became deeply unfashionable among Black Power organisations during 
the movement's second phase. Showing a willingness to lead resulted in many 
formerly respected Black Power activists being accused of being bourgeois and 
placing themselves above the people, which in the Maoist-influenced atmosphere 
of the 1970s Black Power movement were cardinal sins. Ron Phillips, who ran the 
UCPA's Manchester branch, was expelled in May 1970, for example, because, 
among other things, 'He spent most of his time in the university and very little time 
with the ordinary working people of Moss Side ... This man indulges in book 
worship and neglects the experience of the people'. 70 Phillips also stood accused of 
sexism. 'Ron Phillips' behaviour towards several black women (and white women 
too), shows quite clearly that he believes that women are a commodity to be used 
as toilet paper', his UCPA accusers spat. 'Black consciousness demands that black 
women be treated with 66 dignity and honour which is theirs'. 71 By 1970, the 
macho, flamboyant, attention-seeking leadership style of the Black Power 
movement had become much more sober and low key. Althea Lecointe, Obi 
Egbuna's female replacement at the head of the Black Panther Movement, could 
rival any man with her rigid discipline and revolutionary fervour, according to 
former Panthers Linton Kwesi Johnson and Tony Sinclair, but went out of her way 
to remain anonymous outside of the movement. She achieved this with great 
success: apart from statements made by Lecointe, as part of her defence at the 
69 Ibid., p. 1. 
70 UCPA, 'The exposure and expulsion of a con (Ron Phillips) by UCPA', May 1970, pp. 1-2. Two 
page document held in the Black documents file at the MR. 
lbidL p. 2. 
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Mangrove Nine trial in 1971, this author has not been able to find any written 
material by or about her. 72 
The second phase of British Black Power, which lasted until 1972, was 
much more ideologically and organisationally disciplined. While this had many 
advantages, it also meant that groups began to argue over their different 
interpretations of Black Power and the movement began to coalesce into two 
mutually critical camps, one looking to Marxism-Leninism to lead the way out of 
Britain's oppressive capitalism and the other, although it was also socialist, 
focusing on Pan-Africanism and the struggles of the Third World to inspire and 
bolster the black struggle in Britain. BLF leader Tony Soares remembers the 
&constant bickering' of folk who were Marxists and were into socialism and all 
73 that and on the other side ... these very traditional cultural nationalist people'. 
Ile heterogeneous nature of Britain's black population had always posed a 
serious challenge to the unity of the Black Power movement. As groups became 
more and more tightly politically focused and appealed to smaller and smaller 
constituencies, they put off many existing and potential supporters. This trend 
toward factionalism had been observed as early as February 1970 by visiting 
American Black Panther Connie Matthews, who commented scathingly on it 
during a speaking tour of Britain. 'You're much too fragmented and you can't even 
organise this meeting properly', she told one gathering. 'You gotta get out of your 
own individual bags and do something', she snapped at another, 'You don't want 
72 The Mangrove Nine trial, discussed in the following chapter, took place at the Old Bailey 
between 5 October and 16 December 1971. The nine defendants were between them accused of 
thirty-one serious offences arising from disturbances at a demonstration against police harassment 
held in Notting Hill on 9 August 1970. Some of the defendants, including Althea Lecointe, 
conducted their own defence. 
73 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
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to have 16 organisations which won't work with white people'. 74 Matthews' 
warning was prescient. The increasingly strict adherence to different variations of 
Marxist doctrine among the London groups meant that members who did not want 
to toe the political line had little option but to splinter off to form new 
organisations. The BLF, for example, was founded in early 1970 by disaffected 
members of the North and West London branches of the Black Panther Movement, 
who disagreed with the increasingly strict Marxism-Leninism of leader Althea, 
Lecointe and wanted a looser organisational structure with a greater emphasis on 
culture. The BLF and the BPM had much in common; both agreed that racism was 
a function of capitalism that could only be overturned by socialist revolution and 
both maintained links with the'American Black Panther Party. But the BPM's 
inability to tolerate political heterodoxy necessitated the creation of the BLF to 
represent some of its members' dissident views. 
Matthews' criticism of British Black Power groups' unwillingness to work 
with white people was less well-founded. Many British groups' newspapers 
reported sympathetically. on, and expressed solidarity with, the republican struggle 
in Northern Ireland, for example. In fact, in adopting a class-based analysis of 
Britain's problems, groups like the BUFP and, after 1973, the BPM - or Black 
Workers' Movement as it became - could be said to have identified with the white 
working class to the detriment of the Black Power movement. In a February 1971 
interview, BUFP founding member Ricky Cambridge was asked whether 'with a 
political analysis", he saw, 'the root problem as capitalism as opposed to raceT 
'Yes", he replied, 'I think the whole business of race can be projected out of all 
74 D. Humphry, 'Sister Connie swears at the British Black Panthers', The Sunday Times, 22 
February 1970, p. 14. 
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proportion to the correlation of class forces in the society'. 75 If Cambridge was 
accurately representing the BUFP's line, it is hard to square this with its continuing 
existence as a Black Power organisation. His departure from the organisation in 
September 1971 perhaps indicates that his fellow members were not yet ready to 
completely abandon the idea of campaigning on grounds of racial oppression. A 
1974 internal discussion paper explained that although the BUFP took Marxist- 
Leninism as its basis and was inspired by the struggles of the Chinese and 
7 Vietnamese people, it was not a true revolutionary vanguard party. 5 However, 
later that year, the front page headline of the BUFP's newspaper Black Voice 
proclaimed 'Communism The Only Solution", and explained that 'More and more 
of us working class black people in Britain are ... finding that our only salvation 
lies in THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF CAPITALISM' . 
77 And while the article 
conceded that black workers were the most exploited section of their class, Black 
Power was not mentioned at all. 
Representing the other side of the Black Power divide, groups such as the 
BLF did refuse to work with white people and took a more cultural nationalist line. 
The BLF is a black organisation. It's [sic] sole concern is survival for Black 
people in Britain', a 1971 issue of Grass Roots explained, 'As a rule we do not 
accept white members or relate to white organisations' . 
78 Although it is important 
not to overplay the Aftocentrism of the BLF, or other Black Power'groups with a 
cultural-nationalist bent, by the mid-1970s it was the case that their increased 
identification with Africa as a source of cultural pride meant that their Asian 
members felt less comfortable participating. An article, 'Black Is... ', featured in 
73 T. Bowden, 'Questions on Black Power, The Black Liberator 1: 2/3 (Winter 197 1), p. 7 1. 
76 See 'Wbat is the B. U. F. P. ', 3 May 1974, unpublished 46-page internal discussion paper, held, 
unfiledý at the IRPL - 77 'Communism the only solution', Black Voice 5: 1 (1974), p. 1. Capitalisation original. 78 Grass Roots 1: 2 (7 July 197 1), p. 2. 
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the May 1974 issue of Grass Roots, defined black in a way that completely 
excluded Asian people. 'When we define a person as Black, the word for one 
describes the non-white race, the people that person springs from", the article 
explained, 'in our case, The African Pace and The African People'. 79 Tony Soares 
lists nationalism as one of the reason he decided to withdraw from the BLF in 
1977. 'It had ... become very Afrocentric', he says. 'I was one of the last Asians 
left there, so my own personal position was getting difficult'. 80 Sri Lankan-bom 
Sivanandan also noticed the negative impact of cultural-nationalist Afrocentrism 
on the Black Power group he was closest to, the BUFP. 'Black nationalism to a 
certain extent broke down Black Power', he recalls. 81 
Whether one belonged to a more cultural nationalist or a Marxist-Leninist 
Black Power group, community self-help projects were an essential part of one's 
activities. But although setting up supplementary schools, nurseries and youth 
clubs had a positive and often long-lasting impact on their immediate communities, 
these activities advanced Black Power groups' underlying political aims at a 
painstakingly slow rate. Whether the fmal goal was revolutionary black 
nationalism in the Third World (the doctrine of the quasi-anarchist, cultural- 
nationalist BLF), socialist world revolution (desired by the Marxist-Leninist 
BUFP), or the end of capitalism and liberation of all oppressed people (the stated 
aim of the BPM), all three groups agreed that racism was a tool of capitalist 
domination and that only a revolutionary change in society would bring about 
racial equality. To achieve this they all adopted the same strategy of building a 
revolutionary black consciousness at the grassroots level, although the BUFP and 
79 'Black Is... ', Grass Roots 3: 3 (May 1974), p. 7. so Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
" A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 
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BPM were prepared to work with revolutionary white groups while the BLF was 
not. The BLFs approach of retreating into the black community ran the risk of 
contracting the Black Power movement's influence even further, while Black 
Power groups' revolutionary fervour scared off middle-class West Indians, most 
Asians (who believed in economic advancement and organising through the trade 
union movement and were not prepared to sacrifice their religious beliefs for a 
secular revolution) and potential white allies like anti-racist liberals and the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). 
Pamphlets published-by the CPGB show that the party had an impressive 
understanding of the problems facing black immigrants, the injustice of their being 
scapegoated for Britain's pre-existing social and economic problems, and the 
existence of trade union racism. 82 -Me Party also campaigned on behalf of 
incarcerated American Black Power heroes Angela Davis, herself a member of the 
CPUSA, and George Jackson. 83 It was, however, completely opposed to separatist 
black organisations, even Marxist ones, because it believed they divided the 
working class. The CPGB had reacted less than enthusiastically to the arrival of 
committed anti-racist campaigner Communist Claudia Jones in the 1950s, even 
though she had been a dedicated member of the CPUSA, and it reacted to Black 
Power activists' desire to place black people at the vanguard of revolutionary 
politics with equal suspicion. Hence, a report on racial discrtimmation by CPGB 
member Asquith Gibbes, from March 1968, acknowledged the validity of black 
dissatisfaction but not of Black Power. 'We have to try to understand why and how 
12 Ilm representative examples of pamphlets were, H. Bourne, 'Racialism: Cause and Cure,, 
1965, pp. 14, London District Committee of the Connnunist Party, 'Brothers in the Fight for a 
Better Life, undated but pre-decirnalisation, and Communist Party, 'One Race, Ilie Human Race: a 
Communist Party broadsheet on the menace of racism', 1975, in CPALON/RACE/01/1, 
CPALONIRACE/O 1/02 and CPALON/RACE/02/02 respectively, held at the Labour History Archive 
and Study Centre, Manchester University. 
' See CPALON/RACEIO 1/02. 
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these feelings upon which black power [sic] bases itself actually arise, and we have 
to recognise the positive elements in them', he wrote, 'even though unscrupulous 
demagogues exploit them. These propagandists mouth revolutionary phrases while 
in practice they remain outside the struggle'. 94 The CPGB regarded Black Power's 
Communist heroes Mao Tse Tung, Leon Trotsky and Che Guevara to be dangerous 
dissidents. 'Many of these [British Black Power] groups have links outside Britain 
with Trotskyist and Maoist circles and are strongly anti-Communist', reported the 
CPGB's international affairs committee. 85 Stokely Carmichael's reported criticism 
of the white left in April 1968 reinforced the CPGB's impression that Black Power 
was at heart a separatist, anti-white movement. 'Marxism only takes into account 
the economic aspect of the struggle. It cannot help black people because ours is 
more social and cultural than economic', a CPGB memo reported Carmichael 
saying, 'Besides, Marx was a honkie, and we don't want black people looking up 
to no white man no matter who he is'. 86 
Although coming from different parts of the political spectrum, both the 
CPGB and white liberals mistakenly perceived the Black Power message to be that 
all white people were the enemy. While, during the 1960s, this had not been the 
case, by the early 1970s groups like the BLF and BRAM did believe that the white 
working class had been so corrupted by capitalism that it was beyond redemption. 
But without white suppor4 even if every black person in Britain had been 
persuaded of the need for a Black Power revolution, they would still only have had 
the support of about 3 per cent of the population. And even if they had been armed, 
" A. Gibbes, 'Ile fight against racial discrimination, 9-10 March 1968, p. 2. See file 
CP/LON/RACE/02/01 held at the Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester 
University. 
85 'Racialism and "Black Powee-, information document prepared for meeting of the International 
Affairs Committee, 10 May 1968, in ibid.. 
" Memo from Johnny W. to Jack Woddis, reporting on Carmichael's speech at the National Black 
Anti-War, Anti-Draft Union Conference in April 1968 in ibid.. 
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which British Black Power activists were not, success would still almost certainly 
have eluded them - despite a wider support base and a ready supply of guns, the 
American Black Panther Party had hardly got very far in fomenting a revolution 
across the Atlantic. Therefore, although the second phase of Black Power was 
more. focused and organised, its political aims were no more achievable. A 
movement without realisable aims cannot sustain momentum, as former Black 
Panther Darcus Howe realised. 'Once you set your sights on "The Revolution! ', 
when it doesn't come you are going to have a lot of demoralised people', he 
87 
reflected. 
One of the factors behind the movement's decline in its third phase, was 
that activists lost their motivation to pursue political revolution as a practical aim 
and redirected their energies into self-help projects with more immediately 
demonstrable results; cultural forms of resistance; or increasingly nebulous 
intellectual debates about revolutionary theory. A fine example of the latter 
tendency, Ricky Cambridge and Colin Prescod's journal The Black Liberator, a 
self-styled 'theoretical and discussion journal for black revolution', founded at the 
end of 1971, was so densely written and impenetrable that Prescod liked to joke 
that, 'even our footnotes had footriotes'. 88 By 1977, even Tony Soares, one of the 
most active and committed anti-colonial and Black Power campaigners, who had . 
not let several spells in prison deter him from following his political ideals, had 
given up on the promise of Black Power. 'I got the feeling that we were very much 
going round in circles, he says of the BLF. 'We were not making any progress and 
'7 Transcript of an unpublished interview with Anne Walmsley, 16 January 1986, p. 7. The 
document is part of the CAM papers held at the George Padmore Institute (GPI). 
88 The Black Liberator 1: 1 (Sept/Oct 197 1), p. 1. Colin Prescod, interviewed by the author, 20 July 
2004. 
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I could not see it going anywhere'. 89 He quit the organisation, went to university to 
study sociology and has since developed a successftd career in providing social 
housing for ethnic minorities. 
Black Power in the United States was an essential source of inspiration to 
militant black people in Britain, even though the situation of African Americans 
bore little relation to that of black people in Britain. Yet, nothing 'seemed more 
relevant to a settling British black population than those in black America', 
remembers former BUR member Harry Goulbourne, 'The Americans' books and 
popular publications, particularly the Black Panthers Speak, were avidly read'. 90 
'There is no doubt that we were influenced by events in the USA and how our 
black brothers there were meeting the situation', wrote Roy Sawh. 91 Linton Kwesi 
Johnson remembers events in the United States fascinating him as a schoolboy in 
1968. 'When those athletes gave the Black Power salute at the Olympics, that had 
a tremendous impact on a lot of us, especially me', he recalls. 92 For Johnson and 
his classmate Tony Sinclair, their admiration for American Black Power spurred 
them on to look for local militant groups. 'The thing that led me into Doining the 
Black Panther Movement] in the first place was Linton and the American 
movement', remembers Sincla03 Often the best-attended Black Power events in 
Britain were rallies and demoristrations in support of imprisoned American 
activists like Angela Davis, Bobby Seale and George Jackson. For example, a rally 
89 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
90 H. Goulboumc, Caribbean, p. 90. 
9' R. Sawh, From "ere IStand (London, 1987), p. 33. 
92 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
" Tony Sinclair, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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at Central Hall, Westminster, on 20 April 1971, to raise funds for the Soledad 
Brothers, attracted 3,000 people and raised E2,000.94 
The fact that American Black Power could be such an inspirational tool 
often led British Black Power activists to overlook the marked differences between 
the contexts of the two movements, Trinidadian student Colin Prcscod ran up 
against these differences as early as July 1967, when he dared to question the 
practicality of Stokely Carmichael's call for armed revolution. 'I saw Stokely 
speak in London at the West Indian Students Centre', Prescod recalls: 
He had been getting into rhetoric - arm ourselves and fight and all that 
business - but I raised my hand and said, "Well Stokely, yeah, all the people 
here are cheering like crazy but actually most of us have never seen a gun 
like you folks in the States. You know what guns are like: the idea of taking 
one up and firing it is not something we should be simply claging about, we 
don't know what that means7'. ... I got booed down of course. 
Outwardly, British Black Power appeared to be a close facsimile of its American 
progenitor, but within the movement British activists like Prescod acknowledged 
the differences in context between Britain and the United States. '[Wle were all 
first genemtion, we were from different countries, we were not homogenous. It 
wasn't quite like America, but I suppose we were all carried away with the rhetoric 
of America', says former BLF member Tony Soares ý6 By adopting the style and 
rhetoric of the American movement, British Black Power activists both showed 
their solidarity with their transatlantic counterparts and hoped their own 
organisations would appear more important and influential by association. By 
explicitly making these links, however, they also implied a connection between 
94 CPGB, 'Speeches From Ile Soledad Brothers Rally, Central Hall, Westminster, April 20,1971 -, 
London, 1971, p. 1. Pamphlet held in the CPGB archive at the Labour History Archive and Study 
Centre, Manchester University. The rally was organised by a coalition of groups including the 
BPK BUFP and BLF. 
95 Colin Prescod, interviewed by the author, 20 July 2004. 
96 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
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their groups' goals and tactics, and those of the American Black Power movement, 
at least in the minds of the British public, government and criminal justice system. 
The BPM, for example, had no organisational affiliation to the American 
Black Panther Party (BPP), yet it copied both its name and branded its newspapers, 
the Black People's News Service and Freedom News, with the BPP's trademark 
insignia of a black-gloved fist and a leaping panther. It was hardly surprising, 
therefore, that most people outside the organisation assumed, erroneously, that the 
BPM was the British branch of the BPP, or at least shared its policies and tactics. 
British Panthers, however, always knew that there were significant differences. 'I 
would say that although the BPM in England was keen to follow the developments 
[of the BPP], at no stage in my view did the BPM think that we should become like 
a carbon copy of them and, for example, pick up the gun', says former British 
Black Panther Tony Sinclair. 'We recognised our own situation for what it was and 
thought we could learn some lessons from themlý7 Ile BPM never actually 
advocated the use of anything more dangerous than martial arts in self-defence, but 
this was hard to tell from reading its literature. For example, the masthead on the 
front page of the March 1970 issue of the Black People's News Service interwove 
slogans from leading African American militants Bobby Scale and Malcolm X in 
the sentence, 'Black people unite and fight by any means necessary for our 
liberation ... Seize the time!! The time is now! ' and illustrated them with an image 
of a snarling black panther and two pictures of men giving the Black Power 
saluteý8 'I think it's the name more than anything that drove our scaring the police 
97 Tony Sinclair, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004.1 
" BPM, Black People's News Service, March 1970, p. 1. The Bobby Seale quote is 'Seize the time' 
and the Malcolm X quote, 'By any means necessary'. 
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in this country, says former British Black Panther Linton Kwesi Johnson. " That 
statement seems disingenuous until one understands both the- deliberate effort 
made by the Black Panther Movement to link its public image with its more 
radical, armed American counterpart, and its lack of a strategic plan actually to 
pose any physical threat to the security of the British state. 
Appropriating the American Black Panther Party's insurrectionary rhetoric 
for less than revolutionary ends was not the sole preserve of the BPM. In 1972, the 
BLF's newspaper Grass Roots reprinted from the BPP newspaper, 7he Black 
Panther, instructions on how to make a Molotov COcktail. 100 Tony Soares, who 
stood trial for four separate serious offences as a result of the issue, says it was 
definitely not part of a considered plan to equip Grass Roots readers with the 
know-how to make bombs for a coming revolution. 'No', he laughs. 'Sometimes 
they used to struggle to find stuff to put in, which is why that particular thing went 
in'. 101 Of all the Black Power organisations the BLF's literature suggests that it 
was the most serious about using guerrilla tactics, if only because of its proclaimed 
total disillusion with white British society. Soares had already spent over a year in 
prison for advocating violent resistance while a member of the Vietnam Liberation 
Organisation and had been involved in anti-colonial struggles in Mozambique 
where he grew up. Looking back, however, he does not rate the BLF's 
revolutionary potential highly. 'There was a lot of militant rhetoric but I don't 
think anybody was organised enough to do something', he says. 'There were a few 
99 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
100 BLF, 'Recipes', Grass Roots, September 1971, p. 5. During the trial it transpired that the 
instructions, as printed, did not make a working bomb. 
"" Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
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incidents - certain individuals -Aere they did throw the odd petrol bomb ... but 
they were very, vmy few 9.102 
The BLF, in common with many Black Power groups, actively supported 
armed revolutionary struggles that had a genuine potential for success, in the form 
of the guerrilla campaigns of African liberation movements in countries like 
Guin6-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia. All Black Power 
newspapers carried reports on the progress of groups like the Frente de Libertagao 
de Morambique (FRELIMO), Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola 
(MPLA), Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) and the Partido Afficano da Independencia da Guind e Cabo Verde 
(PAIGC), and Black Power activists looking to actively involve themselves in an 
armed struggle against white oppressors could fulfil this ambition by fandraising 
for these groups. Although the BLF was the only one of the four major London 
Black Power groups that openly declared that revolution in Britain was not 
possible and that therefore its focus was on fomenting revolution in the Third 
World, in practice the nearest any Black Power organisation in Britain got to 
armed revolutionary struggle was ftough expressing solidarity with African 
freedom fighters. 
Sivanandan thought the biggest threat posed by the concept of 
revolutionary violence was to the Black Power movement itself. 'Very often we 
were suspicious of two sorts of people', he contends. 'One was Uncle Toms. ... 
The others were people who had stupid bloody politics, who wanted revolution and 
said "bum, baby burn: " when they couldn't light a fag. And they were dangerous. 
Those were the sort of people who distracted our organisations; - and organisations 
102 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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collapsed. 103 Within the Black Power groups the contradiction between their 
revolutionary aims and non-revolutionary methods led to confusion, fiustration and 
disillusion. 'You see the BLF was trying to put roots down in the community, but 
many of the youths were impatient', recalled one anonymous former member, 'and 
we got attacked from all sides. Some were calling us extremists, others were saying 
we were selling out'. 104 
Youthful impatience overtook grassroots political organisation in 
September 1975 when three black men - Anthony Monroe, Wesley Dick and 
Frank Davies - attempted an armed robbery on the Spaghetti House restaurant in 
Knightsbridge, London. 105 When the police arrived on the scene before the robbery 
had ended, the robbers took eight of the restaurant's employees hostage and during 
the five-day siege that followed, declared that they were called the Black 
Liberation Army, had links to the BLF and that the robbery had been politically 
motivated. 106 After five days, during which none of the hostages were hurt but 
Frank Davies attempted suicide by shooting himself in the stomach, they 
surrendered to the police. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Robert Mark insisted 
that there was no political dimension to the Spaghetti House siege. 'From the 
outset it was rightly assumed that this was a simple armed robbery that had gone 
wrong', he wrote in his memoirs, 'any attempts ... to represent 
it as a political act 
107 were received with the derision which they clearly deserved'. Once in custody, 
however, the three robbers were held under the same conditions as political 
`3 A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 
` BLF member Ali Hassan (not his real name) quoted in H. 0. Nazareth, 'No Simple Robbery', 
Time Out, 23-29 November 1979, p. 27. 
"" Details about the robbery referred to in this and the next paragraph are taken from ibid., A. 
Sivanandan and R. Lofters, 'The Spaghetti House Siege', Aftas Review 2 (Summer 1976), pp. 28- 
33 and R. Mark, In The Qfflce of Constable (London, 1978). 
106 The robbery took place on 28 September and the siege lasted until the early morning of 3 
October 1975. Two hostages were released before the end of the siege. '07 R. Mark, In The Office, p. 188. 
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prisoners. Inspired by IRA members they met on remand, Monroe, Dick and 
Davies refused to recognise the court. Having offered no defence, they received 
respective sentences of seventeen, eighteen and twenty-one years' imprisonment. 
The BLF tried to make political capital out of the siege by refusing to 
confirm or deny that the three robbers were members. A BLF press statement 
released just after the siege declared that, 'These three men were fighting to make 
white society realise that they can't push Black people around too often any more, 
but in private many activists thought their methods were misguided. 108 'It may 
have been a bit stupid', commented an anonymous BLF member who had known 
the trio. 'They were clearly not prepared ; tnd the community also was not ready for 
it - to support or even understand it. 109 The British media, public and judiciary 
simply regarded the trio as common criminals. This assessment was probably 
correct in the case of Frank Davies, who had only just been released from a 
previous ten-year sentence for armed robbery, but Wesley Dick had been a 
volunteer at the IRR and Anthony Monroe had helped to set up a supplementary 
school in Shepherd's Bush, London in 1973. It is likely that both Dick and Monroe 
would have used part of their share to Rind black community projects and that their 
justification for getting involved in an uncharacteristically criminal act stemmed 
from their political beliefs about why they, as young black men, were at the bottom 
of the social and economic heap. Ultimately, though, they had taken part in the 
robbery more out of fiustration rather than as part of a conscious political 
programme. 
In the final analysis, most black people in Britain were not interested in 
Black Power. '[M]ost black individuals that I met, who were not members of the 
08 Untitled, undated BLF press release, p. 1. Held in the Spaghetti House siege file at the IRR. 09 Nazareth, 'Robbery', p. 27. 
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radical groups, thought that there was no real Black Power movement in London 
and dismissed the whole thing as a "politicised hustle", contemporary researcher 
Susan Craig damningly concluded. ' 10 At the time she was writing, almost all black 
people in Britain were first-generation immigrants. Large-scale West Indian and 
Asian immigration to Britain had only started twelve years before the Black Power 
movement began, so the second generation of British-born black people that 
British politicians feared would react violently if they were not treated equally, had 
not quite yet come of age. Most of Britain's Black Power organisations, were 
peopled by educated, first generation inunigrants. Even the younger, working-class 
activists, like Linton Kwesi Johnson, who joined the Black Panther Movement as a 
teenager, had come to Britain as young children. Hence the Black Power 
movement addressed their political concerns, which were more international in 
outlook and informed by a memory of anti-colonial resistance in the countries from 
which they had emigrated. 
The children of the first generation of the immigrants from the Caribbean, 
whose British upbringing gave them a more homogeneous cultural identity and 
increased their identification with African Americans, were influenced by the 
cultural messages of pride and resistance that the Black Power movement 
successfully transmitted well beyond its membership, but their struggle was fought 
against a more entrenched racism and in particular against a police force that 
viewed young black men with hostility and suspicion. Brought up in socially 
deprived areas, let down by a structurally racist education system that condemned 
them - at best - to unskilled, badly paid jobs, and harassed by a rising far right 
presence on the streets and a hostile police force, the first generation of British- 
110 S. Craig, 'Black Power groups in London, 1967-1969', unpublished BSc thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1970, p. 6. 
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born black people faced what seemed a more monolithic racism than their parents. 
'The second generation didn't have a double consciousness, their culture was 
wholly British', says Sivanandan. 'So whereas we struggled for equality and anti- 
discrimination and anti-racism, against trade unions and education and bussing of 
children, housing etcetera, these kids said "bum, baby burn7, because they had 
nothing'. "' 'I think [Black Power] radicalised a section of young people and 
changed their perception, explains Tony Soares, 'but by then they had an entirely 
different problem'. ' 12 Neither Black Power's successful assertion that there was 
noihing inherently wrong with being black, nor the government's passage of a 
genuinely powerful anti-discrimination legislation in 1976 managed to halt the 
deterioration of the relationship between the police and black communities. When 
black youths fought a six-hour street battle against the police at the Notting Hill 
Carnival in August 1976, it was an indication both of the success of the Black 
Power movement in having instilled in the next generation a culture of proud 
resistance that enabled them to take on the police, and of its failure to bring about a 
society in which they would not have to. 
Conclusion 
The Black Power movement in Britain can be credited with both significant 
achievements and failures. Politically, it was a short-lived movement, starting in 
1967 and peaking at the start of the 1970s. Although at least two of the main 
London Black Power groups continued to exist well into the 1990s, after the mid- 
1970s there was no longer much of a Black Power 'movement. At times far too 
reliant on American Bla6k Power for direction, British Black Power groups started 
11 A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 112 Tony SoareS, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
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off unfocused and poorly led and evolved into doctrinally rigid organisations that 
had no chance of building a broad following. Furthermore, the socialist revolution 
that almost all Black Power groups stated was their ultimate aim was no ftirther 
advanced by 1976 than in 1967, and disagreement over how to bring it about split 
some groups and distracted others from their fight against racism. The use of 
violent rhetoric by Black Power members and in their groups' literature was a 
tactical error. It handed the state a justification for using heavy-handed policing 
methods and severe legal sanctions against them, alienated potential white allies 
and confused members who grew fi-ustrated and disillusioned when their 
revolutionary goals did not move any closer. 
On the other hand, Black Power had a lasting cultural impact on Britain's 
black communities and the way race relations was discussed in Britain. It helped to 
bring about a radical change in the race relations industry and created an inclusive 
'black' political identity that was capable of temporarily bridging the differences 
between diverse communities when unity was needed on specific issues. Although 
groups continued to define themselves and organise on the basis of their 
nationality, religion, geographical location, age or relationship with the police, they 
could also make use of the wider category of black when it imparted strength to 
their campaigns. The movement's central messages of black pride and agency 
contributed to more people becoming involved in both politics and community 
organising, especially in the fields of education and housing. Although the Black 
Power movement was small, its members' militant reffisal to accept second place 
in British society changed the paradigm. of black protest. It proved to be a 
watershed between past groups, which had struggled against colonialism abroad 
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and petitioned the government for equality in Britain, and future organisations, 
which learned to use the power of their communities to push for their rights. 
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CHAPTER4 
Counter-insurgency and community funding: the state response 
Introduction 
The British state took a carrot and stick approach to dealing with the Black Power 
activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s. ne police and the criminal justice 
system were used consistently and effectively to harass and disrupt Black Power 
groups and their leaders. Although it stopped short of a British COINTELPRO (the 
FBI's domestic counter-insurgency programme that was pursued with lethal effect 
against the American Black Panther Party), Black Power activists and groups were 
kept under constant surveillance, often infiltrated and regularly raided and arrested 
by the Special Branch. This resulted in a series of high profile trials such as those 
of Michael X in November 1967, the Mangrove Nine in October 1971 and Tony 
Soares of the Black Liberation Front (BLF) in March 1973. To minimise the 
propaganda value of Prosecutions of Black Power activists, however, there seems 
to have been an unwritten government policy of using the courts ýo inconvenience 
and intimidate Black Power groups but not to send their members to gaol. The 
government had learned a sharp lesson from its heavy-handed treatment of Michael 
Y., who was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for inciting racial hatred and was 
released in 1968 more famous and influential than before. After that, Black Power 
activists usually spent months on remand awaiting trial for offences that, upon 
conviction, rarely resulted in custodial sentences. The most effective punishment in 
terms of social control was the suspended custodial sentence, which meant that the 
convicted person was left with the threat of prison hanging over their head should 
they be arrested i. 
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At the same time, the government sought to tackle the wider problem of 
black disaffection - exemplified most vividly by the rapidly deteriorating 
relationship between the police and young British-born West Indians - through 
legislation and generous funding of social, cultural and welfare organisations in the 
deprived inner-city areas where most black people lived! The Urban Programme, 
inaugurated in October 1968, was clearly influenced by American President 
Lyndon Baines Johnson's Great Society programmes, particularly the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1965 and its Community Action Programs (CAPs). Britain had 
learned from Johnson's mistakes, however, and the various Urban Programmes 
were much more closely monitored than the early CAP schemes, which had 
resulted in federal money being used to fund political groups and even buy guns. 
The British Urban Programme channelled national and local government money 
directly to community groups, but they had to work within the guidelines of their 
funders. This significantly altered the nature of black community organising, 
which had previously been independent and spearheaded by Black Power groups in 
many of the poorest black communities. To tackle the ongoing problem of racial 
discrimination, successive Labour - governments also passed two more Race 
Relations Acts in 1968 and 1976. Although the 1968 act was little improvement on 
its piecemeal and weakly enforced 1965 predecessor, the 1976 act was a much 
more comprehensive and hard-hitting law that acknowledged the principle of 
indirect racial discrimination and vested a new body, the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE), with the power to investigate potential discriminatory practices, 
even where no complaint had been made. 
1 Although the British-born children of West Indian immigrants were Britons, the thesis will 
continue to refff to them as West Indians, as this is how many continued to descnibe themselves. 
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The British state took the Black Power movement very seriously, both at 
home and abroad. In the five years after December 1965, when inciting racial 
hatred was made a criminal offence, over a third of the people prosecuted for it 
were Black Power activists. Although the numbers were small - only thirteen 
people were tried in total, five of whom were Black Power activists - this was still 
a disproportionately high figure both compared to the percentage of black people 
in the general population and the percentage of black members of radical 
organisations. For those prominent in the British Black Power movement, raids on 
their homes and organisational headquarters and arrests and court appearances for 
a range of alleged offences were an almost unavoidable part of life. All the known 
Black Power leaders, including Mchael X, Roy Sawh, Obi Egbuna, Tony Soares, 
Darcus Howe and Althea Lecointe, were prosecuted at least once for actions 
related to their political activities. Abroad, the progress of Black Power in 
America, Africa and the Caribbean was closely monitored by the British state. 
Documents from the British Prime Minister's office show that Britain helped the 
Bermudan government to search for legal grounds on which to ban a Black Power 
conference on the island in July 1969. Unable to prevent it, Britain sent Special 
Branch officers to attend the conference undercover, while a Royal Navy ship full 
of marines was redirected to anchor off the Bermudan coast during the conference 
weekend under the guise of a training exercise, in case a military intervention was 
required. 2 Having barred Stokely Carmichael firom returning to Britain in July 
1967, the British government used its influence to dissuade the state-owned British 
2 See PREM13/2885: 'Bermuda, Black Power conference, July 10-13,1%9' and FC044/195: 
'"Black Power" political activities 1969', both held in the National Archive (NA). 
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Overseas Airways Corporation from flying him from Trinidad to Bermuda to 
aftend the samc confcrence. 3 
The state treated the Black Power movement in Britain as highly dangerous 
because it believed it encouraged discontent among the already disaffected 
generation of black people who had been bom or brought up from an early age in 
Britain. From the mid- I 960s onwards, politicians had been worrying about how the 
children of the first wave of black immigrants, who were effectively British in 
outlook and upbringing, would react to being treated as second-class citizens. 
Furthermore, two reports published in 1967 persuaded Mps, academics and the 
press that British race relations might be more analogous to those in the United 
States than they had previously thought. The government-commissioned Political 
and Economic Planning (PEP) report on racial discrimination, published in April, 
concluded that racial discrimination not only existed in Britain but that it was 
actually worse than non-white immigrants perceived it to be. 4 It was followed in 
October 1967 by the Street Report, a legal survey of anti-discrimination laws in 
other countries that recommended that parliament follow the American model as 
the basis for future legislation. 5 At the same time as they were looking across the 
Atlantic for policy inspiration, politicians also noted the hugely destructive riots 
that were taking place there. The millions of dollars of damage to the Watts district 
of Los Angeles in August 1965 and Detroit in July 1967 made them increasingly 
worried that the same level of disorder might engulf Britain's cities. By the 
summer of 1967 the newspapers were fidl of articles written by me relations 
3 For details of communication between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and BOAC see 
PREM 13/2885: 'Bermuda: Black Power conference, July 10-13,1969, held in the NA. 
4 Political and Economic Planning (PEP), Racial Discrimination in Britain (London, 1967). 3 H. Street, G. Howe and G. Bindman. Anti-Discrimination Legislation: the Street Report (London, 
1967). 
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academics debating whether race riots might take place in BritairL6 The likelihood 
of the American nightmare becoming a British reality seemed to increase between 
the late 1960s and early 1970s as Britain's economy entered a vertiginous decline, 
bringing with it increased social and class tensions, crime and racial intolerance, 
the latter expertly whipped up by Enoch Powell and the increasingly active 
National Front. The descent of Northern Ireland into virtual civil war during the 
early 1970s showed that British society was not immune from bloody sectarian 
division and the IRA's campaign of mainland bombings made domestic terrorism a 
very real fear. 
The antagonism between the police and young black men was such an 
openly acknowledged social problem by the start of the 1970s that Edward Heath's 
Conservative government instigated a select committee investigation of police- 
'immigrant' relations. Its findings were published in 1972, with the government 
making an official response the following year. 7 Although both the report and the 
government's response conceded failings in some police procedures, neither 
acknowledged the existence of structural racism in the police force, nor the 
corrosive effect on race relations of the 1971 Immigration Act, which gave the 
police new responsibilities and powers to search for illegal immigrants. This had a 
particularly negative impact on the relationship between the police and Asian 
communities, which were the main targets of immigration raids. The sustained 
strikes of Asian workers over working conditions and workplace discrimination 
also contributed to a sense of social unrest. 
6A representative example was a Sund4 Times article from 30 July 1967, by lawyer and race 
relations expert Anthony Lester, titled 'Why it shouldn't happen here'. 
7 Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigratioi; Session 1971-1972, PolicelImmigrant 
Relations, Volume 1. Report (London: RMSO, 1972) and PolicelImmigrant Relations in England 
and Wales: Observations on the Report of the Select Committee on Race Relations and 
Immigration. (London: HMSO, 1973). 
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As well as these external factors, within Westminster a range of political 
and legal pressures combined to create the impetus for the 1976 Race Relations 
Act. A series of PEP reports showed that the 1968 Race Relations Act had had 
very little impact on racial discrimination. The passage of the Sex Discrimination 
Act in 1975 also meant that the racial and sexual discrimination laws were out of 
step, with racial. discrimination clearly the weaker partner. The scope and strength 
of the 1976 Race Relations Act, which came into force on I January 1977, threw 
the half-heartedness of its predecessors into sharp relief. The act heralded a new 
willingness to confront the problems of structural racism rather than individual 
prejudice and showed that the government had at least begun to recognise the 
seriousness of the consequences of racial discrimination! 
The Urban Programme 
Britain's Urban Programme, which ran from 1968 until the 1980s, owed a lot to 
the Great Society programmes of Lyndon Johnson and those of his successor 
Richard Nixon. Prior to the Urban Programme's introduction in 1968, a number of 
govcmment-employed race relations workers were sent to America to study its 
anti-poverty programmes. Although, like Johnson, the British government denied 
the link between colour and poverty, the Urban Programme was clearly and at 
times explicitly directed at areas with high percentages of black residents. Having 
learned a lesson from the American government's difficulty in controlling how its 
CAP funding was deployed, the British government was quite successftd in 
bringing many previously independent radical black groups under the aegis of the 
state through generous but closely monitored funding agreements. Many Black 
$Racial Discrimination (London: HMSO, 1975). 
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Power activists regarded the Urban Programme as a form of bribery, while others 
were prepared to downplay their politics in order to receive funding for the social 
programmes they were struggling to nm. 
The Urban Programme was first mooted by Labour Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson during a speech on race relations in Birmingham on 5 May 1968. Put into 
action five months later, it was originally designed to last for four years, but was 
extended by the 1969 Local Government (Social Need) Act to last until 1976? The 
Home Office administered the Programme's overall budget of f. 55 million, 
disbursing it in stages to a series of mini-programmes aimed at different areas of 
need. Announcing the outline of the first in July 1968, Home Secretary James 
Callaghan tried to play down the link Wilson had made in his Birmingham speech 
between social deprivation and high levels of immigrant settlement, insisting, as 
Lyndon Johnson had in relation to America's Great Society progmmmes, that the 
government's scheme was colour-blind. 10 One of the two criteria the Home Office 
used to judge which areas were in urgent social need during the initial stages of the 
Urban Programme, however, was whether more am 6 per cent of school places 
were occupied by immigrant children. " Using the presence of immigrants as an 
index of urban deprivation was not a new thing: under the Local Government Act 
of 1966 extra funding was already being provided to fifty-seven needy local 
authorities selected partly because immigrants constituted more than two per cent 
of their populations. Furthermore, although the first phases of the programme 
focused on the theoretically colour-blind issues of provision of nursery education, 
9 It is not clear when the Urban Programme's lifespan was extended again, but Dilip Hiro refers to 
Urban Programme fimding being disbursed in 1981 in D. Hiro, Black Britisk White British: a 
History ofRace Relations in Britain (London, 1992), pp. 243-4. 
'0 See the round-up of news commentary on Callaghan's speech in the Institute of Race 
Relations Newsletter (July 1968), p. 27 1. 
" The other was the level of homelessness. 
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child-care, housing and services for the homeless, phase twelve - implemented in 
the mid-1970s - was exclusively aimed at funding independent black self-help 
groups. 12 
However much Callaghan tried to persuade his fellow M[Ps that the Urban 
Programme was about poverty not colour, the legislation was clearly aimed at 
countering the impact of the combination of the two. Sociologists Gideon Ben- 
Tovirn and John Gabriel made this point in their persuasive analysis of the impact 
of government initiatives on radical black politics in Britain in the 1960s and 
1970s. 'Evidence does suggest, they argued, 'that the [Urban] progrmme can 
only be understood against the debate about Commonwealth immigration and race 
13 
and was devised as an attempt to defuse a potentially explosive situation'. Wle 
it is correct to identify the post-war influx of black immigrants as a source of great 
concem to the British govemment in the 1960s, it was the spectre of repeated race 
riots in America that led it to fear the situation might become 'explosive' in the 
second half of the decade. The British government followed America's lead in 
believing that tackling inner-city social deprivation was a vital step in preventing 
ethnic ghettoes developing in its cities. 'The next generation who will not be 
immigrants but coloured, Britons ... will expect full opportunities to deploy their 
skills', said Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1967. 'If we fiustrate those 
expectations we shall ... creat[e] an American 1ýrpe situation'. 
14 
'2 For more information on the specific details of the Urban Programme see E. J. B. Rose et al, 
Colour and Citizenship. a Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969), pp. 621-3 and G. 
Ben-Tovim and J. Gabriel, 'The politics of race in Britain, 1962-79: a review of the major trends 
and of recent debates' in C. Husband (ed. ), Race in Britain. Continuity and Change (London, 
1982), pp. 156-8, and F- Holman, 'The Urban Programme', Venture 23: 1 (January 197 1), pp. I I- 
14. 
13 G. Ben-Tovim and J. Gabriel, ibid., p. 157. 
14 Roy Jenkins' 30 July 1967 speech on race relations is quoted in J. Solomos, Black Yout& Racism 
and the State. the Politics of1deology and Policy (Cambridge, 1988ý p. 83. 
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The British government, perhaps unsurprisingly, also looked to America for 
the solutions to the social problems it was witnessing there. Lyndon Johnson's 
Great Society programmes were studied by a number of government-employed 
race relations experts during a series of state-funded fact-finding trips to America. 
The general secretary of the National Commission for Commonwealth Immigrants 
(NCCI), Nadine Peppard, reported back from her month-long trip in 1966 that, 
'Whatever its faults ... there are lessons to be derived from the Anti-Poverty 
Programme for Britain'. 15 She was particularly keen that Britain should follow 
America's lead by taking 'an imaginative approach to the administration of 
fLmds' . 
16 Another lengthy fact-finding trip was undertaken the following year by 
Mark Bonham-Carter, the head of the Race Relations Board and in 1969 Dipak 
Nandy, director of the government's closest independent race relations advisors, 
the Runnymede Trust, reported back enthusiastically on President Nixon's 
attempts to get small businesses involved in the regeneration of poor African 
American areas. Americans were invited to bring their expertise to Britain too. In 
July 1967 Roger W. Wilkins, director of America's Community Relations Service, 
a conciliatory body set up under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, spent two days briefing 
the Home Secretary, various MPs and police representatives in London on how 
America was dealing with urban poverty in the ghettoes. 17 
Taking its lead from the most successful Great Society initiative, the Head 
Start pre-school prograziune, the Urban Programme's initial focus was on the 
provision of nursery education. The British government also introduced its own 
13 NCCI, 'Report of the General Secretary's visit to the USA October 12'h to November 4* and 
November 13' to 19d' 1966', p. 6, held in NCCI file at the Institute of Race Relations (IRR). 16 Ibid, p. 6. 
17 See NCCI/67/50: 'Revised programme of the visit of Mr Roger Willdns, Director of the 
community Relations Service, USA, Thursday 6 July to Thursday 13 July 1967'. Document held 
in the NCCI file at the IRK 
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version of America's CAPs, a less successful initiative to help poor communities 
help themselves by setting up local anti-poverty boards that gave local people real 
control over how funding was spent in their area. This concept was known as 
'maximum feasible participation' of the poor and in many cases rapidly led to 
corruption and/or radicalisation. British politicians were quick to learn from the 
mistakes of the early CAPs: Urban Programme funding in Britain was much more 
tightly controlled and its recipients more carefully vetted than the American groups 
that had received CAP money in the mid-1960s. The concept of 'maximum 
feasible participation', central to the philosophy of the early CAPs but quietly 
dropped by the end of 1966, was also never a factor in Britain's Urban Programme. 
Furthermore, affirmative action and the idea of ethnic monitoring were still 
anathema to British leaders in the early 1970s and so were not included in 
government policies. 
In order to obtain Urban Programme grants local councils had to apply to 
the government. Initially, funding applications were only accepted from thirty-four 
councils identified by the government as being in areas of special social need and 
the money they received could be spent directly by them. After phase two, all 
councils were eligible to apply, but on behalf of local community groups whose 
projects they had vetted and decided to supporL Groups were, therefore, only likely 
to receive Urban Programme money if they proposed initiatives which fitted in 
with their local council's strategic aims and were run by people sympathetic to its 
political goals. This was partlyjustified by the fact that each council was obliged to 
provide 25 per cent of successfid grant bids from local funds. Many former Black 
Power activists, nevertheless, blamed the targeting of black community groups for 
Urban Programme funding during the mid-1970s for stymieing the development of 
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a radical independent black political movement. 'The government started a lot of 
programmes that were intended to buy out the leadership. By the early 1970s it 
became all grants and Urban Aid [sic], argues Tony Soares. 'A lot of money was 
going in, employing people, channelling them into community work and taking 
them away from political work. They all got caught up in some kind of project or 
the other because there was money on a scale they'd never seen before'. ' SA Black 
Unity and Freedom Party (BUFP) document from 1974 voiced similar suspicions 
about the motivation behind expensive government initiatives like the Urban 
Programme. 'Blacks organising themselves outside the state fi-amework ... 
represented a threat to the state', it postulated. 'The alternatives which the state 
offered were plush offices, staff salaries [and] to discuss the problems and 
strategies in compliance with the state and its laws: within the state structure'. 19 
Sivanandan agrees: 'They bought off everybody except [Harambee-founder 
Brother] Herman with Urban Aid', he says. 'Even Herman took the money - he 
just thought he could tell them what to do with iti, . 
20 
Sociology professor John Solomos viewed the Urban Programme as 
disastrous for independent black political organising. In a 1977 paper on 'Black 
militancy and class conflict', he described Urban Programme funding as more 
damaging than police harassment. 'Still worse', he wrote, 'a self-help programme 
for Black groups was financed which could only have the effect of castrating the 
groups who took the money. 21 Self-help had always been a key tenet of Black 
Power philosophy and community work was a central feature of Black Power 
Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
BUFP, 'What Is Ile B. U. F. P. [sic]', 3 May 1974, p. 24. Unpublished document, held, unfiled, at 
the IRR. 
20 A. Sivanandan, interviewed by the author, 28 June 2004. 21 J. Rex, "Black militancy and class conflict', July 1977, p. 22. Unpublished paper held, unfiled, at 
the EM 
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groups' activities. In London, for example, the BLF ran the Headstart nursery, a 
Sunday supplementary school, a 'black community legal advice service and the 
Black Berets youth club; the BUFP ran annual South East Summer Schools; the 
UCPA's Ajoy Ghose and his wife ran the Malcolm X Montessori school; RAAS's 
headquarters, The Black House, also Rinctioned as a hostel for homeless youths; 
and the BPM provided fi-ee legal advice (and sometimes representation) to black 
youths who had been arrested or were having problems with their landlords or 
employers. Elsewhere in the country, in Manchester, Afro-Caribbean Liberation 
Movement leader Gus John helped set up the George Jackson Trust which 
provided hostel accommodation, education and employment training for black 
youths, and in 1970 the West Indian United Association set up the Nello James 
centre which provided legal services and education courses. In Birmingham the 
African-Caribbean Self-Help Organisation (ACSHO), whose newspaper, 
Harambee Black Unity, sported a black gloved fist, ran a supplementary school 
and welfare advice service! 2 
When the Urban Programme chose to single out black self-help groups for 
funding, therefore, many of the groups it was targeting had close associations with 
Black Power. As local authorities and the Home Office were, understandably, not 
prepared to allocate funding to groups with political objectives, Black Power 
groups and activists had then to make a tough choice. Although their work in the 
community was in many respects an end in itself, it also helped Black Power 
groups establish a rapport with local people and introduce them to their political 
philosophy. This vital link had to be broken in order to receive Urban Programme 
22 For information on the Neflo James centre, see Manchester Evening News, 28 December 197 1, p. 
5. Nello was the nickname of CLR James. For the activities of ASCHO see reports in Harambee 
Black Unity, undated, held, unfiled, at the EM ASCHO was independent of Brother Herman's 
London Harambee Project. 
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funding. On the other hand, Black Power community initiatives were chronically 
under-funded and Urban Programme grants, which could run into hundreds of 
thousands of pounds, were extremely useful. In 1975, for example, Harambee and 
The Melting Pot Foundation in London and the George Jackson Housing Trust in 
Manchester, all community projects run by former Black Power activists, received 
Urban Programme grants of E281,000, E51,000 and 02,000 respectively - more 
money than they could possibly have raised independentlyý3 The existence of the 
Urban Programme forced Black Power activists to choose between the political 
and the practical objectives of community work. Virtually everyone chose to be 
pragmatic. 
If the strategic aim of the Urban Programme was to separate the practical 
work of the Black Power movement from its ideological base and bring it into the 
orbit of the state, it was indeed successful. The Black Power movement was split 
by the question of whether government money could be used to achieve radical 
objectives. Those who took money or accepted jobs were denounced as sell-outs, 
those who did not found their financial and political independence came at the 
price of influence and effectiveness. Brother Herman Edwards, a former member 
of the Racial Adjustment Action Society (RAAS) who founded a hostel for 
homeless young black ex-convicts at the start of the 1970s, was deeply embittered 
by his encounter with the Urban Programme. Having refused on principle to take 
govemmen money for many years, he eventually accepted a grant - but refused to 
follow the rules on how it should be spent and accounted for. As a result, in the 
mid-1970s, he served several short prison sentences for embezzlement. Edwards 
23 Figures from Urban Progrwnme Circulars, Nas 11 and 12 (London: HMSO, 1975) quoted in 
Sivanandan, 'Race, class and the state: the black experience in Britain', Race & Class 17.4 (1976), 
p. 364. 
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ultimately came to see the Urban Programme as 'The biggest con trick of this 
century'ý4 'Julius Nyerere that brilliant thinker said "aid from the west is like a 
rope around your neck"', Herman wrote. 'Ile west bring [sic] that same filthy 
dirty trickery and now calls it urban aid [SiC],? 5 
Black Power and the criminal justice system 
Between 1967 and the mid- I 970s the British state used the criminal justice system 
to inhibit the Black Power movement. The new criminal offence of 'incitement to 
racial hatred', introduced by the 1965 Race Relations Act, was, ironically, one of 
the first legal weapons it used. Although the state viewed Black Power as the 
mirror image of white supremacy, Black Power activists were, in fact, treated less 
sympathetically in court than white supremacists. These black defendants and their 
organisations, however, quickly realised, the propaganda value of being sent to 
prison for their political beliefs. To minimise this, the state developed an unwritten 
policy of handing down non-custodial sentences to Black Power activists in 
politically sensitive trials, even though many were denied bail prior to appearing in 
courL 
The criminal offence of incitement to racial hatred was introduced by the 
1965 Race Relations Act and left in place by the 1968 Race Relations Act. 
Prosecutions for inciting racial hatred could only be instigated by the Attorney- 
General and carried a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment and a fine of 
E1,000. Although part of an act designed to lessen racial discritnination, nearly 50 
per cent of the defendants in incitement to racial hatred trials were black. The 
24 I-L Edwards, 'Loyalty and DUV, undated speech transcript held in the Harambee Me at the MR, 
6. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
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incitement clause was, however, rarely used. In the almost three years between the 
passage of the first and second Race Relations Acts, the Attorney-General, Elwyn 
Jones, authorised only six trials of thirteen men. Two of these concerned five Black 
Power activists. A ftulher proposed prosecution for incitement - against American 
Black Power leader Stokely Carmichael for speeches he had made in London in 
July 1967 - was shelved when the Home Secretary banned him from returning to 
Britain instead. Ile new criminal penalty set out by Britain's first law against 
racial discrimination was therefore being used against black people almost as often 
as it was against whites. 
The reason for this was that, when deciding whether to prosecute, the 
Attorney-General assumed a level playing field between Black Power activists, 
seasoned fascist and neo-Nazi agitators and far-right MPs like Enoch Powell, Cyril 
Osborne and Duncan Sandys. This led him to treat the blood-curdling rhetorical 
excesses of anonymous Black Power advocates in front of small audiences at 
Speaker's Comer as more threatening to public order than the more soberly 
worded anti-immigrant statements of MIN like Enoch Powell and Duncan Sandys 
which routinely filled the national newspapers. Furthermore, because the Attomeyý- 
General, all judges and magistrates and the overwhelming majority of jury 
members were white and middle-class (property ownership was a condition ofjury 
service until 1972), they rarely perceived the difference in impact between the 
racism of white majority society and the reactive verbal abuse of a few hundred 
Black Power activists. A July 1967 article from The Sun newspaper, for example, 
while deploring the extremism of speeches by both Duncan Sandys MP and 
Michael Y, nonetheless concluded that, "Black intolerance is no more acceptable 
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than white ... it is apartheid in reverse'. 
26 This comparison was reiterated in 
parliament shortly afterwards by the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, 
David Ennals, when he declared in October 1967 that 'Black Power in Britain and 
white supremacy elsewhere is out of tune with the times'? 7 To politicians and the 
media during the late 1960s and early 1970s, drawing parallels between the 
totalitarian apartheid regime of South Africa and an unarmed clique of Black 
Power activists in Britain seemed reasonable. 
Black Power activists used insulting, threatening and abusive language for 
a variety of reasons: to make up for their lack of numerical and organisational 
strength, to grab their audiences' attention, to emphasise the seriousness of their 
grievances and sometimes just to entertain. But the Attorney-General seems to 
have taken statements by Black Power activists literally. Ilierefore, when police 
reported statements such as, 'I would like to see all English people die', 'We must 
act like the white man thinks a human being acts, that is by killing and murdering' 
and 'The whites have used guns and power and we shall do the same, he decided 
it was in the public interest to prosecute. 29 MPs like Duncan Sandys and Enoch 
Powell, on the other hand, as well as extreme-right groups like the Racial 
Preservation Society (RPS) and the British National Socialist Movement (BNSM) 
could discourse at length about the threat to white society from disease-carrying 
immigrants with atavistic cultures, and the undesirability of miscegenation, with 
little fear of being prosecuted. 
I The quotation fi-orn an article in The Sun on 26 July 1967 is included in The Institute of Race 
Relations Newsletter (September 1967), p. 336. 
27 David Ennals' speech in Wolverhampton on 9 October 1967 is reported in The Institute ofRace 
Relations Newsletter (December 1967), p. 417. 
'Mese three quotes are taken from police transcripts of speeches at Speaker's Comer by Alton 
Watson, Roy Sawh and Ajoy Ghose respectively. See DPP2/4428: 'Alton Watson, Roy Sawh, Ajoy 
Shankar Ghose, Michael Ezekiel, RAAS and UCPA, 23-24 August 19671, held at the NA. 
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This was especially true if they obeyed the letter, although not the spirit, of 
the Race Relations Act and were a person of high social standing. The Attorney- 
General often seemed loath to ascribe ill motives to well-heeled white people when 
they made inflammatory racist statements. Furthermore, as the 'problem' of 
coloured immigration was a legitimate topic of discussion for white Britons, 
discussing it - even in very hostile terms - was not interpreted as encouraging 
hatred of black people. 'Since the underlying assumptions of most racialists, are 
fmnly enshrined in the Immigration Act of 1971', barrister Ian Macdonald 
commented acidly in 1977, 'all kinds of racist propaganda can be dressed up as 
proposals for the amendment of that Act. 29 This meant that despite repeated calls 
for Powell and Sandys to be prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred, neither was 
taken to court. In July 1967, for example, Sandys was reported to the Attorney- 
General because of a nationally-reported speech in which he called for 
govemment-funded. repatriation and a complete ban on non-white Hintmigration. At 
the heart of his argument was a fear of miscegenation. 'The Government has just 
published a report which urges us to accept a large increase in mixed marriages as 
an essential element in -our declared policy of integration7, he erroneously stated. 
'The breeding of millions of half-caste children would merely produce a generation 
of misfits and create increased tensions'. 30 There were also numerous demands for 
Enoch Powell to be prosecuted after his infamous 'Rivers of blood' speech on 20 
April 1968. Even Conservative leader Edward Heath described the speech as 
" I. Macdonaldý Race Relations - The New I4m (London, 1977), p. 139. 30 Quote reported in The Institute of Race Relations Newsletter (June/July 1967), p. 246. The 
Attorney-General announced his decision on 21 September 1967 that Duncan Sandys would not 
face prosecution. 
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Gracialist in tone and liable to exacerbate racial tensions', but the Attorney-General 
still did not find it in the public interest to prosecute. 31 
Successful prosecution for incitement to racial hatred rested on convincing 
the jury of three factors: that the defendants had used insulting language, that they 
had done so with the intent of stirring up hatred against a group on the grounds of 
its colour or nationality and that their actions were likely to have this effect. Once 
in the dock, the conviction rate for black defendants was 100 per cent - double that 
for whites. The fact that all the black defendants decided to represent themselves in 
court may have been partly responsible for their higher conviction rate. (Although, 
as evidence from the next section will show, defending oneself was not necessarily 
foolhardy if one were a Black Power activist. ) It was also the case that all the black 
defendants had talked about white people in openly violent terms, whereas white 
supremacists tended to use coded language, allowing them to argue it had not been 
their intention to insult. The Institute of Race Relations drew attention to this 
loophole in Colour and Citizenship. 'Section 6 will lead to the prosecution and 
conviction of those who use crude, flamboyant, vulgar speech', noted its authors, 
'but it will not touch those who express highly prejudicial opinions in a more 
sophisticated style'. 32 Even after taking these factors into account, however, it 
seems clear that juries and judges had different standards for black and white 
defendants. In R v. Hancock, the March 1968 trial of four Racial Preservation 
Society (RPS) members for publishing a racist magazine called Southern News, the 
defence successfully argued that Southern News could not have been intended to 
be offensive to black people because it was predominantly distributed in East 
31 Heath said this when dismissing Powell from the shadow cabinet on 28 April 1968. His speech 
was reported in The Institute ofRace Relations Newsletter (April/May 1968), p. 157. TUe Attorney- 
General announced on 2 May 1968 that Powell would not face prosecution. 32 E. JJ3. Rose et al, Colour and Citizenship., a Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969), p. 689. 
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Grinstead where there was a tiny black population. In the November 1967 trial of 
Michael Y, however, the fact that the speech for which he was being prosecuted 
had been delivered in a privately rented hall in front of a small audience of Black 
Power supporters did not stop him being convicted. 
While juries had little time for Black Power activists' argument that their 
anti-white sentiments should be assessed in the context of an exploited minority 
group living in a hostile, racist country, they were often prepared to dismiss 
aggressive white racism as an ill-judged but essentially benign overstatement of the 
accepted truth that black people presented a social problem for Britain. An 
American academic who sat in on the trial of the four members of the RPS in 
March 1968 was shocked by the level of racist propagandising disguised as legal 
argument allowed by the judge. 'I can say that the general mood of the trial 
descended to a racialist level which for an American was reminiscent of "corn- 
pone' invective in a trial in Mississippi in the 1940s', wrote Professor Richard P. 
Longaker in a report for the IRR? 3 
Such notions as miscegenation, the purity of the races, dominance of 
coloureds in schools, the crime rate, and the inherent genetic inferiority of 
those non-Caucasian Anglo races were put forward to the middle class jury 
and no doubt the judge ... The defence also read strong words 
from the Daily 
Express on immigration and said that his clients, although more hard-hitting, 
were engaged in the same enterprise of public education on the issue. 34 
The fact was that the Racial Preservation Society's vicious scaremongering about 
non-white people coming to Britain could plausibly be argued to fall within the 
parameters of the respectable debate on immigration. Its contention that the best 
number of non-white immigrants to Britain was zero was just an extreme extension 
" 'Memorandum for Mr E. J. B. Rose on the Racial Incitement Trial, Lewes Assizes, Sussex, 
March 25-28,1968', written by Richard P. Longaker, professor of political science, University of 
California, 3 April 1968, p. 2. Document held, unfiled, at the MR. 34 Ibid, p. 2. 
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of the 'numbers game' argument used by academics and politicians. A month 
before the RPS trial began, for example, parliament had voted overwhelmingly to 
approve an immigration act that was clearly designed to stop British Asians living 
in East Africa from exercising their right to live in Britain. Within the context of 
Britain in the late 1960s and 1970s, where there was a political consensus that non- 
white immigration was undesirable, it was much harder to prove incitement to 
racial hatred in cases with white defendants than with black. 
Prosecutions under section six of the 1965 Race Relations Act, only a 
trickle in the late 1960s, dried up completely in the 1970s. The inetTectiveness of 
the law in preventing anything but the most explicit racial hate-mongering had 
been noted in a select committee inquiry published in 1972, which concluded that 
'Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965 should either be repealed or 
occasionally be brought to bear against publications and speeches manifestly 
seeking to stir up racial hatred'? s The government response, published as a White 
Paper in October 1973, declined to follow either recommendation. Describing 
section six as 'unobjectionable', it ascribed the paucity of prosecutions to the 
success of the law's deterrent effect and asserted that The Attorneym-General would 
not hesitate to prosecute or give his consent to a prosecution if he believed that it 
would be in the public interest to do So'. 36 
One of the reasons the Attorney-General may have been so reluctant to 
initiate incitement prosecutions, even of Black Power activists, was the high 
volume of publicity that such trials attracted. The trial of Michael X in 1967 (R v. 
Malik) was a case in point and generated an enormous amount of publicity for the 
33 Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigratiom Session 1971-1972, PolicelImmigrant 
Relations, Volume 1. Report (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 23. 16 Policefimmigrant Relations in England and Wales. Observations on the Report of the Select 
Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (London, HMSO, 1973), p. 8. 
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Black Power movement. Michael X was indicted in September 1967 for a speech 
he had given in Reading on 24 July in which he had said, 'Whites ... are vicious 
and nasty people. ... If ever you see a white man lay 
his hands on a black woman 
kill him instantly'? 7 Pleading not guilty, Michael X conducted his own defence, 
giving him plenty of opportunity to put forward his views in front of an eager 
press. The newspaper coverage actually became part of the story in October, when 
the trial had to be abandoned after The Sunday Times published an unfavourably 
captioned picture of Michael X that the judge decided was prejudicial . 
38 A two-day 
retrial at the start of November, however, resulted in his conviction and a one-year 
gaol sentence and after a failed appeal on 21 December Michael X was sent to 
prison. The extended trial process had produced three months of intense publicity 
for Michael X and his organisation RAAS, as the press debated the nature of Black 
Power and his role in it. The severity of his sentence made Michael X an instant 
martyr to the Black Power cause. It went a long way towards resuscitating his 
reputation among those in the black community who had previously doubted the 
sincerity of his commitment to radical black politics and evoked sympathy among 
white advocates of civil liberties and freedom of speech. Even his strongest 
detractors believed that 'Michael's sentence was harsh considering that Roy Sawh 
and three other blacks had merely been fined ... a week earlier for saying much the 
same things'? 9 It was the last time a Black Power activist would have to serve a 
custodial sentence for a political act. 
In December 1968, former UCPA leader and BPM founder Obi Egbuna was 
convicted of 'conspiracy to utter a writing threatening to murder' because of a 
37 Excerpts from Michael X's Reading speech were reported in The Institute of Race Relations 
Newsletter (JunetJuly 1967), p. 246. 
38 Thomson Newspapers Ltd, which owned The Sunday Times, was eventually fined L5,000 for 
contempt of court. 
" D. Humphry and D. Tindall, False Messiah: the Story ofMichaelX (London, 1977), p. 50. 
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pamphlet he had written. The only prison time he endured, however, was the four 
months he and co-defendants Peter Martin and Gideon Dolo spent on remand. 40 
Egbuna, who had been under police surveillance for some time, was portrayed in 
the written police evidence to the court as the violent leader of an aspiring terrorist 
organisation. Yet, despite being convicted of conspiracy to incite murder, his 
sentence of one year's imprisonment was suspended for three years. (Dolo was 
eventually acquitted and Martin was fined 00 for his part in the conspiracy. ) The 
state's goal of disrupting the BPM without providing it with any martyrs was 
adequately served by holding Egbuna and Martin on remand for four months but 
not sending them to gaol once convicted. 'The arrest of Egbuna and Martin has, at 
this stage anyway, put the [Black Panther] party in confusion and it is not likely to 
resurrect for many months to come', noted Detective Chief Inspector Kenneth 
Thompson in a memorandum commending the officers who had worked on 
Egbuna's case! ' 
Despite a policy of not sending convicted Black Power activists to prison, 
the government still ran the risk of giving Black Power groups publicity and 
reinforcing their members' sense of injustice. Linton Kwesi Johnson believes the 
legal harassment the BPM encountered was not entirely destructive. 'Court 
appearances took up a lot of our time and sapped our energy but it didn't stop us', 
he recalls. 'In fact it made us more determined and more committed to fight for 
racial equality and social justice'! 2 In two famous trials - of the Mangrove Nine 
' For further details of the prosecution see MEP02/11409: 'Benedict Obi Egbuna, Peter Martin and 
Gideon Ketucni T. Dolo charged with uttering and writing threatening [sic] to kill police officers at 
Hyde Park, WT, held at the NA. 
"' `203/68174: Recommendation for commendation or reward from Detective Chief Inspector Y, 
Tbompson, January 13,1969', in MEP02111409: 'Benedict Obi Egbuna, Peter Martin and Gideon 
Ketueni T. Dolo charged with uttering and writing threatening [sic] to kill police officers at Hyde 
Park, WT, held at the NA. 
42 Linton Kwesi Johnson, interviewed by the author, 17 September 2004. 
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in 1971 and of Tony Soares of the BLF in 1973 - articulate black activists chose to 
defend themselves and in the process attracted a great deal of publicity. They used 
it to put the structural racism of the state on trial and attract new members to their 
organisations. 
Former BUR member Harry Goulboume has written that, 'In the black 
communities of London and elsewhere perhaps the single most dramatic event of 
these years was the trial of the Mangrove Nine in Notting Hill where the police 
43 
came into direct confrontation with young and articulate black youths'. The 
Mangrove Nine trial lasted for eleven weeks between 5 October and 16 December 
1971 and was widely covered by the press in Britain, as well as attracting 
signfflcant interest abroad. The nine black defendants were charged with riot, 
afftay and assaulting police officers, after a rnarch on 9 August 1970 against police 
harassment of the Mangrove Cafd in Notting Hill ended in violence. The police 
contended that the fighting at the end of the march had been part of a well- 
organised and pre-planned riot by black agitators. The defendants countered that a 
disproportionately large and antagonistic police presence had deliberately 
provoked the marchers. 
The Mangrove Nine trial was regarded as political not just because it 
involved black people protesting against the Metropolitan Police but also because 
the defendants had been the subjects of police surveillance (and harassment in the 
case of Frank Critchlow) for a long time because of their Black Power activism. 
Two days after the march, Home Secretary Reginald Maudling told 7he Guardian 
that, 'The Special Branch has had the movement under observation for more than a 
43 FL Goulboume, Race Relations in Britain Since 1945 (Basingstoke, 1998), p. 65. 
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year. Police now regard Black Power as, at least, worthy of tight surveillance%" It 
was not a coincidence that, of the twenty-three people who had been arrested 
during the march, it was those nine who eventually stood trial. They had been 
picked out from surveillance photographs taken by an undercover police 
photographer and some were not even arrested on the march but were picked up 
weeks afterwards !5 Three of the defendants, Althea Lecointe, Radford (Darcus) 
Howe and Barbara Beese were leading members of the BPM. Another, Frank 
Critchlow, was the owner of the Mangrove Cafd, an unofficial community centre 
and regular meeting place for Black Power activists that the Metropolitan Police 
had been trying to close down for months. 'The trial was a political trial', wrote 
Louis Chase of the West Indian Standing Conference, 'and throughout the three 
defendants who represented themselves made the courtroom an international 
vehicle for black protest about injustices against the black community by the 
police'. 46 
It was clear from the start of the Mangrove trial that the jury would have to 
decide between the Metropolitan Police's depiction of the Mangrove protestors as 
violent criminal thugs and the defendants' portrayal of the Metropolitan Police as a 
racist and corrupt force of occupation. Lecointe, Howe and Rhodan Gordon, 
presenting their case in coordination with lead defence counsel Ian Macdonald, 
drew on the specific experiences of Black Power activists and the black 
community in Notting Hill but also made broader parallels between the situation of 
44 The Guardian, 12 August 1970, p. 3. 
45 One defendant, Rothwell Kentish, was arrested by four policemen at the garage where he worked 
on 14 October 1970, six weeks after the march. He resisted arrest because the police did not have a 
warrant in his name and he claimed that he had left the march by the time the clash with the police 
took place. Subsequently acquitted of all charges during the Mangrove trial, he was, however, 
separately convicted of assaulting a police officer and carrying offensive weapons (the hammer, 
welding equipment and wire cutters he had been using at work) - charges resulting from his 
October 1970 arrest. 
46 L Chase, 'What justice for the Mangrove Nine? ' Race Today 4: 2 (February 1972), p. 39. 
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the Mangrove defendants and African American political prisoners like George 
Jackson and Angela Davis. Iley systematically tried to highlight not only the 
vindictive and dishonest behaviour of the police but also the structural racism of 
the judicial system which, they said, prevented black people receiving a fair trial. 
Macdonald started the trial by requesting an all-black jury -a demand that 
appeared on the manifestos of all British Black Power groups. Citing the Magna 
Carta, he argued that only black people could understand the attitude of the police 
to the black community and so fairly judge the case. Judge Edward Clarke rejected 
this and many other defence requests, leading Macdonald to argue in his 
summation that, 'We've been subject in this trial to spectacles of naked judicial 
tyranny. The judge has given the defence some latitude, but the only alternative 
was to send them down or to gag them like Bobby Seale'. 47 Macdonald's use of the 
phrase 'naked judicial tyr=ny' seems somewhat harsh. Judge Clarke's statements 
during the trial show that, while not sympathetic to the defendants, he managed to 
stay relatively impartial - something that judges in other Black Power cases found 
more difficult to doý" 
At the end of the trial, five of the defendants - Rothwell Kentish, Frank 
Critchlow, Radford Howe, Barbara Beese and Godfrey Millet - were acquitted of 
all charges. The other four - Anthony Innis, Rhodan Gordan, Althea Lecointe and 
Rupert Boyce - received suspended sentences for seven of the less serious charges. 
As the majority of the prosecution's case rested on police testimony, this 
represented a clear rejection by the jury of the police's contention that the August 
1970 march had been a pre-planned riot. In light of this it was perhaps unsurprising 
47 Ian Macdonald is quoted in 'Blacks in Britain Today', 7 Days, 22 December 197 1, p. 6. 48 Clarke's comments are reported in MEP02/9719: 'Racial incidents: relations between the police 
and the black community in the Notting Hill area', held at the NA. 
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that Judge Clarke gave lenient sentences to the four people who had been 
convicted. He even conceded during sentencing that some members of the 
Metropolitan Police appeared to hate black people. 'What this trial has shown, he 
said, 'is that there is clearly evidence of racial hatred on both sides'! 9 The 
sentencing followed the pattern of Black Power defendants being given non- 
custodial or suspended sentences. That a suspended custodial sentence was a form 
of social control which placed its subject at the whim of the police was angrily 
pointed out by one of the convicted Mangrove defendants. 'I don't want a 
suspended sentence', said Rhodan Gordan on hearing his punishment. 'If you give 
me suspended sentence I shall get nicked by police at Notting Hill anyway so you 
might as well put me inside' . 
50 Gordan's words were prophetic: two days later he 
was charged with assaulting a police officer and causing an obstruction, after being 
asked to move his car by a Notting 1-fill policeman, and the suspension of his 
sentence was revoked. 
Judge Alan King-Hamilton, who presided over the trial of the BLF's Tony 
Soares in March 1973, made no attempt at impartiality. Soares had been indicted 
on four separate serious charges of attempting to incite the murder of persons 
unknown, the manufacture of explosives, the possession of firearms, and arson. 
The basis of the charges was that instructions on how to make a Molotov cocktail 
had been published in the September 1971 issue of the BLF's newspaper, Grass 
Roots. Ihe instructions had been reprinted from an American Black Power 
newspaper, The Black Panther, which was already widely available in Britain. 
After initially fleeing the country to escape arrest (to Morocco, where he stayed as 
49 Ibid- 
" Gordan quoted in a Metropolitan Police memo included in NEP02/9719: 'Notting Hill riots, 
1959-1978', held at the NA. 
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a guest of Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver) Soares had returned to Britain in March 
1972 and been arrested shortly afterwards. He then spent four months on remand in 
Brixton and Pentonville prisons before being granted bail. Although the 
prosecution could not prove that Soares was Grass Boots' editor, they could 
produce evidence that he had sent twenty-five copies of the paper overseas and was 
therefore involved in distributing the illegal material. According to the 'dock brief 
published in Race Today, during the trial Judge King-Hamilton repeatedly asked 
defence witnesses whether they were communists and atheists, Special Branch 
officers sat at the front of the court noting down their names and addresses, and an 
IRA-planted bomb in front of the Old Bailey injured one of the jurors. 51 At its 
conclusion, King-Hamilton instructed the jury that if they believed Soares had 
distributed the twenty-five newspapers they were duty bound to find him guilty on 
all charges. Soares was eventually convicted by majority verdict on the charges of 
attempting to incite arson and the manufacture of explosives. 
To his great surprise, however, Soares did not receive a custodial sentence. 
This was indeed surprising given the seriousness of the charges, the fact that 
Soares; had a previous conviction for distributing leaflets that incited violence and 
King-Hamilton's reputation as a 'hanging' judge. 'It was very, very strange, 
remembers Soares, 'because the judge said to the usher at sentencing time, there's 
an envelope in my safe from the Home Office, go and get it. He went and got the 
envelope and when he read what was in [it] his face went so angry - that's when 
this surprisingly mild sentence came out'. 52 In the end Soares was sentenced to 200 
hours of community service and bound over to keep the peace for seven years. It is 
very difficult to corroborate Soares' version of the sentencing, but whatever King- 
31 'Dock brier, Race Today 5.4 (April 1973) p. 102. 52 Tony Soares, interviewed by the author, 23 August 2004. 
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Hamilton's reasons, the sentence fitted the pattern established in the previously 
cited trials of Black Power activists. 'Binding over without banishment has also 
been used to deal with Black defendants', commented sociologist Paul Gordon on 
the Grass Boots case. Soares' sentence was 'an attempt to curtail future political 
activity', he ConClUded. 53 
The manifest injustice of the charges brought against Soares and the 
behaviour of the judge in the trial won the BLF much publicity and public 
sympathy, which was marshalled by the well-supported Grass Roots Defence 
Committee. On the other hand, the time the BLF's linchpin Soares, spent absent 
from the movement and the strain the trial put the BLF under undoubtedly 
burdened the organisation. Sunday Times journalist Derek Humphry described, for 
example, the impact of the trial on the BLF's 'Headstart' supplementary Sunday 
school for black children. 'Although run from the Front's headquarters ... it won 
approving, if discreet, praise from the teaching profession', reported Humphry. 
'But "Headstarf' collapsed when the police began calling on the Front in a bid to 
find who was responsible for the bomb article'. 54 Soares, however, ignored the 
conditions of his sentence and continued to be an active member of the BLF until 
1977, when he left the organisation for entirely unrelated reasons. Grass Boots 
continued to be printed in roughly the same format, however, at least until 1988, 
although it regularly claimed to be on the verge of fmancial collapse. 55 Overall, the 
trial had achieved little more than increasing the black community's sense of 
victimisation by the state, at a large cost to the public purse. 
53 P. Gordon, White Law. Racism in the PoUcA Courts andPrisons (London, 1983), p. 116. 
*4 D. Humphry, 'Black Power. reality and the rhetoric', The Sunday Times, 30 March 1973, p. 18. 35 The IRR holds a non-continuous run of Grass Roots spanning from 1971 until 1988. 
190 
Chapter 4: Counter-insurgency and community funding: the state response 
Black people and the police 
The relationship between the police and black people from Africa, the Caribbean 
and Asia, steadily worsened throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The 1971 
Immigration Act, which came into force on I January 1973, classified any non- 
British-born citizen who had neither been naturalised nor could claim a British- 
born parent or grandparent as a 'non-patrial' citizen with no right of abode. It also 
removed the automatic right of Commonwealth citizens to register as British 
citizens after five years' residence, and applied retrospectively, putting all black 
people, particularly Asians who were more likely to have arrived after the start of 
immigration control in 1962, under suspicion of being illegal immigrants. The 
police were given new powers, such as being able to arrest suspected illegal 
immigrants without a wan-ant, making them, for the first time, a branch of 
immigration control. To help it ftdfil its new responsibilities, the Metropolitan 
Police set up an Immigration Intelligence Unit W, which quickly gained a 
reputation similar to its Special Patrol Group (SPG). 
The deployment of the SPG in black neighbourhoods from the mid-1960s 
onwards and the increasing use of the infamous 'Sus' law, which almost always 
resulted in a charge where the only evidence of wrongdoing was the arresting 
officer's statement, made policing seem brutal and corrupt. 56 An irresponsible 
media that characterised young West Indian men as potential muggers and Asians 
"6 Ile Special Patrol Group was set up in 1961 as a centralised, mobile squad of the Metropolitan 
Police designed to respond to serious crime that local divisions could not deal with. From the mid- 
1960s onwards it was used to control demonstrations and police areas with high rates of street 
crime. Frequently the subject of allegations of racism, brutality and unaccountability, the SPG was 
disbanded in 1986. Ibe offence of 'being a suspected person, part of the Vagrancy Act 1824, 
allowed a police officer to arrest someone on the suspicion that they were loitering with the 
intention of committing a criminal offence, as long as he had seen them acting suspiciously on a 
previous occasion. Tried in a magistrates court, if found guilty the defendant could be sentenced to 
up to three months in gaol. The Isus, law was eventually repealed in 1981. For more information 
see C. DeMuth, 'Sus'A Report on the Vagrancy Act 1824 (London, 1978). 
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as illegal immigrants or their co-conspirators, made the likelihood of colour-blind 
justice seem even more remote. 57 Black people also complained that the police did 
not investigate crimes against them as thoroughly as those against whites and often 
arrested the black victim who had alerted them when they arrived at the scene of 
the crime. 'After the first years of the 1970s police brutality against black 
communities in the inner cities was to become so commonplace', wrote former 
Black Power activist and academic Harry Goulbourne, 'that it was widely believed 
that there was hardly a black family in Britain which had not had a nasty 
experience with the police'. 58 
By 1971, the government was so concerned by the deteriorating relationship 
between the police and black communities that it set up a parliamentary select 
committee to look into the matter. But although its report, published in 1972, found 
that there was some evidence of racial prejudice among the police, it ascribed it to 
cultural misunderstanding rather than institutional racism. Older Asian immigrants, 
the report observed, came 'as strangers expecting to be treated as such' and saw 
Gno reason to change their style of life', while their view of the police, which 
ranged from 'submissive awe' to 'suspicious passivity', was 'conditioned to some 
extent by police customs in their homelands'. 59 Other reasons why the behaviour of 
the police might have inspired submissive or suspicious reactions from Asians 
immigrants do not appear to have been considered. Overall, the report's 
recommendations avoided the issue of racism and put the onus on the black 
community to behave in a more assimilated way in order to receive better 
-" For a more detailed discussion of the media's portrayal of young black men see Runnymede 
Trust, Race and the Press (London, 1971) and S. HalL C. Critcher, J. Clarke and B. Roberts, 
Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State and Law and Order (London, 197 9). 51 H. Goulbourne, Caribbean Transnational Experience (London, 2002), p. 106. 39 Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigratiom Session 1971-1972, 
PolicelImmigrant Relations. Volume 1: Report (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 67. 
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treatment from the police. The government's response a year later paid equally 
little attention to the accusations of police racism. 
Black people often did not experience colour-blind justice in the courts 
either. The majority of magistrates automatically accepted the evidence of police 
witnesses as truthful and even in the cases where they were later shown to have 
been lying, the police very rarely faced peýury charges or even internal 
disciplinary procedures. Crown court judges were less predictable in their attitude 
to the police, but in at least one famous trial - of two West Yorkshire Police 
officers for the killing of a homeless Nigerian man - the judge expressed his 
distaste that policemen should be facing trial and instructed the jury to dismiss all 
the charges except assault, despite the weight of the evidence pointing strongly to 
the pair's guilt. 60 Finally, the Metropolitan Police force, which, because it had 
policed the area where the majority of black people in Britain lived, was the 
subject of most complaints, was highly resistant to criticism. It. prevaricated when 
asked to hire more black officers, opposed calls for an independent complaints 
process, attempted, where possible, to suppress public criticism, and took only the 
most perfunctory steps to discipline officers who had been found to act dishonestly 
or out of racism. 61 
Strong criticism of the police by the black community pre-dated the Black 
Power movement and continued long after its end. As early as 1958, black 
witnesses to the Notting Hill riots had complained that the police had only 
' The five-week trial of former Leeds policemen Inspector Geoffrey Ellerker and Sergeant Mark 
Kitching for man laughter, peýury, grievous bodily harm of David Oluwale took place in Leeds 
Crown Court in December 197 1. He had been found beaten and drowned in the river Aire on IS 
April 1969. Kitching and Ellerker were found guilty of nine counts of assault, the only charge the 
jury was allowed to consider. See K Aspden, Nationality Wog- the Hounding of David Oluwale 
(London, 2007). 
61 For a representative example of police self-exculpation in the case of a proven miscarriage of 
justice see the case of Satnam Singh Kane on pp. 241-2. 
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intervened to stop the violence once black people had begun to defend themselves 
successfidly against their white aggressors. When West Indian carpenter Kelso 
Cochrane was stabbed to death on the same streets the following year, after a 
period of heightened fascist activity that the police had failed to tackle effectively, 
the local black community ascribed the fact that the assailants were never caught to 
police indifference. In 1965, Joseph Hunte of the West Indian Standing Conference 
(WISC), published a booklet called Nigger Hunting in England? based on 
complaints about police behaviour received by WISC from the black community in 
London. 62 A firmly worded but sober document that included extensive comment 
from the Lambeth police, the author argued that it was needed because, 'For the 
seven years that I have been residing in Brixton, I have been constantly besieged 
by members of the immigrant population with matters of conflict between them 
and members of the Police Force. 63 In 1969, the authors of Colour and Citizenship 
commented that, 'all organisations connected with civil liberties or race relations 
have files full of complaints about police practice', although they added that it was 
difficult to substantiate such complaints. " From the late 1960s onwards, most of 
the domestic news coverage in all Black Power newspapers consisted of articles 
about police corruption and violence towards black people. Finally, during the 
1970s and 1980s, a number of book-length studies catalogued and analysed 
65 evidence of racially prejudiced police behaviour. 
During 1971, the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration 
spent more than a year collecting evidence from Britain's police forces, 
62 J. Hunte, Nigger Hunting in England? (London, 1965). 
63 lbid., p. 1. 
Rose et al, Colour, p. 349. 
See J. Lambert, CHM4 Police and Race Relations: a Study in Birmingham (London, 1970), D. 
Htunphry and G. John, Because They're Black (Hamondsworth, 197 1), D. Humphry, Police Power 
and Black People (London, 1972), Hall et al, Policing the Crisis, and Institute of Race Relations, 
Policing. 4gainst Black People (London, 1987). 
194 
Chapter 4: Counter-insurgency and community funding: the state response 
community organisations and Community Relations Councils, as well as individual 
black people. Its three-volume report was published in 1972 and contained some 
damning evidence. The way the evidence was interpreted, however, was generous 
to the police to the point of appearing to have entirely discounted the perspective 
of the black witnesses. The report did recommend that a lay element be introduced 
to the police complaints procedure as a matter of urgency and drew attention 
forcefiffly to the fact that the police's own statistics showed that crime rates among 
non-white populations were lower than among whites. The bulk of the report, 
however, evaded the issues or blamed black people for their disagreements with 
the police. The following excerpt is representative of the prevarication and side- 
stepping of issues that took place before the authors attributed only the most minor 
of wrong-doings to the police and laid the bulk of the blame at the feet of the black 
community. 'We do not doubt, on the evidence before us, that nothwithstanding 
the loyal defence of senior officers - though some were prepared to be quite fiwk 
about it - there have been instances of policemen acting insensitively and 
officiously against immigrants', the authors eventually conceded before adding: 
'This is particularly true of young West Indians, whose conduct is sometimes 
calculated to make policemen "lose their cool"'. 66 
The report claimed on several occasions that there was not enough 
evidence, or it was too difficult, to investigate allegations of police racism. 'Ag i 
it is impossible to know to what extent - there have been some cases - the police 
pick on black youths merely because they are black', it argued. 'There is very little 
statistical evidence about the volume of formal complaints made by immigrants 
66 Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigratio, % Session 1971-1972, PolicelImmigrant 
Relations, Volume 1: Report (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 91. 
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against the police'. 67 In the end, it recommended more cultural awareness training 
for the police (including exchanges with policemen from the Caribbean), the 
creation of community liaison officers, and that all officers be reminded that black 
people were no more pre-disposed to crime than white people. 
69 In terms of the 
black community, it implied that if West Indians could learn to behave in a more 
civilised manner the police would not get flustered by them and act 
'insensitively'. 69 The racism black people had encountered was explained away as 
a misunderstanding or an exaggeration. 'Past mistakes by the police are apt to 
grow to legendary proportions', it noted, 'even in areas where they were 
unconnected' . 
70 Black Power groups in Notting Hill were not impressed. 'We 
intend to expose this report for what it is', proclaimed an disappointed writer in the 
BackayardNews Sheet, '- a lot of Middle-Class hogwash! -) . 
71 
The government printed its response in a 1973 White Paper that took its 
lead from the previous year's report. 72 It used the evidence that black people were, 
if anything, more law-abiding than white people to dismiss the claim that there 
might be problems between them and the police. 'The report rightly stresses that 
immigrants are not in themselves a problem to the police', the report affirmed, 
ignoring the black community's central allegation that it was the colour of their 
skin not the criminality of their community that attracted the police's attention. 73 it 
continued by hinting that police prejudice against black people was the result of the 
agitation of the Black Power movement. 'Only a small minority of young coloured 
67 Ibid, pp. 70,88. 
" Para 243, ibid., p. 71 
69 Para 338, ibid., p. 9 1. 
70 Para 339, ibid., p. 91. 
71 BackayardNews Sheet (week 37), date stamped 2 October 1972, p. 4. 
72 Policellmmigrant Relations in England and Wales: Observations on the Report of the Select 
Committee on Race Relations andImmigration (London: HMSO, 1973). 
73 IbidL, p. 3. 
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people arc affected by ... confrontation with the police, noted the government. 
'Some groups, apparently anxious to imitate the behaviour amongst the black 
74 community in the United States, themselves provoke the difficulties' . 
It would 
have been extraordinary if the paper had concluded that institutional racism existed 
in Britain7s police forces as the government did not even acknowledge the 
existence of indirect racism until 1976. Its failure even to consider the possibility 
of police racism, however, gave ammunition to its harshest critics. 'The police are 
viewed as the army of the enemy, which is the immigration-controlling, arms-to- 
South-Africa-selling, friend-of-lan-Smith British government', journalist Derek 
75 Humphry had written in 1972. The government's published response in 1973 to 
the previous year's select committee findings on 'police/immigrant relations' only 
served to reinforce the impression. 
While magistrates' and judges' attitudes to black people and black 
defendants differed widely, their view of police officers was generally that they 
were honest, trustworthy, tolerant, socially-minded people doing a tough a job in 
difficult circumstances. Tliey were inclined, therefore, to believe police officers' 
evidence and to give them the benefit of the doubt when their actions were 
questioned. 'A series of judicial decisions and police comments seemed to 
suggest', comm d sociologist John Rex in 1977, 'that, if anything, the judges 
and the police were more concerned with the threat of Black action against white 
society than they were with the defence of Black civil rights'. 76 Judicial behaviour 
in trials of Black Power activists has already been discussed, but those trials 
usually took place in the Crown court, where trained barristers were present, 
74 Ibid., p. 5. 
75 Humphry, Police Power, pp. 11-12. 
76 J. Rex, 'Black militancy and class conflict' (July 1977), p. 22. Spcech bwscript held4 unfiled, at 
the EM 
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experienced judges oversaw proceedings, and an entire jury had to be convinced. 
The majority of young West Indian men passing through l3ritain's legal system 
appeared in magistrates courts charged with petty crimes. Their trials could last a 
matter of minutes and often involved no witnesses being called, other than the 
police officer who had arrested them. A 1973 survey into the policing of black 
people in the London borough of Ealing reported that, of twenty magistrates 
interviewed, 'Exactly half ... were unequivocal in their views of the 
incorruptibility of the British police'. 77 'Me other half had expressed broadly the 
same sentiment, but in less emphatic terms. 'The general tenor appeared to be that 
JPs [that is, magistrates] and the police were fighting the same cause', the author 
noted. 78 When asked how they viewed non-white defendants, the majority of the 
magistrates agreed that they must have 'at least done something to be in court in 
the first place' . 
79 Although he argued that most magistrates were not consciously 
racist, academic Stanislaus PulI6 concluded that, in Ealing at least, it was not 
possible for black people to receive a fair trial in a magistrates court. 
If reform would not be imposed from other branches of the British legal 
system, there was very little chance it could come from within the police forces 
themselves. The Metropolitan Police, for example, reacted with indignation to 
suggestions that an outside body should monitor its practices. When Home 
Secretary, and nominal head of the Metropolitan Police force, James Callaghan 
proposed, in 1968, to add a clause to the Police Code making it an offence to 
discriminate against black immigrants, the head of the policemen's union, the 
Police Federation, declared that it was, 'A gross insult even to suggest it. ... The 
77 S. Pulld, Police Immigrant Relations in Ealing (London, 1973), p. 59. 71 Ibid., p. 60. 79 Ibid., p. 62. 
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only purpose of this extra clause is to placate the misplaced fears of some 
immigrant bodies that they may not get fair treatment. 80 The Police Federation 
was also strongly opposed to an independent element being incorporated into the 
police complaints procedure. This was in keeping with many senior officers' siege 
mentality in which outside criticism was not brooked. In July 1968, for example, 
when the investigative BBC series Cause For Concern had attempted to air its 
programme 'Equal Before The LawT which featured interviews with black people 
who had successfully sued the police for malicious prosecution, the Metropolitan 
Police threatened legal action if it was shown. The programme was eventually 
aired after protests from civil liberties and race relations organisations. The 
Metropolitan Police continued to maintain that the black people in the programme 
had fabricated their stories: future Chief Commissioner Robert Mark described it in 
his memoirs as, 'one of the most distorted and inaccurate films ever to find its way 
on to a BBC screen'. 81 When Judge Clarke commented at the end of the Mangrove 
Nine trial in December 1971 that there was clear evidence of racial hatred on both 
sides, the Metropolitan Police rejected his observation out of hand. 'I believe there 
was no justification for this remark respecting witnesses appearing for the Crown, 
wrote Detective Inspector Graham Stockwell, 'certainly not from Police 
witnesses'. 82 In 1973, the Metropolitan Police objected strongly to a report 
commissioned by the Ealing Community Relations Council into policing in the 
borough, which concluded that, 'there are, to put it no higher, elements of doubt 
about the evidence presented by the police'. 83 
80 See C. Worrell, 'Police Insulted Mr Callaghan Told: Race Clause Plan Attacked', The Guardian, 
15 May 1968, p. 7. 
31 IL Mark, In the Office ofConstable (London, 1978), p. 100. 82 'Memo from Detective Inspector Graham Stockwell, 21 December 1971', in MEP02/9719: 
'Notting 1-fill riots, 1959-1979', held at the NA. 
a3 Pulld, Police, p. 7 1. 
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'Me Metropolitan Police recruited black police cadets reluctantly while 
protesting that it was the dearth of suitable candidates that prevented more black 
people becoming police officers. Black candidates' lack of educational attainment 
was usually cited as the reason for their failure to be selected. An internal 
memorandum to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, from December 
1963, however, showed that other factors were at play. 'The truth is, of course, 
that we are not yet prepared to recruit any coloured men', the author candidly 
admitted, 'although the time may not be so far distant when we shall be unable to 
turn down well-qualified men who have been born and educated in this country'. 
94 
The Metropolitan Police managed to procrastinate for another four years before 
recruiting Norwell Roberts as London's first black police officer in 1967.85 In 
August 1973, Home Office figures revealed that there were still only sixty-five 
black police officers in the whole of England and Wales. 86 
Race Relations Legislation 
The 1976 Race Relations Act represented an important advance from its 1968 
predecessor. The 1968 act had been viewed by many as a window-dressing 
exercise by the Labour government after its unseemly scramble to pass the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act in March 1968. It had little impact on Black 
Power groups because it neither significantly redressed the issues that led black 
people to support the movement, nor increased the risk of prosecution for publicly 
advocating Black Power by strengthening the incitement to racial hatred clause of 
" The memo is included in NEP02/9854: 'Police liaison with the West Indian community in 
London', held at the NA. 
a' Astley Lloyd Blair was Britain's first black policeman. He joined the Gloucestershire 
constabulary in 1964. 
" Policellmmigrant Relations in England and Wales: Observations on the Report of the Select 
Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (London: RMSO, 1973), p. 11. 
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the 1965 act. The 1976 act, however, had real teeth and represented a more 
committed and thorough attempt to lessen the gap between British-born black 
people's expectation of equality and their actual experience of social, educational 
and economic subordination. Tellingly, it was the first Race Relations Act not to be 
accompanied by legislation restricting black immigration. That the act was passed 
in 1976 was partly attributable to the scale and militancy of black people's 
campaigns for their equal rights during the first half of the 1970s and some credit 
for this should go to the Black Power movement. The primary driving force behind 
the act, however, was the need to halt the frightening and socially destabilising 
deterioration of the relationship between West Indian youth and the police. The 
British government had believed that suppressing the Black Power movement 
would help prevent disaffection spreading in the black community but by 1976 it 
had realised that it needed to attack the causes of this disaffection rather than its 
expression. 
Although Home Secretary Roy Jenkins announced the government's 
intention to draft a second, stronger Race Relations Act and banned Stokely 
Carmichael from Britain on the same day, the 1968 Race Relations Act was not a 
legislative response to the rise of a Black Power movement in Britain. Neither did 
its eventual passage in October 1968 have much impact on the movement. The 
main catalyst for the 1968 act was the publication, in April 1967, of the PEP report 
Racial Discrimination in Britain, which showed that the 1965 Race Relations Act 
had not come close to eradicating racial discrimination. Rather, as a later survey 
neatly quipped, the PEP's 'situation tests, whereby it sent a white Briton, a white 
Hungarian and a black West Indian to apply for the same jobs, housing and 
commercial services and compared the responses they received, revealed that, for 
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people with black skin racial discrimination in Britain ranged from 'the massive to 
, 87 the substantial . Ile case for strengthening the first act was further reinforced by 
the publication of the Street Report six months later. The Street committee 
analysed anti-discrimination legislation in other countries - focusing primarily on 
the United States - and argued that the approach favoured in America, of targeting 
discrimination through civil rather than criminal law, and choosing conciliation 
over compulsion, could also work in Britain. 'Ile accumulation from this report, 
the earlier PEP study on discrimination in housing and employment and Elizabeth 
Burney's study of local housing policy', reported the IRR Newsletter, 'has silenced 
nearly all the doubters'. 88 
The Race Relations Act that eventually came into force in November 1968 
was, however, widely regarded as weak and difficult to enforce. It did plug some 
of the more obvious gaps of its predecessor: in addition to the 'places of public 
resort' covered by the 1965 act, racial discrimination was prohibited in the 
provision of various public services, employment, trade unions, advertisements and 
housing. The Race Relations Board was also given new powers to initiate civil 
proceedings against those practising racial discrimination and those found guilty 
could henceforth be sued for damages. Nonetheless, even those who took a 
generous view of the 1968 Race Relations Act thought it was ill-conceived. 
Remarking that it contained a 'most unusual' mixture of civil and criminal legal 
procedures, the authors of Colour and Citizenship concluded: '[W]e fear that 
although the new Act is liberal in intention and broad in range it contains 
87 E. J. B. Rose et al, Colour, p. 414. For a fuller discussion of the weaknesses of the 1965 act and 
the criticisms of it, see chapter one. 
18 77je Institute of Race Relations Newsletter (December 1967), p. 430. Elizabeth Burney was a 
researcher for the Institute of Race Relations who wrote a book detailing how some councils' 
housing allocation schemes discriminated against immigrants. E. Burney, Housing on Trial. a Study 
of1mmigrants and Local Government (London, 1967). 
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weaknesses that may well result in a loss of confidence in the efficacy of 
legislation of this kind'. 89 A 1975 government White Paper on race relations 
legislation confirmed that confidence in the act had indeed been lost - even by its 
own employees. Both the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations 
Council, it stated, 'have forcefidly drawn attention to the inability of the legislation 
to deal with widespread patterns of discrimination ... a lack of confidence among 
minority groups in the effectiveness of the law, and a lack of credibility in the 
efficacy of the work of the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations 
Commission themselves'ýO Most disillusioning for black people, perhaps, was the 
limp and tentative appearance of the 1968 act in comparison to the speed and 
vigour with which the Commonwealth Immigrants Act had been pushed through 
parliament earlier in the year. Many would have agreed with sociologist Paul 
Gordon's assessment that 'It was obvious that the 1968 Act would scarcely dent 
the surface of racism in Britain. It was equally obvious that discrimination could 
have been dealt with had the desire and political will to do so existed. 71be reality, 
however, was otherwise'. 91 
By 1976, the political will to tackle racial discrimination more effectively 
had been created. The Labour government's 1975 White Paper, Racial 
Discrimination, which set out its plans for a new act, gave several clues as to why. 
The fear of social unrest was a recurring theme. I [I]t is vital to our well-being as a 
society', the authors argued, 'to tap those reservoirs of resilience, initiative and 
vigour in the racial minority groups and not to allow them to lie unused or to be 
deflected into negative protest on account of arbitrary and unfair discriminatory 
" Rose et aL Colour, pp. 686,687. 
90 Racial DLscrimination (London: HMSO, 1975), p. S. 
91 Gordon, Mte Law, p. 18. 
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ý2 practices' Without making explicit reference to the intense criticism of policing 
and judicial practices being levelled by the Black Power movement and the black 
community, it also acknowledged that, 'It is no longer necessary to recite the 
immense damage, material as well as moral, which ensues when a minority loses 
, 93 faith in the capacity of social institutions to be impartial and fair. Describing 
racial discrimination as, 'a form of economic and social waste', it concluded that, 
'It is the Government's duty to prevent these morally unacceptable and socially 
divisive inequalities from hardening into entrenched patterns. 94 
ne section of the White Paper setting out the proposed new race relations 
legislation showed how reform of the 1968 act had been precipitated by the 
passage of the Sex Discrimination Act. The 1976 Race Relations Act was to be the 
fulffinient of the government's pronuse, made in its White Paper Equality for 
Women to '"harmonise the powers and procedures for dealing with sex and race 
discrimination so as to secure genuine equality of opportunity in both fields"095 
The authors of the Sex Discrimination Act had thoroughly investigated the 
weaknesses of the 1968 Race Relations Act in order not to replicate them. Once the 
failures of the 1968 Race Relations Act had been officially acknowledged, pressure 
quickly built up to remedy them. Although the White Paper side-stepped the issue 
somewhat, by arguing that 'It is not possible to provide a quantifiable measure of 
the practical impact of the 1968 Act, it made it clear that the Sex Discrimination 
Act, rather than previous race relations legislation, was to be the model for the new 
law. 96 'Except for good reason, the two statutes and the procedures for their 
92 Racial Discrimination (London: HMSO, 1975), p. 3 1. " IbidL, p. 6. 94 IbidL, p. 3. " Equalityfor Women (London: HMSO, 1974), quoted in Racial Discrimination (London: HMSO, 
1975ý p. 11. 
" Ibid, p. S. 
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administration and enforcement will be fi-amed in similar forms', explained the 
paperý7 
Impetus for the 1976 act also came ýrom the black community. The persistent 
strikes by Asian and West Indian workers from the mid-1960s onwards in factories 
like Woolf s (1965), Coneygre Foundry (1967), Ford Motors (1973) and Imperial 
Typewriters (1974) made it clear to employers, trade unionists and the government 
that that they were no longer prepared to be used as sweatshop labour and wanted 
to participate equally in Britain's workforce and trade union movement. Barrister 
Ian Macdonald believed that the 1976 Race Relations Act was both, 'a recognition 
of the justice of their case', and, 'at the same time an attempt to prevent any such 
future conflicOs The amount and the militancy of independent organising in black 
areas, where black people set up their own amenities like youth centres, homeless 
shelters, supplementary schools, nurseries and legal advice centres, also put 
pressure on the state to take the initiative in promoting equality and fighting 
economic and social injustice. It was also becoming increasingly clear that black 
communities were organising to protect themselves from the police. Groups in 
some areas (for example, the Brixton branch of the Black Panther Movement) 
formed citizen patrols to watch the police while, in other places, crowds of local 
people spontaneously intervened when they thought police were unfairly harassing 
black people. Police could no longer expect to make public arrests of black people 
without encountering spirited resistance, not just from the arrestee but bystanders 
too. A steady stream of trials with multiple defendants (and accompanying defence 
campaigns), resulting from black people resisting arrest with public help, 
97 Ibid., p. 11. 
98 Macdonald, Race Relations, p. iv. 
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punctuated the 197W9 By 1975, the government had realised that if it did not 
legislate for black people's rights they would take up the battle themselves on their 
own terms. 'To abandon a whole group of people in society without legal redress 
against unfair discrimination', warned the White Paper, 'is to leave them with no 
option but to find their own redress'. too 
By the mid 1970s, black people who had been born or brought up in Britain 
were having their own children and getting actively involved, alongside their 
parents, in their communities and workplaces. It had become obvious, both to the 
government and to black people themselves that, whether inadvertently or by 
choice, they had become settlers. The 1975 White Paper acknowledged Britain's 
multiracialism. This was an important development from 1971, when the 
Conservative government's Immigration Act had created a definition of British 
citizenship that privileged those with white ancestors and gave the Home Secretary 
power to fund the voluntary repatriation of non-patrials. 'The government's 
proposals are based on a clear recognition of the proposition that the over- 
whelming majority of the coloured population is here to stay', the White Paper 
announced, even conceding that, 'a substantial and increasing proportion of that 
population belongs to this country'. 101 Having moved black people from the 
category of 'immigrant other' to 'British', it then fi-amed its attack on racial 
discrimination as a protection of British rights. I[T]he time has come for a 
determined effort', it resolved, 'to ensure fair and equal treatment for all our 
people, regardless of their race, colour or national origins'! 02 
" For examples of these numeric trials, such as those of the Metro 4 (197 1), the Oval Four (1972), 
the Brockwell Park 3 (1973) and the Cricklewood, 12 (1974), see 'Cases to remembee, Race Today 
(July/August 1976), p. 15 1. 
100 Racial Discrimirwion (London: RMSO, 1975), p. 6. 
101 Ibid, p. 2. 
1 02 Ibid, p. 2. Italics added. 
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Ile major innovations of the 1976 Race Relations Act were to: recognise 
the concept of indirect discrimination (whereby a seemingly fair rule or practice 
might inadvertently unfairly disadvantage a specific racial group); give individuals 
the power to make direct complaints about racial discrimination to an industrial 
tribunal or county court; replace the Race Relations Board and Community 
Relations Commission by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and vest this 
new body with the power to initiate investigations into racial discrimination and to 
enforce its decisions. It also made it illegal to victimise a person who had reported 
discrimination under the Race Relations Act. The 1976 Act removed most of the 
exemptions that had applied to its predecessors - no longer allowing, for example, 
working men"s clubs to reffise black people entry and white ferry passengers to 
refuse to share a cabin with a black person. It also made inciting racial hatred part 
of the Public Order Act and removed the necessity to prove intent, making 
prosecution slightly easier. 
The form of the act owed much to American anti-discrimination laws, as 
well as British sexual equality legislation. Although the authors of the 1976 act 
were not prepared to mandate affirmative action or ethnic monitoring - both in use 
in America at the time - American political scientist Erik Bleich has argued that it 
was studying American legislation that persuaded them to incorporate indirect 
discrimination into the law. Noting that Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, Street 
Report co-author Anthony Lester and members of the parliamentary select 
committee on race relations and immigration all visited America to consult with 
race relations experts in the two years before the act, Bleich asserts that, 'One of 
the lessons learned from U. S. developments was that confining the definition of 
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discrimination to direct intentional acts was insufficient'. ' 03 Ian Macdonald also 
pointed to America as the source of inspiration for the incorporation of indirect 
discrimination into British law. "The concept ... is derived from the U. S. 
experience', he wrote in 1977. 'It bears a strong family likeness to the judicial 
interpretation which the U. S. Supreme Court had placed on the anti-discrimination 
provisions of Title VH of the Civil Rights Act 1964 as amended by the Equal 
Opportunities Act 1972'. 104 
The last piece of race relations legislation to be passed in the twentieth 
century, the 1976 act was a significant improvement on its predecessors. It made a 
noticeable impact on discriminatory practices in the workplace and contributed to 
the sharp decline in trade union racism after 1976. The black community's belief in 
the Labour government's commitment to racial equality continued to be 
undermined by its support for the 1971 Immigration Act, however, and the 1976 
Race Relations Act did not go nearly far enough in countering racial discrimination 
in the most crucial section of society: the police. It did not stop the police from 
continuing to think of and treat black people as a social problem, nor did it have 
the scope to break 'the familiar cycle of cumulative disadvantage' which the 1975 
White Paper had warned that, when combined with racial discrimination, would 
lead to a 'vicious downward spiral of deprivation'. ' 05 
Conclusion 
By using a two-pronged policy of harassment by the police and through the courts, 
coupled with generous funding of social work projects, the government managed 
103 E. Bleich, 'Continuity as the path to change: institutional innovation in the 1976 British Race 
Relations Act', unpublished paper presented to the British study group of the Center for European 
Studies, Harvard University, 15 March 2002, p. IS. 
" Macdonald, Race Relations, p. 13. 
105 Racial Discrimination (London: HMSO, 1975), p. 3. 
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to disrupt the activities of some Black Power groups and depoliticise the work of 
others. State persecution was a blunt tool, though, and many Black Power groups 
capitalised on the victimisation of their members to gain publicity, credibility and 
sympathy. The heavy-handed treatment of black youths by the police also served 
as a recruitment tool for groups like the Black Panther Movement and the Black 
Liberation Front which offered legal advice and representation, not just to 
members but to anyone in the black community. The introduction of government 
funding schemes under the Urban Programme from 1968, and particularly its 1976 
phase of offering direct funding to black groups, meant that activists in Black 
Power groups in dire need of money to continue their social welfare programmes 
had to make a hard choice between their work being funded and regulated by the 
state, or spending most of their time scrabbling for donations from an already poor 
support base. For most of them the price of independence was too high and they 
divorced their social philanthropy fiom their political perspectives, the marriage of 
which had been at the heart of the Black Power movement. 
During the 1970s the antagonism between young West Indian men and the 
police steadily escalated. Although the first generation of British blacks 
experienced discrimination in education, housing and the job market without 
regard to gender, it was male teenagers whom the police targeted as a social 
problem. A self-regulating body, the police were very resistant to the suggestion 
that they suffered from institutional racism or that complaints against them should 
be investigated. Despite a two-year select committee enquiry into the attitude of 
the police to black people, which found they held a prejudiced view of black 
criminality, the government continued to treat the problem between the police and 
young black men as one of cultural misunderstanding. By 1976, young Asian men 
209 
Chapter 4: Counter-insurgency and community funding: the state response 
were expressing the same levels of fiustration at their communities' treatment by 
the police as their West Indian counterparts and as a response the first of what 
became a national network of Asian Youth Movements was founded in SoutlWI. 
In an attempt to remove some of the grievances of the black community, 
the goverment passed the country's fust thorough and effective Race Relations 
Act in 1976. Recognising that discrimination could operate indirectly in policies 
and practices, as well as being deliberate, direct and personal, the act represented 
an important step towards a more equal society, particularly in the field of 
employment A watershed year for all involved in British race relations, 1976 
marked the political awakening of a new generation of Asians, a much firmer 
commitment to tackle discrimination by the state and a new phase in the resistance 
of West Indian youth to their mistreatment by the police. In August 1976, Britain's 
first major street battle between young black men and the police broke out, as local 
youths reacted angrily to a provocatively large police presence on the streets of 
Notting Hill during the Carnival celebrations. It was to be the first of many. 
210 
Chapter 5: 'Here to stay, here to fightV Asian militancy, Black Power and the trade 
union movement 
CHAPTER5 
'Here to stay, here to fightll Asian militancy, Black Power and the trade union 
movement 
Introduction 
The history of Asian immigrants in Britain has often been overshadowed by the 
story of immigration from the Caribbean. It is easy to fall into the trap of 
conceiving British race relations in the binary, black and white American mould. 
Even the most integrated and inclusive histories of the black experience in Britain 
have tended to privilege the African diasporan experience over the Asian! Peter 
Fryer, for example, whose book Staying Power. the History of Black People In 
Britain remains the most useful general history of non-white immigration to 
Britain, has been justly criticised by Asian academic Tariq Modood for his slight 
coverage of the Asian immigrant experienceý The danger of under-representing 
the agency of Asian immigrants is that they become seen as passive, apolitical and 
marginal to the history of non-white people in Britain. In defence of those who 
unwittingly perpetuate this impression, it must be acknowledged that it is very 
difficult to weave the Asian, African and Caribbean stories into one coherent 
narrative because the experiences and activities of the three groups often seem so 
discrete. The enormous differences in language, culture, religion and social 
organisation and the differing ways in which British imperialism operated in 
southern Asia, Africa and the Caribbean mean that few easy parallels can be drawn 
between the Indian, Pakistani, East African Asian, African and Caribbean 
1 It is worth noting that historians' treatments of the diasporan African experience in Britain after 
the Second World War have also tended to overlook the contribution of immigrants from 
continental Africa in favour of those from the Caribbean. 2 p. Fryer, Slaying poWer.. the History ofBIack People in Britain (London, 1984). For a critique see 
T. Modood, 'The limits of America: rethinking equality in the changing context of British race 
relations', in B. Ward and A. Badger (eds), The Making of Martin Luther King and the Ctvil Rights 
Movement (Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 18 1-93. 
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communities in post-war Britain. By examining the inter-relationship between the 
seemingly separate spheres of Asian politics, industrial militancy and the Black 
Power movement, however, this chapter presents a more integrated history. It 
shows that Asians, Africans and West Indians, despite their disparate goals and 
methods, were all historical agents in the same struggle. 
Indians' and Pakistanis' struggles against racial discrimination began long 
before the industrial action of Asian factory workers caught the attention of the 
British media and public in the 1970s. The small but historically significant Asian 
population that existed in Britain before the period of large-scale immigration from 
the Indian subcontinent in the 1960s included, for example, three members of the 
House of Commons and a peer. The active political engagement of the Indian 
community represents a thread of continuity between the pre- and post-war 
periods. The Indian Workers' Association (IWA), for example, one of the most 
important and active Asian organisations campaigning for racial equality in Britain 
during the 1960s, was founded in 1938 to campaign for Indian independence. 
During the Second World War several thousand Indian civilians worked 
manufacturing arms in Britain and over two million signed up in India to join the 
British army. Indian soldiers fought in both Europe and South-East Asia, although 
very few were stationed in Britain. 
The just under 350,000 Indian and Pakistani immigrants who arrived in 
Britain in the first half of the 1960s went through broadly the same processes of 
acclimatisation and politicisation that immigrants from the Caribbean had 
embarked on in large numbers from the mid-195W The language barriers and 
3 For immigration statistics see Commonwealth Immigrants In Britain (London: HMSO, 1967), 
p. 12. The estimated total number of immignmts from India and Pakistan to Britain between 1960 
and 1965 (inclusive) was 335,653. 
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cultural differences that inhibited social contact, however, initially shielded them a 
little from realising the full extent of white British racism, delaying their 
disillusionment. Also, as the experience and impact of British imperialism had 
been quite different in the Indian subcontinent than in the Caribbean, Asians had 
very different expectations of Britain to West Indians. Compared to plantation 
slavery in the Caribbean, the colonisation of India had largely left its peoples' 
cultures, languages and heritages intact, giving Asians a much stronger sense of 
identity and community than West Indians. T'hey did not think of themselves as 
English and did not look on Britain as the mother country. Equally, Indians and 
Pakistanis found West Indians and Africans as culturally alien as white Britons and 
the great majority did not perceive themselves as black or identify with the Black 
Power politics of the 1960s. 
This did not mean, however, that they were not political. The image of the 
Asian immigrant as ignorant, timid and apolitical was a popular misconception 
held by many Britons during the 1960s. Once Asian immigrants realised that their 
stay in Britain was going to be a long or even permanent one, they started to 
campaign against a range of domestic injustices. Asians campaigned hard against a 
variety of issues that specifically or disproportionately affected their communities, 
for example immigration restriction and the right to religious observance. They 
campaigned on these issues both through their own organisations, such as the 
IWAs, and broader groups like Birmingham's Co-ordinating Committee Against 
Racial Discrimination (CCARD), founded in 1961 to campaign against the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, and the Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants (JCWI), set up in 1967 to provide immediate help and advice to newly 
arrived immigrants. Asians also played a leading role in Britain's most ambitious 
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civil rights group, the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), founded 
in January 1965. Historian Anandi Rarnamurthy highlighted the significance of 
these earlier political struggles in providing a basis for future, more radical groups, 
such as the Asian Youth Movements (AYMs) of the mid-to-late 1970s. The 
AYMs, she writes, 'would never have been fonned without being able to build on 
4 the struggles of earlier generations of Asian activists'. 
Jagmohan Joshi, of the IWA (GB) Dim-Lingham, was the Asian leader with 
the closest links to the Black Power movements in both Britain and America. A 
is moved to Bi to train as an accountant, Joshi became the 
general secretary of the Binningham IWA in 1958. A co-founder of the radical 
Black Peoples' Alliance (BPA) a decade later, he also worked closely with Black 
Power groups like the Universal Coloured People's Association (UCPA) and the 
Black Panther Movement (BPM) and regularly used the numerical strength of the 
IWA (GB) to bolster Black Power marches. Joshi's widow recalls that Malcolm X 
requested a meeting with the IWA (GB) when he visited Bminmi gham in February 
1965 and that various American Black Power leaders made personal visits to their 
home during the late 1960s. Although politically radical and deeply suspicious of 
mainstream British politics, Joshi was not himself an advocate of Black Power. He 
did, however, subscribe to the political definition of blackness that connected his 
and other Asians' struggles with those of immigrants from the Caribbean. 
Joshi's outlook was exceptional. Outside his orbit the British Black Power 
movement had little appeal to or impact on Asians living in Britain at the time. The 
small number of Asian men who had joined Black Power groups after 1967 
dwindled as parts of the movement became increasingly cultural nationalist during 
4 A. Ramamurthy, The Politics of Britain's Asian Youth Movements', Race & Class 48: 2 (2006), 
p. 39. 
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the early 1970s. At the same time, however, a rise in anti-Asian violence, 
colloquially known as Taki-bashing', police indifference and poor job prospects 
compounded by racial discrimination, led to the political radicalisation of a 
younger generation of Asians. During the early 1970s, Asians' increasing 
disillusionment with the police provided points of crossover between them and the 
Black Power movement. Faced with the same problems of police harassment and 
inadequate protection against violence from assorted white racists and supporters 
of the growing National Front, young Asians began to react with the defiant anger 
more normally attributed to their West Indian counterparts. The Southall Youth 
Movement (SYM), which emerged as a spontaneous response to the Metropolitan 
Police's failure to adequately investigate the racist murder of a local Asian 
teenager in June 1976, clearly referenced Black Power. Adopting the black fist as 
their logo and basing their code of conduct on the strict rules of the Black Panther 
Party, the AYMs that sprang up in Asian areas around the country in the late 1970s 
borrowed from both the style and the substance of the American and British Black 
Power movements. 
The chapter concludes with an examination of Asian involvement in the 
struggle against racial discrimination in the workplace and the trade union 
movement. The Marxist philosophy of the remaining Black Power groups in the 
1970s dictated that black workers should be in the vanguard of the battle against 
racism and its progenitor capitalism. (As previously noted, the Black Panther 
Movement even changed its name to the Black Workers Movement (BWM) in 
1973 to reflect this change in emphasis. ) The section of the black community at the 
forefront of the working-class struggle in the early 1970s, however, was 
undoubtedly Asian industrial workers in the Midlands and the North. The ultimate 
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goal of these Asian strikers, however, was to be integrated into Britain's economic 
system on the basis of equality, not to overthrow it. The arrival in Britain of 
thousands of middle-class Asians from Uganda in the early 1970s boosted Asian 
industrial militancy but also reinforced the capitalist nature of its aspirations. The 
strike at the Grunwick film processing plant in North London, which began in 
August 1976, was led by a female Ugandan Asian worker, Jayaben Desai. It 
marked a watershed moment in the trade union movement's attitude towards its 
black members, as for the first time a spontaneous strike of Asian workers was 
officially recognised by their union and supported by the whole trade union 
movement. While Black Power radicals saw this as co-option, Desai and her fellow 
strikers viewed it as a crucial forward step. 
Asians in Britain: a brief history 
Indians both lived and were politically active in Britain before large-scale 
migration from southern Asia began after the Second World War. 5 The majority of 
them were working class - usually either lascar sailors or itinerant peddlers. There 
were also a few Indian members of the upper class, however, and it seems that they 
experienced an acceptance in British society that their West Indian and African 
counterparts did not. Although a tiny minority, they appear to have enjoyed all the 
privileges of their white British counterparts. For example, four Indian men sat in 
the Houses of Parliament between 1892 and 1929; Dadabhai Naoroji served as the 
Liberal MP for Finsbury Central between 1892 and 1895, Mancheijee Bhownagree 
was the Conservative MP for Bethnal Green between 1895 and 1906, Shapudi 
Saklatvala was elected as the Communist MP for Battersea between 1922 and 1929 
5 Pakistan broke away from India to become an independent nation in August 1947. lberefore, 
before that date only immigration from India can be discussed. 
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and Lord Sinha of Raipur sat in the House of Lords from 1919 until his death in 
1928. lbough, as David Cannadine has pointed out, 'individual social ordering 
often took precedence over collective racial othering' in the British empire, it is 
still remarkable that three Indians were popularly elected to positions of real 
political power in the imperial metropolis. 6 To put this in a comparative context, 
the first Ws of African descent had to wait until 1987 for the same opportunity. 7 
Extra-parliamentary political activity by the Indian community in Britain in 
the inter-war period included the foundation of the first Indian Workers' 
Association (IWA) in Coventry in 1938. Set up to campaign for Indian 
independence, the majority of the IWA's members were Sikhs from the Punjab. In 
1940, Udham. Singh, a founding member of the IWA, assassinated the former 
governor of the Punjab, Sir 1ýfichael O'Dwyer, in revenge for the Amritsar 
massacre of 1919, during which his brother had been shot dead by British troops, 
along with hundreds of other unarmed protestors. Singh was hanged in London on 
31 July 1940 but Home Office records show that N115 continued to keep the IWA 
under surveillance for the rest of the decade! After India was granted 
independence in 1947 the IWA dwindled into obsolescence, until it was revived as 
a social and welfare organisation in the mid-1950s. 
The two million Indians who fought in the British army during the Second 
World War, had quite a different experience from the tens of thousands of West 
Indians who also signed up. In common with Britain's African troops, tens of 
thousands of which fought in Burma, Italy and Germany, most Indian soldiers saw 
6 D. Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (London, 200 1), p. 10. 
7 Paul Boateng and Bernie Grant were both elected as Labour MPs in 1987. 
' See HO 45/25460: 'Disturbances: Indian Workers Association: "inflammatory" tone ofAzad Hind 
(Quit India), a bi-lingual monthly in Punjabi and Urdu, 1945-1951', held at the National Archive 
(NA). 
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active service in Europe and South-East Asia, whereas West Indian recruits were 
more often sent to Britain to fulfil auxiliary roles. 9 Indians were involved in the 
domestic British war effort - for example, historian Rozina. Visram estimates that 
there were more than 3,000 Indian civilians working in British munitions factories 
by the middle of 1942.10 The majority of these people had been resident in Britain 
before the war, however, and had taken advantage of the wartime demand for 
labour to get better-paid jobs. The number of demobilised Indian soldiers who 
decided to move to Britain in the decade after the war was small though, because 
few of them had any direct connection with the country. 
After the war, the creation of a National Health Service in 1948 attracted a 
number of Indian doctors, although only a small number of Asian immigrants 
travelled to Britain during the 1950s. " When immigration from India and Pakistan 
sharply increased at the start of the 1960s, its composition also changed. Whereas 
most Asian immigrants had previously been young men, the new arrivals began to 
include their parents, wives and children, as people rushed to get their families into 
Britain before its open door closed. Statistics compiled by the Central Office of 
Information showed that, in 1959,16,500 West Indians but only 2,950 Indians and 
850 Pakistanis migrated to Britain. In 1962, however, hinnuigration from India and 
Pakistan outstripped that from the Caribbean, and by 1963 there were more than 
four times as many immigrants arriving from Asia as from the Caribbean. 12 
9 Ministry of Defence figures state, for example, that 200,000 Indian and 90,000 Aftican troops 
fought in Burma between 1942 and 1945. See: 
weweredim. defiencedynamics. mod. uktwewerethere old/infareast. hitml. 10 FLVisram, Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History (London, iO-02), p. 268. 11 Pakistan consisted of two separate territories, East and West Pakistan, which were part of the 
same country despite being ovff a thousand miles apart. In December 1971 civil war in East 
Pakistan resulted in some of its territory rejoining India and the rest forming a new country, 
Bangladesh. 
12 Commonwealth Immigrants to Britain (LA)ndon: HMSO, 1967), p12. The immigration figures for 
1963 were 7.928 West Indians, 16,336 Pakistanis and 17,499 Indians. 
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Most Pakistani immigrants to Britain during the 1960s were tenant farmers 
or peasants from the poor, agricultural, battle-torn border regions of Mirpur in 
West Pakistan and Sylhet in East Pakistan and were Muslims. Indian immigrants 
usually came from the slightly more industrialised districts of Punjab and Gujarat 
and were mainly Sikh (from the Punjab) with a small minority of Hindus (from 
Gujarat). Western and Eastern Pakistanis and Punjabi and Gujarati Indians all 
spoke different languages. Despite these differences the young Indian and 
Pakistani men, who made up more than three quarters of the initial immigrants, 
shared the same goals once in Britain. 13 For all of them, their migration was driven 
by the desire to accrue enough money to improve the quality of life and standing of 
their families and communities back home. Initially, they did not intend to remain 
in Britain once they had made enough money to meet their responsibilities at 
home. Unlike many male West Indian immigrants, who had already migrated with 
or subsequently sent for their wives and children by the time the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act came into effect on I July 1962, these Asian men still viewed 
themselves as temporary migrants rather than settlers. Once they realised that their 
financial ambitions could not be easily realised and that the stringent restrictions of 
the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act meant that if they left Britain they might 
not have the chance to return, they too began to send for their families, who as 
their dependents were still allowed to enter Britain without restriction. 
With the arrival of wives, parents and children came a tightening up of the 
social mores within Asian communities in Britain. The young single men, who had 
been their enjoying fteedorn away from the watchful eyes of their parents and 
communities, had adapted their lifestyles to the West. It was not an unusual sight, 
'3 Hiro estimates that in 1960 the ratio of male to female immigrants was 3: 1 from India and 40: 1 from Pakistan. See D. Hiro, Black Britis& White British (London, 197 1), p. 108. 
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for example, to see Pakistani Muslim men drinking beer in a pub and many Indian 
Sikh men had shaved their beards and cut their hair to make it easier to find work. 
A similar relaxing of religious observance for female Asian IMMI'grants would 
have been unthinkable, however, as women were traditionally the bearers of their 
family honour, and as such their behaviour was more closely watched and 
regulated. Because they were often not allowed to work or socialise outside of their 
families, Asian women in Britain were more insulated from westernising 
influences than men. Religion was often extremely important to them because 
displays of piety and religious devotion were one of the few ways they could gain 
status and express themselves. Many Asian families in Britain discovered, 
however, that they could not make ends meet unless the women undertook paid 
work. The 1971 census recorded that 40.8 per cent of Indian women and 20.7 per 
cent of Pakistani women earned wages. 14 Pakistani women, who had to follow 
more strict religious observances, were more likely to undertake piecework that 
could be done at home, which was considered a more honourable solution. Indian 
women also laboured at this low-paid and unregulated home-work, but also took 
jobs in factories and laundries. The dishonour of having to work outside the home 
in an environment that included men was lessened by the fact that whole shifts 
were often staffed entirely by Indian women. 
The Pakistani and Indian communities that grew in Britain in the 1960s 
were concentrated in London, the West Midlands and Yorkshire, with more 
Indians living in the South and more Pakistanis in the North. 15 Whatever their 
14 Statistics quoted in P. Parmar, 'Gender, race and class: Asian women in resistance' in Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, The Empire Strikes Back- Race and Racism in 70s Britain 
(London, 1982), p. 247. 
's Much of the information in this paragraph is taken from a Political and Economic Planning (PEP) 
survey published as D. Smith, The Facts of Racial Disadvantage. - a National Survey (London, 
1976). 
220 
Chapter 5: 'Here to stay, here to fightV Asian militancy, Black Power and the trade 
union movement 
professions had been at home, most Asian men initially joined the British working 
class on the lowest rung. The jobs that were open to them were usually badly paid, 
often dangerous and almost invariably involved unsociable hours and/or shift- 
work. To avoid this, a small petit bourgeoisie of shopkeepers and restaurateurs 
quickly developed - as all those who could circumvent the widespread racial 
discrimination of British employers by working for themselves, did so. Once 
established in Britain, however, Pakistanis and Indians fared quite differently in 
terms of economic advancement, educational achievement and social integration. 
A 1971 Runnymede Trust survey of 450 young Indian, Pakistani and West Indian 
immigrants noted that, 'Clearly most people would consider the young Pakistanis 
to be the worst off. They are almost certainly the most circumscribed of the three 
groups in terms of educational background, job status and, to some extent, housing 
conditions'. 16 Alifliough the survey found that West Indians were most 
economically successful overall, it noted that Indians spoke much better English 
than Pakistanis and had higher educational qualifications than either Pakistanis or 
West Indians. Of the three groups, the Pakistanis were the least likely to stay on at 
school after the age of sixteen and the most likely to work in unskilled jobs. 17 
Furthermore, the survey concluded, 'Insofar as [political] passivity does exist, it is 
most common among the Pakistani youth interviewed'. 18 
The most upwardly mobile group of Asian immigrants did not arri've mi 
Britain until the end of the 1960s. They were African Asians who arrived either as 
British citizens or refugees from Kenya, Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania between 
1967 and 1976. The 1976 Political and Economic Planning survey, The Facts of 
16 P. Evans, Me Attitudes of Young Immigrants (London, 197 1), p. 12. 17 lbid, pp. 1 G-12. 
11 lbid.. p. 25. 
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Racial Disadvantage, noted that African Asians had the best English language 
skills and the most educational qualifications of all Asian immigrants. 19 Although 
they were descended from Indian 'coolie' labourers brought over by British 
imperial administrators in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work on 
projects like the Uganda-Kenya railway, by the 1960s Asians in eastern and 
southern African countries were disproportionately represented in the professional 
middle classes. It was precisely these Asians' relative financial and social 
superiority that leaders like Kenya7s Jorno Kenyatta and Uganda's Idi Amin 
exploited in order to garner public support for policies restricting their activities in 
Africa or expelling them entirely. The majority of the Asians who emigrated to 
Britain from Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s had chosen to take British 
citizenship when the African colonies they lived in gained independence and were 
finding life as foreign nationals very difficult under the Africanisation laws of the 
new independent nations. They were political refugees rather than economic 
migrants and already well practised at making the most of living in an alien and 
potentially hostile country. Despite successive British governments' best efforts to 
keep them out or make them move to areas where there were few fellow Asians, 
the majority of the East African Asians eventually settled in London or the 
Midlands, where they played an important role in the industrial disputes of the 
1970s. 
Asian political activity during the 1960s 
Asians - particularly Indians - campaigned on a range of issues that affected their 
communities during the 1960s, including immigration rules, the infringement of 
19 Smith, 7le Facts, pp. 44,47. 
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their religious rites, discrimination at work and educational inequalities such as the 
bussing of their children to distant schools. They also participated in broader 
organisations fighting for racial equality, even those with radical agendas. The 
most active Asian organisations were the Indian Workers Associations, both those 
in the Midlands network that were part of Joshi's IWA (GB) and the separate, 
independent IWA Southall. Of all the issues affecting Asians in Britain, 
immigration restriction and the tangle of sometimes arbitrary and unjust rules and 
practices that complicated their passage to Britain and attempts to settle once there, 
were the most important. With the possible exception of CARD, all the groups 
mentioned at the start of the chapter campaigned hard against Britain's 
immigration laws. 
Founded in Birmingham in February 1961, CCARD was the first post-war 
broad-front, anti-racist organisation outside of London. Set up jointly by the 
Birmingham IWA, the West Indian Workers' Association, the Pakistani Workers' 
Association and the Birmingham University Socialist Union, CCARD was 
dedicated to racial equality. Because of its coalitional make-up, CCARD was, in 
some ways, less radical than the local IWA, from which much of its membership 
came, but it grew from the same political heritage. White CPGB member Shirley 
Fossick was recruited to CCARD as its campaign secretary in 1962 and later went 
on to marry its co-founder Jagmohan Joshi. She maintains that CCARD's form and 
direction were very much influenced by its Asian membership. 'It was born of the 
experiences of a lot of the people who came from the Punjab, who were politicised 
and had experience working in broad fronts in India, she says. 'Pakistani workers, 
Indian workers were all central ... There were other organisations and trade 
unionists that were there and alongside it, but the black workers' organisations 
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were at the fbrefront'ýO CCARD, therefore, was an early British civil'rights 
organisation that had its roots in independent Asian traditions of political dissent 
and campaigning for equality. 
Týe fact that CCARD preceded the similar but much higher profile 
London-based Campaign Against Racial Discrimination by almost four years 
undermines the assumption that Asian communities were inward-looking and 
apolitical and lagged behind West Indians and Africans in terms of organising 
against racism. Far from being politically apathetic, Asian activists by the mid- 
1960s were engaged in a heated debate over the tactics required to achieve their 
organisations' goals of economic and social equality. The invitation to join CARD 
exposed an ideological divide in many organisations over whether they should 
follow Joshi's example of independent, grassroots and increasingly militant 
campaigning or CARD's policy of lobbying the government and trying to use its 
legislation to promote equality. The IWA (GB) had refused to join CARD, 
declaring it to be, 'nothing but a middle-class organisation trying to eliminate 
discrimination superficially and without any backing of the three major immigrant 
communities'! ' CCARD, also led by Joshi, declined its invitation to join on 
similar grounds. The large and influential IWA Southall, however, had been 
instrumental in setting up CARD and the National Federation of Pakistani 
Organisations (NFPA) and the Indian Social Club were also among its member 
organisations. 22 Furthermore, several Asians, such as Pakistani academic Hamza 
Alavi, Raniana Ash, the Runnymede Trust's Dipak Nandy and IWA Southall 
leader Vishnu Sharma, served on CARD's executive committee. 
20 Shirley JosK interviewed by the author, 2 November 2004. 
21 Undated document held in the IWA archive, at Birmingham Central Library. 
22 The NFPA, founded in 1963, was itself an umbrella organisation representing over twenty 
Pakistani groups. 
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The number of Asians in leadership positions in CARD led Black Power 
activists to denounce it as Asian-dominated at its third annual conference in 1967. 
Although, in reality, it was not, 'The story was widely believed that CARD had 
been taken over by a sinister coalition of whites and Asians', former CARD 
member Michael Dummett recalled. 23 'The first session of the Convention was 
conducted in an atmosphere of hysteria, fanned by personal abuse from which 
insulting racial epithets - directed against Asians as well as whites - were not 
absent'! 4 The Black Power activists' main objection to the perceived Asian over- 
representation in CARD, was that they viewed those Asians in leadership positions 
as being middle-class government apologists. This impression was partly based on 
CARD vice-chair Harnza Alavi's decision to agree to be co-opted onto statutory 
body, the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, in September 1965. 
Another factor was the reputation of the IWA Southall, which was seen as a 
middle-class organisation with conservative, integrationist, aims. 
Founded in May 1957, the IWA Southall supported the Communist Party 
of India (CPI) and its leader Vishnu Sharma was a lifetime member of the British 
Communist Party (CPGB), even sitting on its National Executive from 1971. 
Representing one of the largest settlements of Asians in Britain, the IWA Southall 
welcomed Pakistani as well as Indian members. it was well funded, collecting 
enough money fiom membership dues to purchase the Dominion cinema, which it 
transformed into an Indian film house, as well as a meeting space for all black 
people. It campaigned against the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in 1961, 
'3 M. Dummett, 'CARD Reconsidered, Race Today 5: 2 (1973) p. 44. 
241bid, p. 43. Dimmett's article was written as a riposte to fellow former CARD member Marion 
Glean who had argued in a book review - M. Glean, 'Whatever happened to CARD? ', Race Today, 5: 1 (1973) - that there was no antipathy between Asians and West Indians in CARD in 1967. Dummett's argument is the more convincing of the two, especially as Glean had left CARD by 
1967 and did not attend the conference. 
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provided food and money for striking workers at the local Woolf s factory in 1965 
and, in 1967, joined forces with the West Indian Standing Conference to found the 
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants. (An organisation that campaigns 
effectively for the better treatment of immigrants and provides a direly needed 
welfare and advocacy service for them at the ports of entry, the JCWI still exists. ) 
In 1969 the IWA Southall also joined the campaign against Ealing borough 
council's discriminatory policy of bussing black schoolchildren. 25 
These campaigning activities notwithstanding, the accusation of 
conservatism and shying away from hard politics in favour of cultural issues was 
levelled against the IWA Southall by other Indian and Black Power groups in the 
1960s and 1970s. "Apart from one major demonstration against the Immigration 
Act of 1972 [sic], into which the IWA [Southall] leadership was forced, it has done 
absolutely nothing', thundered a pamphlet published by another Southall group, 
the Indian Workers' Front. 'Most of the time this gentry are happy to act as the 
stooges of the Home Office'. 26 The main source of the Indian Workers' Front's 
hatred of the IWA Southall, however, stemmed from the latter's continued support 
of the 'fascist' Congress Party of India, not its conduct in Britain. Politics in the 
home country clearly still shaped political allegiances in the metropolis, even as 
late as the mid-1970s. It was certainly the case, though, that the IWA Southall was 
not as radical as the Birmingham branch of the IWA (GB), particularly with regard 
25 In 1963, in response to complaints from white parents in Ealing that they did not want their 
children to be educated in classes with a majority of 'immigrant' (that is, black) pupils, the borough 
council asked education minister Edward Boyle to visit Ealing's schools and advise them what to 
do. Boyle's solution was to suggest that a quota be introduced, restricting the number of 
'immigrant' children per class to a third. Those that exceeded the quota would be bussed to a school 
with fewer 'immigrant' pupils. This stigmatised black children and took away their choice to go to 
a local school. They also firequently found that they were very unwelcome at the school to which 
they had been bussed. White children were never subject to bussing. The 1965 White Paper, 
Immigration Jrom the Commonwealth, recommended that all schools use a quota system for 
'immigrant children' and, hence, bussing. 
26 Indian Workers' Frontý 'On the lap-dogs of Indian Fascism: an exposure of the leading clique of 
the IWA (Southall)', undated, p. 2. Held, unfiled, at the Institute of Race Relations (IRR). 
226 
Chapter 5: 'Here to stay, here to fightt' Asian militancy, Black Power and the trade 
union movement 
to its willingness to work with the Labour Party. 'Though the IWA-Southall has 
criticized the Labour government', wrote sociologist DeWitt John in 1969, 'it has 
27 
consistently supported Labour candidates in British elections". Ultimately, it was 
this willingness to collaborate with the state that undermined the IWA's reputation 
in many eyes. Assessing the legacy of the leaders of the IWA Southall, academic 
Harwant Bains concluded that, although it achieved many things, 'Unfortunately, 
they also succeeded in opening the back door to forms of state sponsorship which 
destroyed the very principles of autonomous organisation for which they formerly 
stood'ýs Bains' assessment throws up superficially striking parallels with the 
transformation of several Black Power activists into government-sponsored social 
workers in the mid-1970s under the Urban Programme, but the IWA Southall 
never professed to be part of a radical movement and its achievements should be 
judged within its own frame of reference. 
Asians displayed great militancy in defending their cultural rights and these 
should not be overlooked by defining political activity solely in narrow party or 
organisational terms. Religious issues, in particular, should not be considered apart 
from their political and social context. Many Indians and Pakistanis who did not 
think it an appropriate use of their time to protest against the attacks of far-right 
politicians like Enoch Powell and Duncan Sandys, were quick to demonstrate 
when they felt their religious freedom was being threatened. For example, when, in 
August 1967, the transport department of Wolverhampton council threatened to 
sack a Sikh bus conductor if he did not shave his beard and replace his turban with 
a cap, it sparked a two-year campaign of resistance. The actions taken included a 
27 D. John, Indian Workers ' Associations in Britain (London, 1969), p. 159. 
, 23 It Bains, 'Southall Youth: an old-fashioned story' in P. Cohen and H. Bains, (eds), Multi-Racist 
Britain (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 24 1. 
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silent march of 5,000 Sikhs through Wolverhampton in Febnu-try 1968 and 
culminated in sixty-six-year-old local leader Sohan Singh Jolly committing himself 
to ritual self-immolation if turban-wearing were not allowed by the Sikh new year 
in 1969. Jolly's way of showing his resistance to cultural imperialism was more 
than even the most extreme Black Power activist in Britain had ever proposed. 29 
Although the Sikh bus staff s grievances were ostensibly religious, their 
West Indian co-workers viewed their campaign as also against racism, despite 
local MP Enoch Powell's dismissal of the dispute as nothing more than Indian 
Gcommunalism' in a February 1968 speech. 30 In a union ballot on whether to 
support Sikh bus staff s demands, West Indians voted with the Asian members. 
'The result was clearly unexpected by the union leaders, who imagined the West 
Indians would vote with the whites', explained a study of the dispute. 31 West 
Indian workers bad noted, however, the ugly racist tone of the public opposition to 
the Sikh workers' cause. Wolverhampton council eventually backed down on 9 
April 1969, to avoid putting Jolly's ultimatum to the test and because the Sikh 
community showed absolutely no sign of weakening its stance. 
In 1967 the issue of primary immigration became a central issue in British 
politics once again as several thousand British passport-holding Asians facing 
expulsion from Kenya attempted to take up their right of abode in Britaim The 
length to which the British government was prepared to go to prevent more non- 
white immigration shocked and in many cases radicalised those Asians already 
living in Britain. On I March 1968, the Commonwealth Immigration Act was 
voted into law by an overwhelming majority of MPs, after only one week's debate. 
29 The information about the Wolverhampton dispute is taken from D. Bentham, Transport and 
Turbans: a Comparative Study in Local Politics (London, 1970). 
30 Extracts ftorn Powell's speech at Walsall in Febniary 1968 are included in H. Bains, 'Southall 
Youth: an old-fiLshioned story' in Cohen and Bains (eds), Multi-Racist Britain, p. 56. 31 Bentham, Transport and Turbans, p. 44. 
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'By far the most disturbing and demoralizing experience for Pakistani and Indian 
32 
settlers was the 1968 Immigration Bill', concluded Indian commentator Hiro. 
Having been portrayed as little better than a plague of locusts during the run-up to 
the 'Kenyan Asians' Act, Asians provided the backbone of the campaign against it. 
Several Asian organisations also joined the new Black Peoples' Alliance (BPA), in 
which only groups that had never taken government money and whose 
representatives did not sit on government bodies were allowed to participate. In a 
tone-setting act of defiance, the founding conference on 28 April 1968 was held in 
a house in Leamington Spa that had previously been attacked by a British branch 
of the Ku Klux Klan. Several of the original twenty member groups advocated 
Black Power. 
Asian militancy and Black Power 
Although some Asian individuals and organisations did participate in the Black 
Power movement, it held little appeal for their wider communities. Patterned after 
American Black Power, the British movement focused on issues that were much 
more relevant to people of African than Asian descent. Black Power's central 
emphases on self-determination and cultural nationalism were non-issues to 
Indians and Pakistanis. European imperialism had subjugated and indentured 
Asians in the countries it administered, but not enslaved them, deliberately 
dismantled their family structure, or tried to eradicate their indigenous cultures, as 
it had in the Caribbean. Asian communities in Britain were imbued with traditions, 
customs and religions that stretched back thousands of years - cultural nationalism 
to them was not a goal to aspire to but a daily reality. 
32 Ibid., P. 144. 
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Recalling his visit to London in July 1967, Stokely Carmichael wrote that 
he had been pleasantly surprised, 'to hear Black Power resonating and to see the 
raised fists in the Asian communities, especially among Pakistani youth . 
33 TUS 
anomalous statement, given the general indifference of Pakistani immigrants in 
Britain to Black Power, on either side of the Atlantic, can probably be explained by 
the visits between 1964 and 1966 of outspoken and charismatic Nation of Islarn 
(NoI) proselytisers, Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali. Despite its name, the Nol was 
not recognised as a religious group by orthodox Muslims (and in fact was regarded 
as heretical), but this did not stop some young British Muslims being fascinated by 
its spokesmen. Former second-in-command, Malcolm X, was invited to speak at 
Islamic student society meetings at the universities of Sheffield and Birmingham in 
December 1964 and February 1965 and did so to packed audiences, although in 
Sheffield, at least, the majority of attendees were white. By December 1964 
Malcolm X had left the Nol, become an orthodox Sunni Muslim, and was 
attempting to formulate a new global political movement of oppressed black 
people. Unfettered by the political conservatism of the Nol, he could have become 
a powerfid radical Muslim leader. His untimely death on 21 February 1965, cut 
short this potential. 
Wildly popular with Muslim and non-Muslim black people alike, world 
heavyweight boxing champion Ali visited London twice in 1966 to fight British 
boxers. On both occasions he was chaperoned by Michael X and 'made a point of 
reaching out into the Muslim communities'. 34 Furthermore, in April 1967, the 
news that Ali had refused to answer the draft to fight in the Vietnam war, on 
33 S. Cannichael with E. NL lbelwelL Ready for Revolution: the Lire and Struggles of Stokely 
Carmichael (Kwame Ture) (New York, 2003), p. 576. 34 Ibid, p. 276. 
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religious grounds, forfeiting his title and risking prison as a result, earned him the 
respect of Muslims and black people across the world. In 1971, a survey of young 
immigrants revealed that when asked whom they most admired, most Pakistanis 
named Muhammad Ali? 5 Unlike Malcolm Y, Ali was still a devoted member of 
the Nol when he visited Britain. But although it was bracketed with the Black 
Power movement by white Americans, who found its members' advocacy of self- 
defence and disdain for white society equally frightening, the Nol was in fact not 
interested in challenging the status quo. Espousing a millenarian eschatology, it 
deliberately abstained from earthly politics, and thus would neither have sought to 
encourage Muslim immigrants in Britain to take an interest in Black Power, nor 
viewed such an outcome as desirable. Nonetheless, Ali's radical stand against 
white imperialism in the name of his version of Islam was a powerful example of 
political radicalism to young Muslims. 
Although British Black Power theoretically embraced all oppressed non- 
white people as politically 'black', in practice this did not always reflect the 
feelings of its advocates. Those Black Power groups, such as the Black Liberation 
Front (BLF), that tended more towards cultural nationalism, found that their 
emphasis on constructing a positive black identity via a closer identification with 
and celebration of African culture and history had limited appeal for their Asian 
members ?6 Groups which defined oppression in class terms, like the Black Unity 
and Freedom Party (BUFP) and the Black Panther Movement (BPM), found it 
easier to bridge ethnic divisions. This was demonstrated in 1968, when the 
expulsion of thousands of Asians from Kenya presented a potential challenge to 
33 EVans,, Young Immigraw, p. 26. West Indians put Ali in joint first position with Martin Luther 
King, whereas Indians placed him third, after Mahatma Gandhi and, somewhat more surprisingly, 
Harold Wilson. 
36 For a fuller discussion of this see chapter 3. 
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the unity of Black Power groups. A statement from the inaugural meeting of the 
BPA in 1968, made reference to the sometimes antagonistic interests of its 
members of African and Asian descent. 'Further contradictions appear between the 
national minorities. They have been suspicious of each other and have sometimes 
seen their interests conflicting, e. g. over the Kenyan Asians', it read, but add4 
hopefully, 'Tbis meeting is one of the most concrete signs of us overcoming these 
differences'ý7 An article in the journal of the BPA-affiliated Black Revolutionary 
Action Movement (BRAM), showed, however, how a class-based analysis could 
be used to overcome nationalist divisions. Criticising both the policy of 
Afficanisation for being 'bourgeois nationalism' and the behaviour of East African 
Asians as 'collaborating with imperialism at every level', it explained that, 'the 
only true and everlasting solution to the Asian problem is for the Asian working 
class and African workers and peasants to overcome their racial bigotry, realise the 
new African bourgeoisie is a common enemy to both and ... establish a truly 
socialist society abolishing the exploitation of man'. 38 In 1973, however, the issue 
of East African Asians again showed up divisions in the Black Power movement. 
A BPM 'Statement on the Ugandan Asian situation' from September 1972 noted 
that, 'We can see that the Ugandan Asian issue is having the effect of deepening 
the suspicions that exist between black people of African origin and black people 
of Asian ongm'. 39 Despite BRAM's exhortations to join together in a socialist 
utopia, class antagonisms and a degree of mutual suspicion still existed between 
people of African and Asian descent in the Black Power movement. 
37 'Black Peoples' Alliance: documented and adopted at the inaugural meeting 28/4/68'. Document 
held in Tony Soares' private collection. 
38 'The problem of Asians in East Africa', 7he Black Ram 1: 5 (November 1969), p. 5. 39 Black Panther Movement, 'Statement on Ugandan Asian Situation, II September 1972, p. 1. 
Held in Tony Soares' private collection. 
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The overwhelming majority of Asians were highly suspicious of Black 
Power groups, even those promoting a racially inclusive socialist agenda. The 
media and politicians' depiction of Black Power as an anarchistic revolutionary 
movement, or the black equivalent of the National Front, worried most Asians just 
as much as it did white Britons. A 1971 survey, which asked young Asians 
whether they should 'be prepared to fight for [their] rights as a black man', found 
that 91 per cent of Indians and 71 per cent of Pakistanis agreed to some extenOO 
Asked, additionally, if they thought they should join a Black Power group, the 
overwhelming majority, however, said they did not - although Indians were 
reported as being keener on the idea than Pakistanis. 41 Joshi encouraged members 
of the IWA (GB) to think of themselves as 'black' as well as Asian. 'People like 
Joshi were very clear that they were black and took on that identification', 
remembers his widow. 'If some of the elements in some of the Black Power 
organisations among the African-Caribbean community would say, "no you're 
not", Joshi's position was we're in a common struggle, let's not fight over who's 
black'. 42 He took great pains, however, to justify to IWA members his decision to 
align the association with Black Power groups in the BPA, finessing the definition 
of 'Black Power' to suit their proclivities. 'Some of the organizations which we 
worked with in the Alliance belonged to the Black Power Movement and we 
therefore felt it important that we should clearly defirte our attitude to black power 
[sic]', he explained to the IWA (GB)'s 1970 national conference. 
The only general definition we can accept is one which defines black people 
in terms of their class basis, as workers, peasants, capitalists etc. and then 
proceeds to explain black power as the control of the state by the great 
40 Evans, Young Immigrants, p. 25. 
41 lbid., p. 26. 
42 Shirley joShL interviewed by the author, 2 November 2004. 
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ma. onty of black people, workers and peasants, in the lands in which they 
liv 3 
Joshi's defuition of Black Power stemmed from an unusually intimate 
knowledge of the movement. He had had as much first-hand experience of 
American Black Power as any of the London Black Power groups' leaders. 
Malcolm X had arranged a meeting with the IWA (GB) leadership during his visit 
to Birmingham in Febmary 1965. His was not the only visit. Shirley Joshi recalls: 
can remember the press camped out in our front garden because there were 
visitors from Black Power organisations ... One was carrying a gUn! 944 Joshi and 
the IWA (GB) also had a close relationship with British Black Power groups. 
'Toward the end of the 1960s leading members of the IWA talked about 
themselves as black and made those connections with the progressive elements of 
the Black Power movement', recalls Shirley Joshi! 5 The connections were not just 
at the level of leaders. Rank and file IWA (GB) members - sometimes in their 
thousands - regularly constituted the majority of marchers on demonstrations 
organised by Black Power groups, just as they had for more moderate 
organisations in the 1960s. After a BPA demonstration in 1969, Earl Corlis, leader 
of BRAK made an appeal 'to my African and West Indian brothers and sisters', 
that, 'in future we hope to see more of Lyou] on the street demonstrating and not to 
depend on our Asian brothers and sisters and our white liberal friends'. 46 The 
following March, when another BPA-organised demonstration outside the 
American embassy in London, against the prosecution of American Black Panther 
43 MS 2141/2: 'Report of the General Secretary presented by J. Joshl at the National Conference of 
the IWA (GB), 7/1 InO-811 InO, in Nottingham', p. 18. Held in the IWA archive in Birmingham 
Central Library. 
44 Shirley Joshi, interviewed by the author, 2 November 2004. 
43 lbidL 
" Earl Corlis, The Black Peoples [sic] Alliance. Report of meeting, The Black Ram 1: 3 (15 
February 1969), p. 4. 
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chairman Bobby Seale, resulted in several protesters being arrested, the IWA (GB) 
took a leading role in a solidarty protest outside the embassy the following week. 
Joshi explained that they were protesting, 'Not only at racism in the US and in 
particular the treatment of Bobby Seale, but also at the disgraceful behaviour of the 
47 police towards black workers in Britain'. The IWA(GB) was not the only Asian 
organisation to become directly involved in the Black Power movement. The 
London-based, revolutionary Pakistan Progressive Party (PPP) gave the Universal 
Coloured People's Association (UCPA) and its successor the BUR material help 
such as printing its leaflets and the Pakistani Workers' Union (PWU) also 
collaborated with the UCPA and the BUFP. 48 
Other Asian groups that did not see the relevance of the Black Power 
movement to their members, unintentionally promoted behaviour compatible with 
its principles. 'The Black Power concept is seen to have two basic elements: racial 
and cultural pride and integrity-, and racial or ethnic self-help', wrote Hiro in 1971. 
'In that context many Asian settlers show a remarkable (albeit unrecognised) 
rapport with it'! 9 One of the most frequent complaints about Asian immigrants 
made by white Britons was that they did not try to integrate; that is they continued 
to dress distinctively, eat exotic food and speak foreign languages. This was 
exactly the effect the British Black Power movement was trying to manufacture by 
the adoption of African dress, the opening of soul food restaurants like the Back-a- 
Yard and the Mangrove caf6s in Notting Hill and the use of Jamaican patois and 
African American slang. 
47 MS 2141/2: 'Report of the General Secretary presented by J. Joshi at the National Conference of 
the IWA (GB), 7/lino-sh ino, in Nottingham, p. 22. Held in the IWA archive in Birmingham Central Library. 
" The front page of the first edition of UCPA newspaper Black Power Speaks, for example, 
declared it was 'Produced by P. P. P. ', and other UCPA and BUFP documents, such as flyers for 
meetings, held at the IRR bear the initials of both the PPP and the PWU. 
49 Hiro, Black British, p. 148. 
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Asians' deep religious commitments could also be a source of strength and 
cohesion in secular activities. Sikh gurdwaras, Muslim mosques and Hindu 
temples provided public spaces where black people could gather privately, out of 
sight and hearing of white society, just as many African American churches in the 
Deep South had done during the civil rights movement. Shirley Joshi says that 
IWA members received a great deal of support from Birmingham's gurdwaras. 
'They'd pay for coaches down to demonstrations, provide food for people on the 
demos and give a platform to people', she remembers. 50 Gurdwaras and mosques 
also took collections for striking Asian workers who were not unionised or whose 
union was not supporting their action. These religious institutions did not instigate 
campaigns against racial discrimination, but neither did they refim to participate in 
them. Even when strict codes of behaviour, dress and decorum were traversed, 
such as by Indian women strikers during the Grunwick dispute, religious bodies 
often continued to give them their moral backing and material support. 
By the late 1960s the popular perception of Asian people as meek and 
submissive was increasingly resulting in Asian men being targeted for violence by 
white skinhead gangs. 'Paki-bashing' was reported as a new phenomenon in 
British newspapers after a spate of attacks on Asian hospital workers and the fatal 
stabbing of kitchen porter Tosir Ali in East London in the first week of April 1970, 
but in fact anti-Asian violence was not new. During the 1958 Notting Hill and 
Nottingham riots, which took place before wide-scale immigration from India and 
Pakistan had started, the tiny Sikh population of the St Ann's district of 
Nottingham was targeted by local teddy boys. The Indian community responded by 
founding a branch of the IWA in Nottingham at the end of 1958, but they did not 
" Shirley JoshL interviewed by the author, 2 November 2004. 
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physically fight back, unlike many West Indians had in Notting Hill. West Indians 
were seen as likely to defend themselves if attacked, an impression reinforced, 
after 1967, by the advent of Black Power. Violent white bigots, therefore, 
increasingly chose to target Asians instead. 
Young white racists also felt themselves antagonised by Asians' cultural 
differences in a way they were not by the younger generation of West Indians who 
were much more British in outlook. in March 1970 a World In Action 
documentary about the relationship between white and black youths in the East 
End of London was aired on television. It contained interviews with various young 
white men. Explaining why he got on better with West Indians, one said, 'They're 
just like other English blokes, you can talk to them, you look at the way they dress, 
there's things about them you can learn'. 51 Asked why 'white toughs' did not 
target West Indians, another replied, 'Because they'd get a right tasty beating ... 
[T1he white boys are going to pick on the Pakistanis because they know the 
Jamaican boy is going to fight back. That's why they pick on the Pakistanis, 
because they know they're the weakest race'. 52 
In 1967, a spate of assaults on Pakistanis in the King's Cross area of 
London prompted the Pakistani Workers' Union to set up defence patrols and 
publish A Memorandum Concerning Attacks on Pakistani People in London. 53 The 
patrols quickly put an end to the attacks in King's Cross, but political 
developments at the end of the 1960s both alienated Asians from white society and 
increased their chances of being physically assaulted by white people. Such 
developments included the scaremongering that preceded the passage of the 1968 
'11 Transcript of World In Action, 'Trouble Down East', broadcast on ITV on 9 March 1970, p. 23. 
Held at the MR. 
32 Ibid., p. 23. 
53 pakiStani WolrkerSs Union, A MeMorandUM Concerning Attacks on Pakistani People in London 
(London. 1967). 
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Commonwealth Immigrants Act, Enoch Powell's inflammatory speeches on 
immigration from April 1968 onwards, and the rising popularity of far right groups 
like the newly created National Front. 54 The most important factor in the rise of 
violence against Asians during this period, however, was the police's apparent 
unwillingness or inability to catch Asians' assailants. 55 'Many Asian women I 
spoke to told me that for protection from racial attacks it was essential to have 
Asian neighbours', recorded Amrit Wilson in 1978. 'Calling the police had proved 
again and again to be useless'. 56 This reticence on the part of the police meant that 
white racists felt they could attack Asians without fear of arrest or prosecution. 
Conversely, many Asians felt there was little point in even reporting attacks as the 
police would either do nothing or, worse, arrest them for having been involved in a 
fight. The relationship between the police and the Asian communities was further 
strained by the use of police to break up pickets during strikes and to track down 
illegal Immigrants. The 1971 Immigration Act charged police with the latter 
responsibility and although it was promised that they would not do this by means 
of 'fishing raids', after 1972 impromptu invasions of workplaces and homes 
became a feared and unpleasant part of many Asians' lives. The Metropolitan 
Police's newly formed Immigration Intelligence Unit, which masterminded the 
searches for illegal immigrants in the capital, quickly came to occupy a similar 
level of notoriety among Asian communities as the Special Patrol Groups did in 
West Indian neighbourhoods. 
After 1970, therefore, Asians were being forced to take a position on two 
issues that had been affecting West Indian and African immigrants since the 1950s: 
"4 Ile National Front was a coalition of the League of Finpire Loyalists, the British National Party 
and a section of the Racial Preservation Society. 
53 For numerous examples see L. London, 'The East End of London: Paki-Bashing in 1970', Race 
Todcoý 5: 11 (1973), pp. 337-41. 
'ý6 A. Wilson, Finding a Voice. - Asian Women in Britain (London, 1978), p. 19. 
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anti-black violence by white people and racism in the police force. The response of 
some Asian groups was in every way as militant as that of the Black Panther 
Movement or the Racial Adjustment Action Society: vigilante groups were formed, 
retaliatory violence was promised and the police were condemned. The IWA (GB), 
for example, publicly expressed its disillusionment with the police and its support 
for the use of violence in self-defence at its annual conference in November 1970. 
'The black community have [sic] little faith in the processes of law in Britain. They 
have fi-equently found themselves at the end of discriminatory behaviour by the 
police', explained Joshi. 57 
But the black workers are now standing up to defend themselves. When the 
recent wave of skin-head attacks began the Indian Workers' Association 
immediately called upon its members in all cities and towns to take whatever 
measures were necessary, including the formation of self-defence 
committees to protect Indian lives and property. The Central Executive 
Committee of the Indian Workers' Association also promised financial help 
to Indians involved in court cases arising out of their self-defence. The 
response was immediate and as a result the skin-heads have been silenced in 
the majority of towns where Indian workers live. 58 
This statement represented a significant change from the IWA (GB)'s position in 
1966, and makes it clear how disillusioned with the police the organisation had 
become in the intervening four years. Reporting the IWA's response to the violent 
harassment of a Smethwick member by local whites, the 1966 executive committee 
report recorded that, 'A letter was sent to the police and the Watch Committee in 
which the IWA demanded the protection of the racial minorities by the law of the 
country. It further stated that if adequate protection was not given then the racial 
minorities would set up vigilante committees in different areas to protect their 
57 MS 2141/2: 'Report of the General Secretary presented by J. Joshi at the National Conference of 
the IWA (GB), 711lnO-Sllino,, pp. 21-22. Held in the IWA archive in Birrningham Central Library. 
" lbid, p. 22. 
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communities'. 59 The threat of the local community taking the law into its own 
hands appears to have galvanised the police into action. 'After this the police 
increased its [sic] patrol and the attackers who were at large for two weeks were 
arrested in 24 hours', the report notedýo Although the IWA (GB) was willing to 
bypass the police and resort to self-defence as early as 1966, by 1970 it had given 
up on the idea of petitioning the police to uphold the law and assumed that Asians 
would be prosecuted for defending themselves. 
Jagrnohan Joshi's views on police racism in 1970 were not representative of 
those of most Asians. A Runnymede Trust survey of young immigrants' attitudes 
in 1971 showed that 66 per cent of young Indians and 75 per cent of young 
Pakistanis agreed with the statement that the police dealt fairly with their ethnic 
group. 61 The same survey noted, however, that of the young Asians and West 
Indians it interviewed, 'The most militant have had most encounters of an 
unpleasant kind with the police'. 62 Events such as the widely publicised case of 
Satnam. Singh Kane were very damaging to the police's reputation. Nineteen-year- 
old Indian Kane was arrested in March 1973 and confessed in Southall police 
station to stealing f. 50 from his employers, an Ealing petrol station. In court he 
changed his plea to not guilty and said he had been beaten and threatened into 
confessing, and when the missing money was subsequently found by his 
employers, Kane's case was thrown out and an inquiry ordered into how he had 
" 'Indian Workers Association Great Britain, Birmingham Branch. Report of the Executive 
Committee, from V May 1963 to V April 1966', p. 2. Document held in IWA archive at 
B irminghain Central Library. 
` Ibid, p. 2. 
61 Evans, Young Immigrants, p. 28. 
'62 lbid, p. 27. 
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been persuaded to plead guilty. In October 1973, however, an internal 
Metropolitan Police inquiry cleared all the officers involved of wrong-doing. 63 
By 1976, in Southall at least, the cumulative experience of white racism and 
cases such as Kane's had caused a sea change in young Asians' attitudes. The 
catalyst for a new wave of more radical, direct action organisations, was the 
murder of another Indian teenager, Gurdip Singh Chaggar, outside the IWA-owned 
Dominion cinema, by a gang of white youths on 4 June 1976 and the police 
response to it. When Metropolitan Police Commissioner Robert Mark publicly 
discounted racism as a possible motive for the murder, young Asians in Southall 
took to the streets in protest, clashing violently with the police. Ignoring the wishes 
of the IWA Southall, which did not support direct action, the youths marched on 
the local police station and staged a sit-in, demanding (and securing) the release of 
two Asians who had been arrested during the protests. The next day, at a meeting 
at the Dominion cinema, the Southall Youth Movement was formed. 64 
Taking as its logo a clenched, black-gloved fist, the Southall Youth 
Movement instantly paid homage to the American Black Panther Party (BPP). 
Future Asian Youth Movements (AYMs) followed the blueprint of the BPP more 
deeply. 'If you consider how the Black Panther Party emerges, AYM was very 
similar', explained a Birmingham organiser. 'We also adopted many of the rules 
of the panthers'. 65 The SYM also drew on the radical black politics of the British 
Black Power movement, particularly in its appeal to Asians on secular, inclusive 
grounds. '[T]he Asian Youth Movements of the 1970s and 1980s were powerfid 
examples of political movements that were influenced by black politics', wrote 
63 See L Mackie, 'No charges over "confessioe', The Guardian, 8 October 1973. 
" Details of the formation of the Southall Youth Movement taken from CARF/Southall Rights, 
Southall., the Birth ofa Black Community (London, 198 1), p. 5 1. 
" Birmingham AYM member Bhopinder Bassi quoted in Ramamurthy, 'The Politics', p. 45. 
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Asian historian Anandi Ramamurthy. 'For the AYMs the term "black! ' denoted a 
political allegiance between those of African and Asian origin, without denying the 
specific cultural differences of each group'. 66 This political definition of black was 
a direct legacy of Britain's Black Power movement. It was not surprising that the 
AYMs replicated, in places, the ideology of Black Power, because their formation 
was a response to the same conditions that inspired the creation of those militant 
organisations in the 1960s. 'The death of Chaggar may have been the incident that 
spurred the Asian youth into organising themselves', concluded the Campaign 
Against Racism and Fascism (CARF), 'but the basis of their militancy was the 
racism that they experienced at school, in the streets and in the search for jobs'. 67 
Their specific experiences of British racism dictated the focus of the AYMs' direct 
actions. Hence, according to Ramarnurthy, 'The SYM tackled head-on what young 
Asians perceived as two central issues: popular racism and police racism'. 69 
Almost nine years to the day after the fust Black Power organisation was formed, 
Asian youth began to fan the embers of radical black politics and vowed to remain 
'here to stay, here to figh09 
Asian workers and the trade union movement 
Asians took the lead in industrial militancy among black workers from the mid- 
1960s onwards and were the driving force behind their struggle to participate in the 
trade union movement. Although the ultimate goal of most striking Asian workers 
was integration into the mainstream economy, to achieve this they had to first 
tackle the racism of the trade unions, employers and the state. 'Indians cannot 
"Ibid., p. 39. 67 CARF/Southall Rights, Southall, p. 54. 
" Ramamurthy, The Politics, p. 42. 
69 'Here to stay, here to fightl' was a popular slogan of the AYMs. 
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afford to wait for the white workers to come out and defend their interests', 
explained the 1968 IWA (GB) pamphlet, 'Indian Workers, British Industry and the 
Trade Unions'. 70 The affival of middle-class Asians, with higher expectations, 
from the East African countries of Kenya and Uganda in the late 1960s and early 
1970s reinforced their efforts. 'At the bottom of the hierarchy of the production 
structure where spirits are assumed to be crushed, have come a new army of 
workers - fresh, vivacious and increasingly angry', wrote Amrit Wilson of the 
impact of (female) East African Asian workers on industrial militancy in Britain. 
'Their expectations are high because many of them have, until recently had a 
middle-class life and outlook ... and because, unlike the British working class, 
they have not been ground down and prepared for their jobs by the British 
education system'. 71 In August 1976, a pivotal strike was initiated by Jayaben 
Desai, a Ugandan Asian female worker at the Grunwick film-processing factory in 
North West London. The Grunwick dispute marked a turning point in the trade 
union movement's attitude to black workers and obliterated the image of Asian 
women as submissive and downtrodden. Asian women had initiated industrial 
action before, however, as early as 1967, when forty female cleaners working at 
Heathrow airport struck over low pay. Inexperienced, lacking good English and ill- 
supported by their union (the TGWU), their protest simply resulted in all forty 
72 being summarily sacked. 
Hailing from countries with strong ft-aditions of trade unionism and 
successful strike action, Caribbean, African and Asian immigrants made joining a 
trade union a priority as soon as they secured jobs in Britain. A government survey 
70 IWA (GB), 'Indian Workers, British Industry and the Trade Unions' (1968), p. 9. 
71 Amrit Wilson quoted in H. Mirza (ed. ), Black British Feminism: a Reader (London, 1997), p. 3 1. 72 See letter from Ealing Community Relations Council to A. Wallis Johnson of the Joseph 
Rowntree Trust 14 March 1973, p. 2. Held in the Black documents file at the IRP- 
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from 1976 showed that the incidence of trade union membership among black 
male workers was consistently higher than that of their white counteqmrts, and that 
union membership among white and black women was roughly equal. 'Among 
men from minority groups who are in employment', stated the report, '61 per cent 
are members of a trade union, compared with 41 per cent of white men'. 73 Even 
very recent black male immigrants, it showed, were as likely to be union members 
as white workers. 74 These black workers soon found, however, that even when they 
joined a union, active membership was discouraged and their grievances were 
ignored. The same 1976 survey that recorded black workers' enthusiasm for trade 
unionism also noted that union leaders, 'had not generally taken steps to ensure 
that they got to know about cases of discrimination within the union, nor had they 
always taken decisive action to combat discrimination when they had got to know 
about it'. Furthermore, 'Little had been done to induct the new minority 
membership into the history, purposes and practices of the movement'. 75 The IWA 
(GB) had reached the same conclusion at the end of the 1960s. 'In the earlier years 
of this decade the main task of our Organisation has been to organise the Indian 
workers into trade unions and to fight against the discriminatory policies of the 
employers', explained a 1968 pamphlet. 'In the last few years ... Indian workers 
have found it increasingly necessary to also combat the racialist attitudes and 
behaviour of the trade unions'. 76 
Hence black workers often initiated industrial action without going through 
union channels and directed strikes against union racism as much as employer 
discrhnination. Their ability to organise independently was facilitated by 
73 Smith, The Facts, P. 115. 
74 Ibid., p. 117. 
73 Ibid., p. 115. 
76 IWA (GB), 'Indian Workers, British Industry and the Trade Unions' (1968), p. 1. 
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discriminatory hiring practices and the unwillingness of white workers to do the 
lowest paid, most inconvenient and dangerous work, which meant that, although a 
factory's workforce might be racially mixed, black workers were often 
concentrated in certain departments or on specific shifts. This de facto segregation 
of black workers made it easier to discrkninate against them because their 
differential treatment could plausibly be explained in terms of their specific job 
description or shift pattern. On the other hand, it also meant that black workers 
could come together more easily to recognise their grievances and organise 
independently to remedy them. In Divided We Stand: American Workers and the 
Struggle for Black Equality, American historian Bruce Nelson relates the similar 
situation facing African American steelworkers in the 1950s. 77 Noting their 
concentration in the lowest paid and most junior jobs and how the leadership of a 
comparatively progressive industrial union, the United Steel Workers of America 
(USWA), failed to honour its commitment to racial equality in the face of the 
opposition of rdnk and file white members, he concludes that African American 
steelworkers had little choice but to organise separate, racially-defined unions. 
'[11he move toward black self-organisation in the mills and other work-placcs', he 
argues, 4was as inevitable as it was necessary'. 78 In the context of Britain in the 
1970s, however, fortning separate black unions was neither possible nor desirable 
for Asian workers. 
The first nationally significant strike by black workers in Britain took place at 
Courtauld's Red Scar Mill in Preston in May 1965, but industrial action became a 
more urgent battle at the start of the 1970s. This was a result of the slowdown of 
" B. Nelson, Divided We Stand: Black Workers and the Strugglefor Black Equality (Princeton and 
Oxford, 2001). 
73 Ibid, p. 220. 
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the British economy, which disproportionately affected black workers who were 
usually the last hired and first fired, as well as the combined impact of the 
Immigration and Industrial Relations Acts of 1971 and a campaign of shop floor 
recruitment by the National Front, which formed its own Trade Union Association 
in 1973. The combination of the Industrial Relations Act and the Immigration Act 
put black workers in a particularly precarious position. The Industrial Relations 
Act made it illegal for non-registered trade union officials to call spontaneous 
strikes. As unions very rarely took action over black workers' grievances and even 
less often supported their independent protests, this gave them no legal recourse to 
industrial action. Furthermore, as the terms of the 1971 Immigration Act stipulated 
that immigrants without residential status could be deported if they either lost their 
jobs or got into trouble with the police, inunigrants who participated in 
unauthorised strikes risked losing far more than their jobs. 79 Nonetheless, a number 
of strikes after 1971, for example at Crepe Sizes in Nottingham in 1972 and Birmid 
Qualcast in Smethwick in 1973, highlighted the willingness of black workers to 
stand up for their rights. Without the support of their white co-workers and unions, 
however, these strikes almost always failed. 
Tension between militant black activists who wanted separate unions and 
the majority of black workers, who did not, had first arisen during the dispute at 
Courtauld's in 1965. The strike of several hundred Asian and West Indian workers 
over pay rates attracted the attention of the recently formed Racial Adjustment 
Action Society (RAAS), whose leaders Michael X and Roy Sawh sought to make 
political capital out of the dispute. Travelling to Preston, Sawh and Michael X 
spoke at strike meetings, suggesting the idea of separate black unions and 
"'Me 1971 Immigmtion Act came into force on I January 1973. 
246 
Chapter 5: 'Here to stay, here to fightV Asian militancy, Black Power and the trade 
union movement 
highlighting the racial elements of the strikers' grievances. Drawing attention to 
the racial composition of the strikers was a double-edged sword, however, which 
could be used for or against the workers' cause. A BPM pamphlet from May 1971 
noted that the Courtauld workers' legitimate grievance, that their workload had 
been increased without a commensurate pay raise, had been dismissed by their 
union, the TGWU, because most of the striking workers were black. The TGWU, 
therefore, 'stigmatised it as a "racial" strike, the pamphlet reported, 'because, they 
said, only the black workers were involved'. 80 RAAS's presence at strike meetings 
and Michael X's talk of separate black unions helped the TGWU and did not 
reflect the wishes of the strikers, who consistently protested that their grievances 
were economic. Reporting in the Institute of Race Relations Newsletter that both 
Michael X and Roy Sawh 'talked consistently in racial terms about the black man's 
burden and the white exploiter', white socialist Paul Foot noted that, ITbey were 
respected by the strikers for their interest and wish to help but their views did not, 
in general, impress'. 81 
In the early 1970s, many Black Power groups trained their focus on black 
workers. In March 1971, the Black Workers' League (BWL, also known as the 
Black Workers Defence League or BWDL) was formed in London from an 
amalgamation of the Black Power Party, the Caribbean Workers' Union, the 
Committee of Afro-Asian Peoples and the Pakistani Workers Group. 82 In 1973, 
partly to make it more appealing to Asian workers, the Black Panther Movement 
changed its name to the Black Workers Movement (BWM). 'Workers from Asia, 
so BPK The Position of Black People in Britain Today', May 197 1, p. 8. Pamphlet held, unfiled, 
at the IRR. 
81 P. Foot, 'Ile Strike at Courtauld's, 24 May to 12 June 1965', The Institute of Race Relations 
Newsletter supplement (July 1965), p. 4. 
u See 'Black MKTation in Britain: Black Workers' League Manifesto', The Black Liberator 1: 2/3 
(Winter 197 1), pp. 75-9. 
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while marching side by side with us on the immigration issue ... picket lines and in 
the communities against racist attacks, regarded us as an Afro-organisation', 
explained an article on the name change in the BPM's newspaper, 'The Panther 
name seemed to exclude them... '. 93 
Very few British Black Power activists believed it was possible to organise 
jointly on the shop floor with whites, although their reasons for thinking this 
differed greatly. The Black Liberation Front believed that racism was a much 
greater source of oppression than class and therefore collaborations with white 
people, especially the white working class, which it identified as the most racist 
section of society, were ill-advised. 'Nobody can tell a Black worker that he must 
unite with a white worker when all the time the white worker tells him to get back 
to where he came from', thundered a BLF pamphlet from 1971.84 The BLF's 
reasons for not wanting to work with whites did not just have their basis in theory, 
but were a reaction to white working-class and trade union racism. 'Organised, 
militant and so-called progressive workers supported Enoch Powell', its pamphlet 
explained. 85 The Black Unity and Freedom Party (BUFP), on the other hand, 
following a strict Marxist-Uninist philosophy, believed in the primacy of class 
oppression and that it was essential for white and black workers to work together. 
The BUFP concluded, however, that as the white working class had been corrupted 
by the bourgeois belief that their skin colour conferred higher status, it was up to 
black workers alone to take on the role of revolutionary vanguard. I [Tjhe working 
class, has temporarily abandoned its historic mission, explained one BUFP 
document. 'In effect, the working class has joined forces with the ruling class, in 
23 'Black Panther Movement to Black Workers Movement, Freedom News, 9 June 1973, back 
page. 
BLF, Revolutionary Black Nationalism', 197 1, p. 3. Pamphlet held, unfiled, at the IRR. 
lbid, p. I 
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an unholy alliance against the interest of Black peoples'. 86 Nonetheless, the BUFP, 
as a matter of policy, supported all white-led strikes that 'could lessen the 
cont-adictions between Black and white [or] ... could neutralise the more overt 
racist'. 87 
Although the BWM, BUR and BWL tried to support striking black (and 
sometimes white) workers by publicising their strikes and holding support 
meetings, they had virtually no base in the workforce and little or no impact on the 
trade union movement. This would not have worried the BWL, which declared in a 
1971 leaflet that, 'We have no time for trade union or parliamentary forms of 
action'. 88 It did not offer an alternative vision of how black workers could achieve 
their goals outside the trade union movement though. 'We need organisations for 
the politicisation of the mass of black workers', it argued, but what these 
organisations might be went unspecified. 89 To the industrial workers in the 
Nfidlands, Yorkshire and Lancashire, who were forcing the trade union movement 
to re-examine its practices in the 1970s, the theoretical exhortations of such 
London groups were irrelevant. 
The issue of separate black unions revealed a fundamental difference in how 
Black Power activists and Asian workers perceived themselves. Asians saw 
themselves as workers first and foremost and had enough faith in the trade union 
system to attempt to reform it from within. When given the genuine backing of 
their union and the support of the trade union movement, as they were during the 
Grunwick strike, Asian members were prepared to work within the trade union 
system. Writing about the Chunwick strikers, A. Sivanandan commented that, 'In 
16 Untitled BUR document, dated 2 May 1%9, heldý unfiled, at the IRR. 
BUT, 'What is the B. U. F. P [sic], 3 May 1974, p. 46. Heldý unfiledý at the IM 
Untitled document by the Black Workers Defence League, dated March 1971, held in the IWA 
archive in Birmingham Central Library, p. 2. 
" IbidL, p. 2. 
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the course of accepting union support, they also accepted the union line ... losing 
in the process the lasting support of the black community'. 90 His interpretation 
that the Grunwick strike was another example of the state co-opting and thus 
subverting a black political struggle would have been contested, however, by strike 
leader Jayaben Desai. She counted Asian workers' incorporation into the trade 
union movement as one of the benefits of the strike. 'This dispute is bringing us so 
many good things, ' she told a journalist in 1977. 'Before the trade unions in this 
country were feeling that our community was not interested ... People coming here 
from all over the country are seeing us as part of the workers now'ý' 
To others, including sociologists Robert Miles and Anne-Marie Phizacklea 
and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), which waged a prolonged 
propaganda war against trade union racism in the 1970s, the universalisation of the 
problems of black workers was a significant victory. To be able to fight 
management simply as workers, rather than as black workers, with the backing of a 
union that provided effective representation to its members regardless of their skin 
colour, was a large part of what the strikers at factories like Mansfield Hosiery 
Mills and Imperial Typewriters had been protesting for. A pamphlet published by 
the IWA (GB) in the late 1960s acknowledged the double discrimination imposed 
on its members by trade union racism but saw their fight as an economic rather 
than a racial one. 'In a number of factories and foundries all over the country', read 
the pamphlet, 'Indian workers have been forced into militant activity to defend 
their interests as workers'ý2 Although more reticent about social integration, 
" A. Sivanandan, From Resistance to Rebellion Asian and Afro-Caribbean Struggles in Britain 
(London, 1986ý p. 144. 
91 B. Campbell and V. Charlton, 'Grunwick women - why they are striking and why their sisters are 
supporting them, Spare Rib, 61 (August 1977). p. 7. 
" IWA, 'Indian workers, British industry and the trade unions', undated, p. 1. Document held, 
unfiled, at the EML Italics added. 
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Asians thought their econonuc interests would be best served as part of an 
integmted workforce. 
The relationship between the TUC, individual trade unions and their black 
members in the post-war period has been the subject of many articles by 
sociologists Phizacklea and Miles and, more recently, Satnam Virdee. At the end 
of the 1970s Miles and Phizacklea published two joint papers, based on previously 
unused records from the TUC's annual congresses, which gave a convincing 
analysis of the changing relationship between the TUC and black workers between 
1954 and 19703 Maldng an important distinction between the attitudes of the 
myriad individual trade unions and the General Council of the TUC, which spoke 
officially for the trade union movement, Miles and Phizacklea showed that, until 
1973, the TUC, while regularly passing resolutions condemning racism, largely 
blamed its existence on the failure of non-white immigrant workers to integrate 
into British society. Bruce Nelson's description of the United Steel Workers of 
Ameri&s 'glacial incrementalism and hollow declaratioýs of good intent', in 
respect of its black members, echoes in the history of the TUC in Britain. 94 Even 
after USWA's leaders had been convinced that they needed to address racial 
inequality within their union, Nelson writes tha4 'they wanted "the Negro" to 
remain orderly, to defer to duly constituted authority and to act in ways that were 
consistent with the USWA's sense of propriety and principle'. 95 In a similar 
fashion, the TUC condemned black workers for not waiting for the backing of their 
R. Miles and A. Phizacklea, The TUC Black Workers and New Commonwealth Immi jo grat P; 
1954-1973, SSRC Working Paper on Ethnic Relations, no. 6 (Bristol University, 1977). R. Miles 
and A. Phizacklea, 'T'he T. U. C. and black workers, 1974-1976', British Journal of industrial 
Relations 16 (1978). These two papers continue to provide the fi-dmework for more recent analyses 
like radical historian Ron RamdiWs The Making of the Black Working Class in Britain (London, 
1987) and Virdee's work in the 1990s. 
Nelson, Divided, p. 186. 
Ibid., p. 244. 
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unions before taking strike action, but at the same time did not recognise white 
working-class racism among its members as a factor contributing to discrimination 
in the workplace, opposed the introduction of racial equality legislation in the field 
of employment and supported immigration control. It recognised black workers as 
having racially specific problems only as far as language and cultural barriers 
prevented them from fully participating in trade union activity and assimilating 
into British life. The TUC, therefore, took a strong stand against racism in 
principle but not in practice - which left black workers with no option but to 
challengeit. 
Both Miles and Phizacklea and Satnain Virdee have singled out the agency 
of black workers as the main factor that caused the TUC to change its policy on 
racism and racial discrimination between 1973 and 1976. Miles and Phizacklea 
pointed particularly to the '[n]umber of industrial disputes which were 
distinguished by ... complaints by black workers of discrimination made against 
trade union officials'. 96 Twenty-five years later Virdee also concluded that 
'[c]ritical were the independent struggles that had been waged by black workers 
for almost a decade prior to the mid-1970s'. 97 The foremost examples of 
independent black strikes given by Miles and Phizacklea were those at the 
Mansfield Hosiery Nfills in March 1973 and at Imperial Typewriters in Leicester in 
May 1974, which both involved accusations of discrimination against the 
96 Miles and Phizacklea, '1974-1976', P. 195. 
97 S. Virdee, 'A Marxist critique of black radical t1mries of tradeurtion racism', Sociology 34 
(2000), p. 558. 
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employers and the unions supposed to be representing the workersý8 Other factors, 
such as trade unionists' unease over far-right groups targeting their unions for 
recruitment, ftom 1973, put increasing pressure on the TUC to actively campaign 
against racism in the trade union movement and beyond, but it was the militant 
agency of Asian workers that fmally tipped the balance. The strike at Grunwick, 
which lasted for two years, demonstrated powerfidly how much greater the impact 
of industrial action by Asian workers could be when it was supported, not only by 
their own union, but also the entire trade union movement. Although ultimately it 
failed, this was - for the first time - not because the trade union movement had 
withheld its support for the industrial action of black workers. The Asian, mainly 
female employees lost their struggle against the management at Grunwick because 
of a combination of the extraordinary intransigence of company director George 
Ward who refused to accept the conciliation of industrial arbitrators ACAS, the 
interference of the hard right Conservative anti-union organisation the National 
Association for Freedom (NAFF), and the weakened position of trade unions 
operating under the Labour government's Social Contract in a time of high 
" See ibid, p. 200. The Mansfield Hosiery Mills strike started after a finding by the East Midlands 
Conciliation Committee that both the employer and the National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear 
Worken (NUHKW) had discriminated Against Asian employees when deciding whom to promote 
to the better-paid knitters' jobs. Although both promised to stop discriminating, when Asian 
workers struck on the matter the NUHKW was reluctant to give them strike pay and refused to ask 
white workers to join the strike. The Imperial Typewriters dispute was started by Asian workers 
unhappy over bonuses and work rates set by the management and the disproportionately small 
number of Asian shop stewards taken on by their union, the Transport and General Workers, Union 
(TGWU). The Asian workers felt that the TGWU stewards were making deals on work conditions 
with management without consulting their Asian members who constituted much more than half the 
workforce. 
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unemployment. r In doing so, however, they overturned the expectation, both 
within their own communities and wider society, that Asian women would be 
submissive and easily cowed. Most crucially, though, they brought the whole trade 
union movement out in support of black workers' equal right to join and be 
protected by a union. This represented a significant break with the past. 
Conclusion 
Although the overwhelming majority of Asian people in Britain were neither 
interested in nor affected by the Black Power movement, in various ways their 
lifestyles fitted with its credo. Asian immigrants' commitment to upholding their 
traditions, languages and cultures in Britain, made them inadvertent cultural 
nationalists. By challenging racial discrimination in the workplace and the trade 
union movement they fiffilled aspects of the vanguard role prescribed for black 
workers by the Black Power movement's Marxist philosophies. A small number of 
Asians participated directly in the Black Power movement during the 1960s, most 
notably Ajoy Ghose, Roy Sawh and Tony Soares, who between them held 
leadership positions in several organisations. There was a symbiotic, if 
intermittent, linkage between Asian organisations; like Jagmohan Joshi's IWA 
(GB) Birmingham and Black Power groups, with the foirmer donating manpower to 
Black Power marches and the latter supporting the industrial action of Asian 
workers. When the new generation of young Asians who had been bom or 
" The Social Cont-dct was drawn up between the new 1AVur government and the TUC in 1974 
during a time of massive industrial unrest. In return for promising to increase spending on social 
services such as housing and schools and replacing the Conservative party's hated 1971 Industrial 
Relations Act with a number of new laws that protected various workers' and union rights, the TUC 
agreed to accept caps on wages and to exhaust government conciliation procedures before 
beginning industrial action. Black workers were a fly in the ointment of this deal between the 
government and the trade union movement because, as they did not feel they were f, *Iy 
represented by their unions, there was little incentive for them to cooperate with the trade unions, 
agreement not to call wildcat strikes. 
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educated in Britain decided to break with their parents' political forms and create 
their own Youth Movements, their choice of self-presentation and organisational 
structure showed clear influences from both the British and American Black Power 
movements. 
Ultimately, however, the Asian workers who challenged discriminatory 
trade unionists and exploitative bosses were not seeking the revolutionary 
overthrow of Britain's economic system that Black Power activists advocated. 
Asians fought to be treated equally in the workplace largely because mcial 
discrimination hampered them from pursuing conventional goals of economic 
advancement. When the trade union movement finally overturned decades of 
neglect of its non-white members in 1976 to come out in support of striking Asian 
workers during the Grunwick dispute, those workers readily allowed themselves to 
be subsumed into a broader trade union campaign. Having demonstrated their 
collective strength and determination during a decade of unofficial industrial 
action, after 1976 Asian workers and their communities finally began to move 
towards their goal, not of overthrowing the system, but of integrating into it. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has explored a facet of recent British history that has not previously 
been given serious consideration by historians. The historical myopia that has so 
often obscured not just the contribution of black people to British history but even 
their very presence in the country, has meant that although a sizeable amount has 
been written about the post-war migration of Britain's former colonial subjects to 
the metropole, little of this literature deals with the independent political activity of 
the black immigrants. This thesis has chronicled one of the most militant political 
responses of black immigrants to the racism - individual, institutional and state. 
sanctioned - they encountered in Britain. 
Between 1955, when the government started monitoring immigration from 
the predominantly non-white countries of the New Commonwealth, and 1962, 
when the Commonwealth Immigrants Act imposed immigration control on those 
countries' citizens, the foundations of modem multiracial Britain were laid. 
Working hard to establish themselves financially in Britain and not intending to 
stay, the majority of black immigrants who arrived during that period did not, at 
faA pay much attention to British politics. In 1958, however, white-on-black 
rioting in Nottingham and Notting 11ill exposed the ugly and violent face of white 
British racism, disabusing West Indians in particular of the romantic notion of 
being welcomed to the mother country. More important for the politicisation, of 
black immigrants, however, was the transmigration of British racism from the 
stred to the statute book, a process that began with the Conservative government's 
1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, resurfaced during the general election of 
1964, and was completed when the labour Party tightened immigration control in 
the 1965 White Paper, Immigration From The Commonwealth. Between 1962 and 
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1965, Labour shifted its position from one of outright opposition to immigration 
control, through grudging acceptance, to its active promotion. Although it was the 
Labour government which took the first legislative steps to combat racial 
discrimination with the Race Relations Act of 1965, this did little to lessen black 
people's sense of betrayal. Alienated from mainstream politics, they began to 
realise the need to form their own political organisations. 
The Black Power movement, which started in London in June 1967 and 
reached its peak in the early 1970s, had a greater impact on British society than its 
small membership and short political lifespan suggest. On a micro-level the 
difference that participating in a Black Power group could make to the lives of 
individual members was often tremendous. Former Black Power activists who 
submitted to their organisations' strict codes of discipline and intense programmes 
of study testify to what a transformative experience it was. One of the central 
tenets of Black Power was self-determination: that black people should take 
control of their own lives. On a personal level this encouraged agency and social 
engagement. An impressive number of Black Power activists went on to have 
highly successful careers in academia, the media and local politics, among other 
areas. Even living in an area that contained a Black Power group could have 
material benefits. The movement's emphasis on self-help, self-sufficiency and 
community action resulted in Black Power groups providing nurseries, 
supplementary schools, hostels for the homeless and other social welfare amenities 
in the neighbourhoods in which they were active. 
On a macro-level, Black Power undermined the stigma attached to being 
black by reclaiming the identity and injecting it with a much-needed sense of pride. 
In a time when black immigrants were treated as ipso facto a social problem in 
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Britain, Black Power identified white racism, not black immigration, as the cause 
of racial strife. It encouraged black people to actively assert their equality rather 
than apply to the government for it to be endowedL In the process it contributed to 
the radicalisation of the race relations industry, the white liberal practitioners of 
which started to consider whether their research was in the interests of its black 
subjects. The positive reconfiguration of blackness had a psychological impact on 
black people, but also an important political impact. The re-assertion of a political 
definition of black that encompassed all non-white people who were oppressed by 
white western societies provided a way for the heterogeneous post-war immigrant 
communities in Britain to work together when it was politically expedient to do so. 
Calling oneself black did not mean ignoring the substantial differences between 
Britain's immigrant communities and their multiplicity of ethnic and religious 
identities - one could still be Sikh Indian and 'black". Rather it overlaid these 
personal identities with a common political identity that was used as the basis for 
anti-racism campaigns from the late 1960s onwards. 
Its creation of a black political identity notwithstanding, the Black Power 
movement largely failed to engage the biggest post-war immigrant groups in 
Britain: Indians and Pakistanis. They found many of the movement's concerns 
irrelevant - for example Indian and Pakistani communities had always enjoyed 
strong independent cultures and young Asian men did not face nearly as much 
antagonism from the police in the late 1960s and early 1970s as their West Indian 
counterparts. Asians largely concentrated their political activities on fighting racial 
discrimination in the areas of immigration and trade unionism. Their hard-fought 
battles against economic super-exploitation by their employers and for 
representation by unions that viewed them as a threat to white jobs and were 
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reluctant to support their grievances, eventually paid off during the Grunwick 
strike in 1976. In the same year, the reaction of a younger generation of British- 
born Asians to the murder of an Indian teenager by a white gang and the 
subsequent indifference of the police revealed that Black Power had been more 
influent al on them than their parents. The Southall Youth Movement was the first 
of %%bat would become a national network of Asian Youth Movements which all 
adopted the Black Power logo of the black-gloved, clenched fist. 
The British Black Power movement only had critical mass as a political 
movement for a short time and by the mid-1970s no longer represented the cutting 
edge of black protest. This was due both to the movement's internal weaknesses 
and the substantial rpression visited upon its constituent organisations and 
I by the state. Poor leadership and a lack of ideological focus in the early 
-stages gave way 
in the 1970s to an ever hardening schism. On the one side was 
inflexible Marxism Leninism, which pushed groups' focus away from race in 
favour of class oppression. On the other was cultural nationalism, which eventually 
alienated potential Asian members and gave its members little hope of effecting 
positive political change in white capitalist Britain. The Black Power movement's 
decline was compounded by a sustained and very successful campaign of 
harassment against its activists, by the police and through the courts, often using 
the legislative powers criminalising incitement to racial hatred introduced by the 
1965 Race Relations Act. Black Power activists' habitual use of violent rhetoric 
and calls for revolution and their deliberate identification with the American Black 
Power movement, whose members were armed, did little to assuage the 
goverment's fears. Even so, the state's response was disproportionate to the threat 
presented by Black PoN%-cr -a movement that was never armed and was partly in 
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reaction to successive governments' failure to legislate effectively against racial 
discrimination before 1976 or acknowledge the vindictive and racist behaviour of 
the police towards young black men. Show trials of Black Power activists, such as 
the Mangrove Nine trial in 1971, only served to further convince black people that 
they lived in an unjust, racist state. 
Rather than contributing to the deterioration of the relationship between 
young black men and the police, which finally boiled over into open street battles 
at the 1976 Notting Hill carnival, Black Power had actually provided a constructive 
but militant channel for black fiustration and anger. Its legacy was visible in the 
rise of well-organised defence campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s that highlighted 
the injustices black people faced at all stages of the legal system. Black Power's 
emphases on black self-determination and self-help were also reflected in 
increasing political activity at the community level throughout the 1970s. 
Ultimately, the Black Power movement's most crucial and long-lasting legacy was 
the sense of self-worth it instilled in black people who, rather than keeping their 
heads down or petitioning the state for reform, held their heads high and demanded 
equality as their right. 
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